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Poor inhibitory control is thought to play a key role in Alcohol Use Disorders. However, 
there is an over-simplistic conceptualisation of inhibitory control as a reactive stopping 
response in the literature. This thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between ‘reactive’ 
and ‘proactive’ inhibitory control and alcohol use in non-dependent, heavy drinkers. 
Specifically, to investigate whether exposure to environmental and psychological triggers 
(alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue exposure and exposure to acute stress) lead to short-term 
impairments in reactive and proactive control, and whether these impairments were related to 
increased alcohol-seeking. Lastly, this thesis aimed to explore potential mechanisms which 
may underlie these relationships. These theories are discussed in detail in chapter one, and 
the general methods used throughout the experimental studies in this thesis are described in 
chapter two. 
 In chapter three, both reactive and proactive control were isolated in heavy drinkers 
during inhibitory control tasks, however, there was no association between individual 
differences in proactive or reactive control and individual differences in alcohol use. Chapter 
four then sought to investigate if impairments in inhibitory processes (reactive control, signal 
detection and proactive slowing) fluctuated in response to alcohol-cue exposure (study two) 
and alcohol-intoxication (study three). The results demonstrated that alcohol-cue exposure 
and alcohol intoxication increased ad libitum alcohol consumption, but this was unlikely due 
to impairments in inhibitory processes. 
In chapter five, two online studies demonstrated that individual differences in 
proactive slowing and reactive control were unrelated to individual differences in alcohol 
consumption. I also found limited evidence for mechanisms (Working Memory Capacity, 
alcohol sensitivity) which may underlie effective use of proactive control. Finally, chapter six 
sought to provide both behavioural and neurophysiological evidence to investigate whether 
acute stress impaired inhibitory control processes, in the presence of alcohol-related cues. 
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The results demonstrated that acute stress had limited effects on reactive stopping, and no 
effect on proactive inhibitory processes or the neurophysiological responses of inhibitory 
control. In contrast, alcohol-cue exposure impaired proactive stopping and increased P300 
responses (compared to neutral-cues). However, there was little evidence of a relationship 
between inhibitory processes (or neurophysiological responses) and alcohol consumption, or 
for the suggestion that Working Memory Capacity or alcohol sensitivity may underlie the 
effective use of proactive control. 
The overall results of this thesis suggest that inhibitory control is a multi-component 
process that is comprised of both reactive and proactive control. Specifically, there was 
limited evidence that impairments in these processes fluctuate in response to psychological 
and environmental triggers. Certainly, this thesis failed to find a consistent relationship 
between both reactive and proactive inhibitory processes and alcohol use, contradicting 
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1.1 Alcohol use statistics 
 
Hazardous alcohol consumption is a global risk factor for population health (Global Status 
Report on Alcohol and Health, 2018). The latest report by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) suggests that 2.3 billion people drink alcohol around the world. Certainly, alcohol 
plays a central role in various social occasions and religions, whilst also having medicinal 
purposes in many countries (Hanson, 2013). Specifically in the UK, a recent government 
survey reported that 58% of individuals aged over 16 had consumed alcohol in the preceding 
week, which is equal to 25.6 million adults in England. Importantly, although the majority of 
these adults may not consume alcohol continually at high-risk levels, or indeed be alcohol 
dependent, there is a range of unsafe drinking patterns in the UK and the rest of the world. 
This covers both occasional hazardous (or binge) drinking, and more frequent daily heavy 
drinking, all of which produce significant public health concerns (Statistics on Alcohol, 
England, 2018). Consequently, in the UK there are government guidelines and restrictions in 
place to try and reduce the number and severity of negative consequences experienced by 
individuals, and wider society as a result of alcohol misuse. 
 
1.2 UK Government guidelines  
The Chief Medical Officers’ guidelines recommend that men and women should not drink 
more than 14 units of alcohol per week, in order to reduce potential health risks from 
drinking. These units should also be consumed over at least 3 days to reduce the possibility of 
death from accidents, injuries and sickness. Those who drink excessively or too fast in one 
session, as well as those who drink more than the recommended units, can put themselves at 
increased risk of injury or death, a loss of self-control and a miscalculation of hazardous 
circumstances. Despite this, government statistics reported that in 2016, approximately 11.4 
litres of pure alcohol were consumed per adult (over the age of 15) in the UK that year 
(Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health, 2018). As 10ml of pure alcohol corresponds to 
one UK unit, this is the equivalent of 22 units per week (e.g. approximately 8 pints of beer 
(5.0% ABV) or 11 medium (175 ml) glasses of wine (12% ABV)), which is above the 
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suggested recommendations. Furthermore, a report by Public Health England (Local Alcohol 
Profiles for England: March 2017, 2017) demonstrated that 25.7% of adults in England 
frequently consumed more than the recommended 14 units per week between 2011-2014, 
with 16.5% of adults binge drinking on their heaviest drinking day. Therefore, many 
individuals in the UK are putting themselves at risk of alcohol-related harm. Certainly, there 
are extensive health and socioeconomic consequences of alcohol misuse and dependency, not 
only to the individual but also to the wider community. 
 
1.3 Alcohol-related consequences  
1.3.1 Health consequences 
Firstly, alcohol consumption has been recognised as a contributing factor to at least 200 
health conditions such as heart disease, various cancers and strokes (Rosenberg et al., 2017). 
The latest report from the WHO (Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health, 2018) 
suggests that in 2016, 3 million global fatalities and 132.6 million disability-adjusted life 
years were the product of alcohol-related harm. That is approximately 5.3% of global deaths 
with various alcohol-related causes, such as injuries (28.7%), diseases (digestive 21.3%, 
cardiovascular 19%, infectious 12.9%) and different types of cancers (12.6%). Consequently, 
only smoking and obesity are bigger risk factors for mortality and/or disability. Specifically 
in the UK, there were 5,507 deaths due to alcohol-related harms in 2016 and 337, 000 
alcohol-related hospital admissions in 2016/2017 (Statistics on Alcohol, England, 2018). 
Consequently, the National Health Service (NHS) annually incurs approximately £3.5 billion 
of costs linked to alcohol (Local Health and Care Planning: Menu of preventative 
interventions, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is often the case that co-morbidity of Substance Use Disorders and 
mental health problems occur. According to government statistics published in 2016 (Health 
Matters: Harmful Drinking and Alcohol Dependence, 2016), hazardous drinking or drug use 
was reported in 44% of community mental health patients in the previous 12 months. Suicidal 
behaviour is also a frequent issue amongst those with a diagnosis of alcohol dependence 
(Wojnar et al., 2009). For example, in 45% of mental health patient suicides between 2003-
2013 there was an history of hazardous drinking (National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide 
and Homicide by People with Mental Illness, 2015). Therefore, it is essential to try and 
pinpoint contributing factors to alcohol misuse and dependency, not only to protect 
individuals but also to reduce the burden of alcohol-related costs on the NHS. 
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1.3.2 Socioeconomic consequences and crime 
Alcohol misuse is also related to further significant financial and social costs to society, 
despite increasing in affordability by 64% in the UK since 1980 (Statistics on Alcohol, 
England, 2018). Government statistics suggest that £7 billion in productivity is lost through 
alcohol use, due to illness and unemployment annually, with a seemingly reciprocal 
relationship between unemployment and alcohol consumption (Boden, Lee, Horwood, Grest, 
& McLeod, 2017). Indeed, Substance Use Disorders are suggested to be both a cause and 
consequence of financial stress (Compton, Gfroerer, Conway, & Finger, 2014).  
Alcohol is also suggested to be involved in approximately half of all violent offences 
and 360,000 domestic violence cases in the UK, with £11 billion lost to crime involving 
alcohol in the UK annually (Alcohol units - A brief guide, 2008). Specifically, a UK 
government crime survey (Crime survey for England and Wales, 2013-14) reported that in 
53% of violent crimes in England and Wales, victims believed the offender(s) had consumed 
alcohol. This equates to 704,000 violent cases. In addition, 64% of violent incidents that 
occurred between strangers were alcohol-related, with increasingly severe injuries in these 
cases compared to non-alcohol related incidents. Thus, it is clear that alcohol misuse plays a 
substantial role in socioeconomical costs and crime statistics. 
 
1.4 Alcohol Use Disorder 
The statistics reported so far emphasise the issues associated with harmful drinking in the UK 
and the rest of the world. Regular heavy drinking (>14 units per week) is also suggested to 
increase the risk of developing alcohol dependence, with 80, 000 individuals receiving 
treatment for problematic alcohol use in 2016/17 in England  (Statistics on Alcohol, England, 
2017). In the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
there were significant modifications to the diagnosis of substance (alcohol) dependence 
(Reichenberg, 2013). The manual has now combined the separate categories of alcohol abuse 
and dependence into one specific disorder; Alcohol Use Disorder. This ranges from mild to 
severe and requires two symptoms (from the following 11) to be met in the previous 12 
months in order for a diagnosis to be made. The list of 11 symptoms include: 
1) “Drinks more than intended,  or for longer than intended 
2) Efforts to control or cut back on drinking have been unsuccessful 
3) Large amounts of time are spent obtaining, using or recovering from alcohol 
4) Cravings (the presence of a strong desire to drink) 
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5) Recurrent use resulting in problems at work, home or school 
6) Continued use despite recurrent social or interpersonal problems resulting from 
drinking 
7) Curtailing important activities in favour of alcohol use 
8) Alcohol use despite potentially hazardous outcomes (drinking and driving, for 
example) 
9) Continued alcohol use despite knowledge that alcohol use is causing or exacerbating a 
persistent physical or psychological problem 
10) Tolerance or a need for increased amounts of alcohol 
11) Withdrawal symptoms” 
Furthermore, the severity of diagnosis is based upon the number of symptoms met: 
• “Mild: presence of two to three symptoms 
• Moderate: presence of four to five symptoms 
• Severe: presence of six or more symptoms”  
As discussed, regular heavy drinking (>14 units per week) is suggested to put individuals 
at increasingly higher risk of many health-related, socioeconomic and other negative 
consequences. Therefore, the importance of pinpointing factors that may contribute to heavy 
drinking and the possible development to alcohol dependence cannot be underestimated. The 
identification of these contributing factors may allow valuable interventions to prevent 
recreational alcohol use from developing into harmful levels and dependence. This could 
have positive results for both the individual user and wider society, particularly reducing the 
burden on the NHS from alcohol-related costs. Therefore, to allow an investigation of factors 
which may contribute to the transition from heavy drinking to dependence, the research 
presented in this thesis aimed to recruit individuals who were consuming more than 14 units 
per week (i.e. heavy drinkers), but who had not received a previous or current diagnosis of 
alcohol dependence.  
1.5 Reduced self-control 
Contemporary models of addiction suggest that substance addiction is either a brain disease 
or the product of deep-learning (Lewis, 2017; Volkow, Koob, & McLellan, 2016). The most 
influential of these describe substance addiction through a combination of biological 
processes, social processes (e.g. behavioural models), and/or psychosocial processes (e.g. 
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environmental factors) (Teesson, Hall, Proudfoot, & Degenhardt, 2012; West, 2001). 
However, there is no single widely accepted theory as of yet which acknowledges all of these 
viewpoints/processes.  
Nevertheless, there are some overlapping similarities in models of addiction. Most 
prominently, across these theories an impairment in self-control has been regarded as central 
to substance abuse (Fillmore, 2003). That is, when an individual loses control over drug 
seeking and consumption (Everitt, 2014). Indeed, this ‘loss of control’ over behaviour (often 
also referred to as impaired or reduced control) is viewed as a crucial factor for substance 
addiction (Fillmore, 2003), and is regarded as a key diagnostic criteria for Alcohol Use 
Disorder. As such, a ‘loss of control’ is consistent with at least the second DSM-5 criteria for 
Alcohol Use Disorder described above (i.e. “Efforts to control or cut back on drinking have 
been unsuccessful”), however it overlaps with other criteria too (e.g. “Drinks more than 
intended, or for longer than intended”). Consequently, various explanations of substance 
addiction recognise this ‘loss of control’ in reward-driven substance seeking behaviour.  
 
1.6 Inhibitory control  
1.6.1 Definition 
Inhibitory control (or disinhibition) is defined as the (in)ability to suppress, postpone or alter 
a response that is no longer necessary (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984), and therefore shares 
significant overlap with a ‘loss of control’ and self-regulation (Baumeister, 2014). 
Specifically, Baumeister et al (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994) suggest that 80-90% of 
self-regulation behaviour requires the inhibition of a response. Indeed, without the ability to 
monitor and regulate behaviour, individuals would be incapable of inhibiting and changing 
their behaviour when necessary and instead, would instantly react to the stimuli that 
motivates them most in their surroundings (Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & 
McLaren, 2014). In the context of substance addiction, this could include a failure to resist 
cravings (Baumeister, 2014). As a result, poor inhibitory control has been implicated in the  
development and continuation of substance misuse (e.g. (de Wit, 2009; Fillmore, 2003; 
Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Yucel et al., 2019)), gambling (Billieux et al., 2012; Brevers et 
al., 2012; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van den Brink, 2006), obesity (Lavagnino, 
Arnone, Cao, Soares, & Selvaraj, 2016; Nederkoorn, Smulders, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 
2006; Spitoni et al., 2017), as well as various psychological disorders such as Obsessive-
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Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD: 
(Murphy, 2002; Norman et al., 2019; van Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van den Heuvel, 2014)). 
 Focusing on substance addiction, there are numerous theories which posit 
impairments in inhibitory control as a candidate psychological mechanism. For example, de 
Wit (de Wit, 2009) argues that dimensions of impulsivity (including inhibitory control) are 
both a cause and consequence of substance use. Specifically, that trait impulsivity is a risk 
factor for developing a Substance Use Disorder and failing to abstain in those already with an 
addiction. Furthermore, components of impulsivity (including inhibitory control) are also 
suggested to fluctuate within individuals, and these fluctuations may increase substance use, 
which can be particularly problematic in those trying to abstain. In contrast, the consequences 
of both acute and chronic substance use may also lead to increasingly impulsive behaviour, 
which then may promote further substance use or misuse.  
As a second example, Everrit et al (Everitt et al., 2008) also recognise ‘a loss of 
control’ in their model of drug addiction, which describes the transition from voluntary 
substance use to uncontrollable, habitual use. However, they also specify that this transition 
reflects a shift in neural transmission from the pre-frontal cortex to striatal control over 
substance use behaviour. Contrastingly, other theories focus on impairments in inhibitory 
control in combination with the hyper-valuation of substance cues which result in increased 
substance use or relapse (Volkow, Wang, Tomasi, & Baler, 2013). For example, Goldstein 
and Volkow (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002) propose an integrated model of substance addiction 
(I-RISA: Impaired Response Inhibition and Salience Attribution). They suggest that impaired 
inhibitory control and increased salience to substance cues are the result of activation of 
frontal cortical areas of the brain during substance cravings and intoxication, and deactivation 
of these areas during withdrawal. This therefore reinforces drug-seeking right across the 
addiction lifecycle. Despite their differences, all of these theories, along with Verbruggen et 
al (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014), argue that we must recognise the significance of 
inhibitory control in motivated behaviours, including the use of alcohol and drugs. 
 
1.6.2 Inhibitory control in the laboratory 
The most widely used behavioural measure of inhibitory control is that of response 
inhibition, which can be measured in the laboratory. These terms are used inter-changeably in 
the literature and this thesis. Specifically, there are three main task paradigms used 
throughout the literature to give valid measures of inhibitory control; these are the Stop-
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Signal task (Logan et al., 1984), the Go/No-go task (Newman & Kosson, 1986) and the Anti-
Saccade task (Hallett, 1978). Each of these tasks measure a somewhat different index of 
response inhibition (e.g. motor vs. oculomotor), which are further detailed below. 
Importantly, the focus on response inhibition is key to providing an objective and unbiased 
behavioural measure of inhibitory control as other self-control measures are questionnaire 
based, meaning respondents have to identify their behavioural tendencies and report these, 
which could lead to inaccuracies or biases (Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). Indeed, 
research has demonstrated poor convergent validity between tasks measuring inhibition (e.g. 
Stroop task) and questionnaire measures of self-control (e.g. (Saunders, Milyavskaya, Etz, 
Randles, & Inzlicht, 2018)), and that self-report and behavioural measures of impulsivity are 
distinct and unrelated (Eisenberg et al., 2019; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 
2006). 
 
The Stop-Signal task (Logan et al., 1984) 
One of the most popular measures of response inhibition involves using the Stop-Signal 
paradigm (Logan et al., 1984). During these tasks, participants are required to perform a 
forced-choice reaction time response to certain stimuli (e.g. press the left arrow key if a 
square appears, press the right arrow key if a circle appears as quickly as possible). These are 
referred to as no-signal trials or go-trials, and occur uninterrupted on the majority of trials. 
However, participants are also required to withhold their response on a minority of the trials 
(stop-signal trials). During these trials, a stop-signal is presented in the form usually of an 
auditory tone (e.g. a loud beep) or visual signal (e.g. a red cross), which indicates to the 
participant that they should try to withhold their response on that trial. The most popular 
paradigm used to describe performance during a Stop-Signal task is the independent horse 
race model (Logan et al., 1984). The idea behind this is that there is a race between the 
presentation of the no-signal stimuli (the no-signal process/go process) and the presentation 
of the stop-signal (the stop process). Therefore, on a stop-signal trial, if the stop process is 
completed before the no-signal process, then the response is usually withheld suggesting 
response inhibition is successful. However, if the no-signal process is completed before the 
stop process, then the response is not withheld i.e. response inhibition is not successful 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). During these tasks, the percentage of stop-signal trials is 
usually around 25% to 33% in order to keep the no-signal response dominant (pre-potent), 
however this can be altered to increase or decrease the difficulty of the task. Importantly, 
participants should be informed that they should respond as quickly as possible and not wait 
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for the stop-signal to appear (Verbruggen et al., 2019), as waiting is thought to reduce the 
reliability of the response inhibition measure (discussed below) (Verbruggen, Chambers, & 
Logan, 2013). It is also recommended by Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen et al., 2019) to use a 
tracking procedure to implement stop-signal delays where possible rather than the traditional 
fixed delays (Logan et al., 1984). This refers to the delay between presentation of the target 
stimuli and the stop-signal. When using a tracking procedure, the stop-signal delays are 
adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Therefore, the initial delay 
may be 250 ms, but if a participant failed to inhibit the delay would decrease by 50 ms 
making subsequent inhibition easier. Alternatively, if a participant successfully inhibited, the 
delay would increase by 50 ms making subsequent inhibition more difficult, as the longer the 
delay between the presentation of the stimuli and stop-signal, the harder it is to inhibit 
(Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). The index of response inhibition taken from this task is 
usually the Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT). This refers to the time taken to withhold a 
response following the presentation of a stop-signal (Brevers et al., 2017), which is calculated 
from the probability of withholding a response at various stop-signal delays (Smith, Mattick, 
Jamadar, & Iredale, 2014). These tasks also allow variation in the stimuli used (e.g. neutral or 
arbitrary stimuli vs. substance-related stimuli), although a two-choice response time task is 
suggested to be appropriate for the majority of populations (e.g. discriminating between 
left/right arrows or two pictures) (Verbruggen et al., 2019). However, there is also the 
opportunity to incorporate relevant cues or distractors (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) into the 
background of the task to investigate if these impair performance.  
 
Go/No-Go task (Newman & Kosson, 1986) 
Another popular paradigm used to measure response inhibition is that of Go/No-go tasks 
(Newman & Kosson, 1986). During these, participants are required to respond to the 
presentation of ‘Go’ stimuli (Luijten, Littel, & Franken, 2011). This is usually a motor 
reaction, for example, pressing a certain button on a keyboard (Meule, 2017). Conversely, 
participants have to withhold their response to the ‘No-Go’ stimuli. Typically, ‘Go’ trials are 
presented frequently to participants, whereas the ‘No-Go’ stimuli are presented infrequently 
(Luijten et al., 2011). The idea of this is for the response to ‘Go’ trials to become pre-potent. 
As a result, inhibitory control is inferred from the number or proportion of commission 
errors; this refers to when participants respond to the ‘No-Go’ stimuli. Researchers can also 
calculate response times to ‘Go’ stimuli as well as the number of correct responses to ‘Go’ 
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trials (also known as hits), and the number of incorrect responses where participants fail to 
press the key (omission errors) when ‘Go’ stimuli are presented (Meule, 2017).  
 These tasks can also be modified in similar ways to Stop-Signal tasks. For example, a 
cue to indicate inhibition is more likely on certain trials can be added. Task difficulty can also 
be increased by reducing the proportion of No-go trials or requiring participants to respond to 
Go trials very quickly by providing a target reaction time (Smith et al., 2014). The main 
difference in comparison to a Stop-Signal task is that the no-go signal usually occurs 
concurrently with or in place of the go-signal. However, in a Stop-Signal task the stop-signal 
occurs after the no-signal stimuli has already been presented so that the participant has 
already began selecting and executing their action (Littman & Takacs, 2017; Smith et al., 
2014). This difference has resulted in the suggestion that there are two forms of inhibitory 
control at minimum. These are action restraint, used in Go/No-go tasks whereby the decision 
to inhibit a response is made from the start. The other type is known as action cancellation, 
which is used during Stop-Signal tasks (and Anti-Saccade tasks), as the decision to inhibit a 
response takes place after the pre-potent stimuli is presented (Jones, Di Lemma, et al., 2016; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Furthermore, SSRT cannot be calculated from performance in 
Go/No-go tasks as we are unable to calculate the time needed to inhibit a response (as the 
decision to inhibit is made on initial stimulus presentation). Lastly, in Stop-Signal tasks the 
speed of go and stop responses are thought to be independent (Logan et al., 1984). Therefore, 
slower SSRTs are considered to be impairments in inhibitory control whereas slower go 
responses are considered to be the result of poor attention. Consequently, SSRTs are not 
influenced by the pattern of go responses (Smith et al., 2014). 
 
Anti-Saccade task (Everling & Fischer, 1998) 
Another well-quantified task used to measure inhibitory control is the Anti-Saccade task 
(Everling & Fischer, 1998). This task is used to measure oculomotor inhibition (eye 
movements) (Jones & Field, 2015) rather than manual response inhibition, and is well 
correlated with neurophysiological measures of executive function (Mirsky et al., 2011). In 
this task, participants are typically required to provide an automatic saccade to a target 
stimulus or location (pro-saccade), or a saccade to the opposite stimulus or location (anti-
saccade), which is reflective of inhibition (Campbell, Chambers, Allen, Hedge, & Sumner, 
2017). For example, participants may first be shown an image on either side of the screen. 
Following this, a target stimuli (e.g. an arrow pointing in 1 of 4 directions) is briefly 
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presented for a short time on the opposite side of the screen to which the image was 
presented. Participants are then required to provide a key press to suggest which direction the 
arrow was facing. Therefore, to increase the likelihood of providing a correct response, 
participants are required to try and inhibit their natural response to look at the image first 
presented, as the target stimuli is only presented briefly (Jones & Field, 2015).  
 
1.7 Executive functioning and Impulsivity in substance use 
The ability to carry out and adapt goal-directed behaviour is suggested to be the product of 
executive control (Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). This term refers to a variety of 
higher order cognitive capabilities, for example, planning behaviour, inhibition and decision 
making which enable individuals to self-regulate and control more complex behaviours 
(Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibitory control is therefore regarded as a key executive function as 
the inhibition of an inappropriate response allows the individual time to move towards a more 
appropriate action or behaviour (e.g. individuals may suppress an initial response to think 
about the consequences of their next action or behaviour (Smith et al., 2014)).  
Working memory processes are also thought to support behavioural control and self-
regulation (Fillmore, 2003; Finn, 2002). Working Memory Capacity (WMC) is defined as a 
brain system which allows provisional storage of information that is essential for complex 
cognitive abilities including learning, reasoning and language comprehension (Baddeley, 
1992). Although, some models (e.g. ‘The Unity/Diversity framework’ (Miyake & Friedman, 
2012)) suggest that inhibitory control is subsumed under a common executive function 
variable which represents the ability to maintain task-related information and goals.  
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the same brain mechanisms may underlie the 
etiologies of certain psychiatric disorders and Substance Use Disorders due to observed 
deficits in both inhibition and WMC (Grégoire, Rivalan, Le Moine, & Dellu-Hagedorn, 
2012). Certainly, Finn (Finn, 2002) suggests that individual differences in WMC may 
contribute to impulsivity and the accompanying behavioural issues such as alcohol misuse 
and abuse.   
Contemporary models of addiction suggest that increased impulsivity has a key role 
in alcohol addiction, with impulsivity being regarded as both a determinant and a 
consequence of substance misuse (de Wit, 2009; Weafer, Mitchell, & de Wit, 2014).  
Impulsivity was originally referred to as a quick reaction to stimuli both internally and 
externally without thinking or having any regard for the consequences of actions (Dawe & 
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Loxton, 2004). However, impulsivity now tends to be referred to as multi-dimensional, or an 
umbrella term for traits which capture various aspects of behaviour, for example delay 
discounting, risk-taking and indeed response inhibition (Weafer & Fillmore, 2016). However, 
there is still some disagreement on the best way to conceptualise and measure impulsivity 
(Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2012), with multiple definitions having been 
recommended (Bakhshani, 2014). 
Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that trait impulsivity is associated with 
Alcohol Use Disorders (e.g. (von Diemen, Bassani, Fuchs, Maciel Szobot, & Pechansky, 
2008)) and is a risk factor for hazardous drinking (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012; 
Fernie et al., 2013). These measures of trait impulsivity tend to be questionnaire based (e.g. 
The Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS; (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) see Appendices 1.E), 
and conceptualise impulsivity as a stable trait. However, alcohol intoxication is also 
suggested to cause both acute and chronic fluctuations in components of impulsivity (de Wit, 
2009), and can also influence other executive functions such as decision-making and 
inhibitory control whilst under the influence (Fillmore, 2003; Weafer & Fillmore, 2016). 
Supporting this, it has been suggested there are two independent measures of impulsivity; the 
first is inhibitory control, which as discussed, is most frequently measured by the Stop-Signal 
(Logan et al., 1984) and Go/No Go tasks (Newman & Kosson, 1986), and the second is 
impulsive decision making (also referred to as delay discounting) which is most often 
measured by Delay-Discounting tasks (Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997). This 
concept refers to over-sensitivity to rewards received immediately, and de-valuation of 
delayed rewards (Matta, Gonçalves, & Bizarro, 2012). Both of these components can be 
measured using objective, behavioural tasks rather than questionnaire based measures. 
Importantly, research has supported this distinction (e.g. (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 
2012; Reynolds, Ortengren, et al., 2006)) using Principal Component Analyses to 
demonstrate independent measures of inhibitory control and impulsive decision making, 
across Delay-Discounting tasks and response inhibition tasks. Christiansen et al 
(Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012)  also found a third independent component, which 
represented trait impulsivity (as measured by the BIS), in support of other research 
demonstrating behavioural measures of impulsivity and self-report measures are distinct 
(Eisenberg et al., 2019; Reynolds, Ortengren, et al., 2006). More importantly, each of the 




Similarly, in a review conducted by Bickel et al (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, 
Gatchalian, & McClure, 2012), they separated  the construct of impulsivity into a trait and 
four states, that is attention deficit impulsivity, impulsive choice, disinhibition and reflection 
impulsivity. Each aspect is thought to have its individual psychobiology and etiology 
(Papachristou, Nederkoorn, Corstjens, & Jansen, 2012), and is implicated in substance 
dependence (Weafer & Fillmore, 2016) and other disorders such as Schizophrenia and 
ADHD (Bari & Robbins, 2013). Although, it should be noted that not every behaviour 
considered impulsive is detrimental or harmful, and actually a slight “loss of control” can be 
advantageous in some situations (Bari & Robbins, 2013) (e.g. when a quick decision is 
required in a pressured situation (Herman, Critchley, & Duka, 2018)).  
Importantly, Bickel et al suggested that specific components of executive functions 
are an antipode to components of impulsivity. They argued that behavioural disinhibition (i.e. 
the (in)ability to restrain a behaviour that has already been initiated, often associated with 
impulsive and norm-violating behaviour  (Bogg & Finn, 2010)) is the antipode of behavioural 
inhibition (i.e. an executive function that describes three related processes; (i) inhibition of a 
prepotent response, (ii) withholding an ongoing response to delay the decision to respond and 
(iii) inference control  (Barkley, 1997)). Specifically, Bickel et al (Bickel et al., 2012) argue 
that behavioural disinhibition is implicit in the second process described above. Therefore, 
effective performance on a Stop-Signal task could be taken to represent low impulsivity and 
efficient executive functioning. Conversely, poor performance could represent higher or 
dysfunctional impulsivity and inefficient executive functioning. As such, components of 
executive functioning and impulsivity may operate at opposite ends of an identical scale 
(Bickel et al., 2012). Indeed, if an individual did not experience a strong urge, they would not 
need to inhibit their response, or if the individual had good inhibition, the impulsive 
behaviour would be inhibited (Bari & Robbins, 2013). Supporting evidence for this (e.g. 
(Castro-Meneses, Johnson, & Sowman, 2015)) has demonstrated that individuals with high or 
dysfunctional impulsivity have slower SSRTs compared to individuals with lower 
impulsivity scores. However, there is a lack of overlapping research between these two 
constructs (Bickel et al., 2012) and some of the existing literature has reported “null” findings 




1.8 Development of inhibitory control 
Whilst trait impulsivity is thought to have an innate factor (Kreek, Nielsen, Butelman, & 
LaForge, 2005), or often decrease throughout adulthood (Forrest, Hay, Widdowson, & 
Rocque, 2019), the ability to inhibit incongruous behaviour is thought to develop more 
gradually throughout childhood and into adulthood. Indeed, an understanding of the 
development of inhibitory control is important in the context of substance addiction. This is 
because some evidence suggests that early interventions in those with poor inhibitory control 
could be particularly useful in helping to recognise young individuals who are at risk of 
developing Substance Use Disorders (Moeller et al., 2016). Certainly, most research 
investigating the development of effective inhibition has focused on the transition from 
young children to adolescents (e.g. (Conners, Epstein, Angold, & Klaric, 2003; Tillman, 
Thorell, Brocki, & Bohlin, 2008; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999)). 
These studies tend to demonstrate that behavioural indexes of inhibition improve 
significantly over this period (Petersen, Hoyniak, McQuillan, Bates, & Staples, 2016). For 
example, using a Go/No-Go task, one study (Williams et al., 1999) demonstrated that 
stopping speed became quicker with increasing age during childhood, with little evidence of 
this slowing during adulthood. Another study (Tillman et al., 2008) also demonstrated that 
inhibition developed with age in 4-12 year olds using a Stop-Signal task. This suggested that 
inhibition was improving until a minimum age of 12 years. Other research (e.g. (Luna et al., 
2001)) has suggested that adult-like inhibitory control matures progressively through 
childhood and adolescence,  although the age at which inhibitory control is fully developed 
often depends on task difficulty. For example, on simple inhibitory tasks young children may 
display adult-like inhibition. Whereas, inhibition may gradually develop until adolescence on 
tasks which are more complex and involve the use of other cognitive functions (Petersen et 
al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, the most likely explanation for the slow development of inhibitory 
control is due to the maturation of the brain. Research suggests that the development of the 
Prefrontal Cortex (PFC) underlies the maturation of inhibitory control (Munakata et al., 
2011). For example, research using imaging techniques (e.g. (Casey et al., 1997; Tamm, 
Menon, & Reiss, 2002)) demonstrated that inhibition during a Go/No-Go task correlated with 
increased activation in the PFC. Furthermore, the level of activation was increased in children 
compared to adults which may be as a greater effort is required for children to inhibit their 
responses. Another study (Durston et al., 2002) reported that brain activity contrasted 
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between children and adults during a Go/No-Go task. Specifically, there was increased 
activation in the parietal and prefrontal regions in children compared to adults. However, 
their results also suggested that the ventral fronto-striatal circuitry may play a role in the 
development of inhibition in children between 6-10 years old. Luna et al (Luna et al., 2001) 
also investigated this in 8-30 year olds. They demonstrated that activation of the PFC was 
increased in adolescents compared to adults or younger children. There was also 
progressively increasing activation in frontal, thalamic, striatal and parietal regions of the 
brain from children to adults. They suggested that the maturation of these brain areas 
underlies the improvement of inhibitory control, which may not be entirely developed until 
adulthood. 
 However, Aron et al (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003) 
comment that it is difficult to specifically locate the areas responsible for executive functions 
in the PFC. They compared healthy controls to individuals with a right Inferior frontal cortex 
(rIFG) lesion and found this area to be key in relation to inhibitory control. Other research 
using Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal tasks has supported the function of the rIFG in inhibition 
(e.g. (Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & 
Taylor, 2003), as has a review of the literature (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014).  
 
1.9 Inhibitory control in substance use  
1.9.1 Alcohol-dependent patients 
Importantly, much research using Stop-Signal and/or Go/No-go tasks has demonstrated 
poorer inhibitory control in those with an alcohol dependency, compared to healthy controls 
(Goudriaan et al., 2006; Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009; Zago-Gomes 
Mda & Nakamura-Palacios, 2009). This evidence is supported by meta-analyses which show 
inhibitory control is impaired in alcohol dependent patients and heavy drinkers compared to 
healthy controls (Smith et al., 2014), and that the broader construct of impulsivity is a robust 
characteristic in individuals who are dependent on alcohol or other stimulants and opiates 
(Verdejo-García, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008). Poor inhibitory control has also been related to 
cigarette dependency (Billieux et al., 2010), and has been demonstrated in cocaine (Fillmore 
& Rush, 2002) and methamphetamine (Monterosso, Aron, Cordova, Xu, & London, 2005) 
users compared to control groups. However, there are some studies which have reported no 
differences between healthy controls and those with a current diagnosis of alcohol 
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dependence (van der Plas, Crone, van den Wildenberg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2009) or a history 
of alcohol dependence (Taylor et al., 2016). 
Despite this, longitudinal evidence suggests that inhibitory control deficits contribute 
to the development of alcohol dependence (e.g. (Fillmore, 2003; Rubio et al., 2008)), 
comorbid drug and alcohol use (Nigg et al., 2006), as well as treatment success (Rupp et al., 
2016). One study (Czapla et al., 2016) also reported that alcohol dependent patients had 
worse inhibitory control than healthy controls and that the likelihood of relapse at a 6-month 
follow up was predicted by individual differences in inhibitory control. Specifically, those 
with the largest impairments in inhibition and a high number of past detoxifications posed the 
biggest risk for relapse. However, it has also been demonstrated that impairments in 
inhibitory control may exist before alcohol use develops (Ersche et al., 2012; Moeller, 
Bederson, Alia-Klein, & Goldstein, 2016), suggesting that they may play a causal role in 
alcohol dependence. Certainly, high levels of impulsivity are said to exist prior to drug use in 
substance dependent populations which increases vulnerability to drug use and dependence. 
However, there is also strong evidence to suggest that the use of alcohol and drugs has an 
effect on both brain structures and functioning in the long-term, which may hide these pre-
existing characteristics (Verdejo-García et al., 2008).  
 
1.9.2 Non-dependent drinkers 
There is also a substantial body of evidence, which indicates that impairments in inhibitory 
control are related to alcohol use in non-dependent drinkers (e.g. (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, 
et al., 2012; Colder & O'Connor, 2002; Houston et al., 2014; Murphy & Garavan, 2011)).  
Certainly, these impairments have been associated with binge drinking (Carbia, Lopez-
Caneda, Corral, & Cadaveira, 2018), ad libitum alcohol consumption in laboratory studies 
(Field & Jones, 2017; Jones, Field, Christiansen, & Stancak, 2013; Weafer & Fillmore, 
2008), as well as the number of intoxication and hangover days in young adults (Paz, Keim, 
& Rosselli, 2016). Longitudinal studies (e.g. (Fernie et al., 2013)) have also reported that 
individual differences in inhibitory control in adolescents predict involvement with alcohol 
after six months. However, there was no evidence that heavy alcohol use worsened inhibitory 
control in these adolescents. Furthermore, Hu et al (Hu, Zhang, Chao, Krystal, & Li, 2016) 
reported that higher scores on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) were 
associated with worse response inhibition during a Stop-Signal task in social drinkers. 
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However, this correlation was only moderate (r=.38) and there was no difference in response 
inhibition between these individuals and those who reported abstinence from alcohol.  
As such, a meta-analyses by Smith et al (Smith et al., 2014) suggested that although 
deficits in inhibitory control are evident in heavy drinkers, these deficits were less evident 
compared to those in dependent drinkers. Certainly, it should be noted that there are 
numerous studies which have failed to find a relationship between individual differences in 
inhibitory control and alcohol consumption (e.g. (Fernie, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2010)). For 
example, one study (Bø & Landro, 2017) reported the opposite relationship to what was 
expected i.e. weekly alcohol use was related to better inhibitory control (compared to alcohol 
abstinence) in a sample of the general public. This could suggest that the relationship 
between impairments in inhibitory control and alcohol use is restricted to certain populations 
or a specific developmental phase, as the majority of research focuses on heavy drinking 
university students or young adults.  However, the sample in this study generally displayed 
between low and moderate levels of drinking which could also explain the results. 
Nevertheless, other studies have also demonstrated very little evidence of inhibitory control 
deficits in heavy drinkers (e.g. (Bednarski et al., 2012; Franken, Luijten, van der Veen, & van 
Strien, 2017; Nederkoorn, Baltus, Guerrieri, & Wiers, 2009)),  or binge drinkers (e.g. (Czapla 
et al., 2015; Moreno et al., 2012)) compared to controls. Although Czapla et al (Czapla et al., 
2015) did report that binge drinking was associated with increased commission errors during 
a Go/No-Go task.  
 
1.9.3 Neurophysiological evidence  
Regardless, as well as the behavioural evidence there is also neurophysiological research 
which has investigated the relationship between alcohol use and inhibitory control in both 
non-dependent and dependent drinkers. This offers a more sensitive measure than 
behavioural data (e.g. reaction times, accuracy), which can be volatile in nature and 
influenced by a variety of factors (e,g. hardware delays (Woods, Wyma, Yund, Herron, & 
Reed, 2015) or past experience of similar tasks (Wong, Goldsmith, Forrence, Haith, & 
Krakauer, 2017)). The majority of this research focuses on two event-related potential (ERP) 
components; N200 and P300, which have been associated with two aspects of inhibitory 
control (Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, Pantev, & Huster, 2010; Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, 
Lavallee, Falkenstein, & Herrmann, 2013; Liu et al., 2015). Specifically, the P300 is a 
positive component which peaks at around 300-350ms following a stop-signal (Dimoska, 
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Johnstone, Barry, & Clarke, 2003; Jones, Field, et al., 2013), and is therefore thought to 
represent the final stages of response inhibition (Wessel & Aron, 2015). Whereas,  the N200 
is a negative component which peaks around 200-250ms following presentation of a stop-
signal. However the functional specificity of the N200 component still has a degree of 
uncertainty (Dimoska, Johnstone, & Barry, 2006), with the possibility it is related to response 
conflict or error monitoring (Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; 
Kok, Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). 
Certainly, when response inhibition is successful, the P300 component has been shown to 
consistently increase in amplitude more than when inhibition is unsuccessful, whereas the 
N200 ERP has been shown to have larger amplitudes during failed inhibition (Dimoska et al., 
2003; Jones, Field, et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2004).  
Crucial evidence has also demonstrated reduced P300 amplitudes during response 
inhibition could be a marker for vulnerability to alcohol dependency (Hesselbrock, Begleiter, 
Porjesz, O'Connor, & Bauer, 2001; Kamarajan et al., 2005; Stein, Fey, Koenig, Oehy, & 
Moggi, 2018). For example, one study (Kamarajan et al., 2005) demonstrated that alcohol 
dependent individuals displayed reduced P300 amplitudes and different topography when 
completing a Go/No-go task compared to healthy controls, suggesting that different brain 
areas may have been activated during response inhibition in those dependent on alcohol. 
From this, the authors suggested that reduced P300 amplitudes may serve as an 
endophenotype for Alcohol Use Disorder. Certainly, research has demonstrated that the 
amplitudes of P300 waves are decreased by moderate measures of alcohol during inhibition 
tasks (Bartholow et al., 2003; Easdon, Izenberg, Armilio, Yu, & Alain, 2005), and that these 
amplitudes are related to ad libitum alcohol consumption (Jones, Field, et al., 2013). 
Contrastingly, increased P300 amplitudes during Go/No-go tasks have also been 
reported in binge drinkers (Lopez-Caneda et al., 2012). However, the authors suggested this 
may have been the result of a requirement for increased activation to complete the task in 
binge drinkers (i.e. these participants had to try harder to successfully inhibit), although there 
was no behavioural differences between the groups. Other research has also demonstrated 
decreased N200 amplitudes in alcohol dependent males compared to controls (Pandey et al., 
2012), and similar results have been found for other addictive substances. For example, 
decreased N200 amplitudes during no-go trials have been reported in smokers compared to 
healthy controls, although there were no distinctions between these groups in amplitudes of 
P300 in this study (Luijten et al., 2011). Indeed, there is other contradictory evidence. For 
example, Smith et al (Smith, Iredale, & Mattick, 2016) reported that heavy drinkers showed 
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marginal differences in P300 amplitudes compared to light drinkers, however on closer 
inspection this is non-significant (p=.09). Another study (Oddy & Barry, 2009) demonstrated 
an association between P300 amplitudes on No-Go trials and alcohol consumption. However, 
the heavy and light drinking groups did not significantly differ on task performance. Thus, 
the authors suggested that this did not represent impairments in inhibitory control. 
Consequently, although there is some robust (and longitudinal) behavioural and 
neurophysiological evidence for the relationship between poor inhibitory control and 
hazardous drinking, there are also contradictory findings. Certainly, we cannot infer a causal 
relationship as the majority of research is cross-sectional. As a result, there is controversy in 
whether poor inhibitory control is a determinant or a consequence of substance use or misuse. 
 
1.10 Inhibitory control as a risk factor or consequence of 
substance misuse 
In a review of the literature, Jones et al (Jones, Christiansen, Nederkoorn, Houben, & Field, 
2013) suggest that there are two plausible explanations for the relationship between 
inhibitory control and alcohol use. The first is that the PFC is subjected to neurotoxic effects 
due to chronic substance use, and this may impair inhibitory control. Conversely, the second 
explanation is that poor inhibitory control during adolescence may be a risk factor for 
developing substance use and eventually a Substance Use Disorder (Jones, Christiansen, et 
al., 2013). Indeed, another literature review (Perry & Carroll, 2008) argues that there is 
supporting evidence for both explanations, which are discussed below.  
 
1.10.2 Neurobiological theories: poor inhibitory control as a consequence of chronic 
substance use 
The Incentive Sensitization theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) argues that recurring use of 
substances can lead to abnormalities in the brain reward-related systems that contribute to 
motivated behaviour. These abnormalities can lead to increased salience of drug-related 
stimuli which can increase future substance-seeking, even following periods of abstinence 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2008). Following on from this, Goldstein and Volkow (Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2002)  created their ‘Impaired Response Inhibition and Salience Attribution 
Syndrome of Drug Addiction Model’ (I-RISA). They suggested that the frontal cortex is 
involved in the reinforcement of substance-seeking right across the addiction life-cycle 
including periods of increased craving, intoxication and withdrawal. This is because recurring 
31 
 
exposure to the substance and its associated cues increases salience and alters brain systems 
that control behaviour. This therefore results in increased drug use, including both bingeing 
and relapse.  
Evidence supporting these theories has demonstrated that repeated substance use 
damages brain structures. Indeed, animal studies have shown that following a four day 
ethanol binge paradigm, adolescent and adult rats experience significant brain damage with 
increased damage in the frontal cortical regions in the adolescents (Crews, Braun, Hoplight, 
Switzer III, & Knapp, 2000). Nixon and Crews (Nixon & Crews, 2002) found comparable 
results suggesting both acute and chronic binges of ethanol leads to decreased cell 
proliferation in adult male rats. Similar results have been demonstrated in humans. For 
example, research has demonstrated that heavy non-dependent drinkers posed a higher risk 
for frontal lobe reduction in comparison to abstainers. However, moderate alcohol use was 
not associated with frontal lobe reduction (Kubota et al., 2001). Other research has 
demonstrated that alcohol dependent patients have a damaged PFC (Crews et al., 2004) 
(which as described above is suggested to underlie inhibitory control functioning), decreased 
frontal lobe volumes (Pfefferbaum, Sullivan, Mathalon, & Lim, 1997)  or decreased grey 
matter volumes (van Holst, de Ruiter, van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2012) 
compared to healthy controls.    
Importantly, some evidence suggests the brain atrophy is partially reversible after 
periods of abstinence (Bartsch et al., 2007; Cardenas, Studholme, Gazdzinski, Durazzo, & 
Meyerhoff, 2007; Gazdzinski, Durazzo, & Meyerhoff, 2005). Certainly, Mann et al (Mann et 
al., 2005) reported that brain volumes increased in alcohol dependent individuals following 
only six weeks of abstinence, however these were still reduced compared to the healthy 
control group. As such, it is still unclear whether the brain can fully recover following long-
term abstinence (Zahr & Pfefferbaum, 2017). Regardless of this, there is evidence that 
substance use may directly lead to impairments in inhibitory control by damaging fontal areas 
of the brain. These impairments may lead to further substance use behaviour. 
 
1.10.3 Longitudinal theories: poor inhibitory control as a risk factor for substance use 
Contrastingly, other research has suggested that impairments in inhibition may exist before 
Substance Use Disorders develop and may actually predict their onset. In support of this, one 
study (Ersche et al., 2012) reported irregularities in fronto-stratial brain areas, which are 
associated with self-control, in both substance addicted individuals and their healthy siblings. 
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Therefore, they suggested that these brain irregularities related to self-control may pre-
dispose individuals to substance addictions. Other longitudinal studies have demonstrated 
that impairments in inhibitory control during adolescence or childhood are a risk factor for 
developing later alcohol problems (Mahmood et al., 2013; Nigg et al., 2006; Tarter, Kirisci, 
Habeych, Reynolds, & Vanyukov, 2004; Wong et al., 2006). For example, one study 
(Squeglia, Jacobus, Nguyen-Louie, & Tapert, 2014) reported that deficits in inhibitory 
control before substance use began (in aged 12-14 year olds) was associated with increased 
alcohol use (measured as number of drinking days and number of drinks per occasion) and 
marijuana use in a follow-up during late adolescence (aged 17-18).  
Comparable results have been reported in adults. For example, Rubio et al (Rubio et 
al., 2008) reported that impaired inhibition predicted the transition from heavy drinking to 
Alcohol Use Disorder at a four year follow-up. Another study of alcohol-dependent patients 
demonstrated that poorer response inhibition during a Go/No-Go task was a risk-factor for 
dropping out of treatments and relapse (Rupp et al., 2016). Therefore, it is possible that poor 
inhibitory control is a vulnerability marker for alcohol misuse later in life. Certainly, there is 
robust, longitudinal support for the relationship between impaired inhibitory control during 
childhood and adolescence and the progression of Substance Use Disorders. 
Nevertheless, some research argues that inhibitory control deficits (and the associated 
fronto-striatal circuit differences) may both precede and occur following excessive substance 
use (Morein-Zamir & Robbins, 2015). Certainly, the notion that inhibitory functions are still 
developing during adolescence may place these individuals at risk for alcohol misuse. 
However, alcohol misuse may also interfere with the development of inhibitory functions 
resulting in reduced control of intake. Furthermore, Perry and Carrol (Perry & Carroll, 2008) 
also suggest an alternative hypothesis that impulsive behaviour is related to substance 
addiction through a third common factor (e.g. sex, environment, reward reactivity). Thus, it is 
only with additional longitudinal studies that we can fully understand the causal relationship 
between inhibitory control and alcohol addiction (López-Caneda, Rodríguez Holguín, 
Cadaveira, Corral, & Doallo, 2013). 
 
1.11 Over-simplification of inhibitory control 
To summarise so far, inhibitory control is implicated as an important construct in alcohol 
misuse and addiction, and there is substantial evidence to support this. However, as described 
above there are also inconsistent results across the literature, with many studies also lacking 
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statistical power (Smith et al., 2014). This is not just the case in the addiction literature, 
Verbruggen and colleagues (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) argue that although 
inhibitory control (and other executive functions) have been the focus of much literature in 
various other disciplines, understanding remains to be inadequate. Consequently, Verbruggen 
et al (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) have developed a theoretical framework which 
aims to look more specifically at the processes involved in response inhibition. Indeed, they 
suggest that researchers often fail to question the mechanistic processes which underlie the 
function they are investigating, and instead state that group differences are the product of 
deficits in “inhibition” or increasingly general terms such as impairments in “executive 
functions.” Therefore, research in this form does not explain which specific underlying 
processes are contributing to group differences and cannot further our understanding.  
 When using Stop-Signal tasks, researchers typically measure differences in SSRT or 
the frequency of errors to operationalise differences between conditions or groups in 
inhibitory control (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Therefore, performance is generally 
ascribed to a single function of inhibitory control. However, reactive stopping involves 
multiple processes that allow an individual to stop successfully, rather than simply the 
duration of the single stopping process (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). To be specific, 
as well as a final motor-related process (the ‘reactive’ act of inhibiting or not), reactive 
stopping involves both perceptual and decisional processes (Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & 
Verbruggen, 2016).To give a real-life example, reactive stopping in a car involves detection 
of a stop-signal (e.g. a pedastrian or object in the road), followed by the selection of an action 
(e.g. press the break pedal) and the execution of an action (e.g. move foot onto the break 
pedal) (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Therefore, by attributing performance on Stop-
Signal tasks (and other task paradigms) to a general inhibitory deficit, rather than 
acknowledging these underlying processes, we are not providing an in depth explanation of 
performance. These processes are described in more detail below. 
 
1.11.1 Signal detection 
In Verbruggen et al’s (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) framework, they suggest that 
signal detection is the first stage of the inhibitory process (e.g. detecting an auditory tone in a 
Stop-Signal task or a red traffic light in the real world). This is an important process as if the 
signal is not detected rapidly enough or detected at all, there can be adverse effects (e.g. 
failing to inhibit in a Stop-Signal task or going through a red light), the severity of which 
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depends on the environmental context. Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 
2014) demonstrated this in a recent study in which participants completed a Stop-Signal task 
which required them to detect a stop-signal presented either centrally in the screen or in the 
periphery of the screen. There were also perceptual distractors presented on some of the 
trials. Importantly, Verbruggen and colleagues demonstrated that the distractors lead to 
impairments in response inhibition, particularly when the stop-signals were presented in the 
periphery of the screen. This suggests that stop-signals are harder to detect when presented 
away from the focus of participants (i.e. in the periphery of the screen) and in the presence of 
distractors, which can have a negative effect on inhibition performance. Therefore, signal 
detection may be essential for effective stopping. 
 This concept also generalises to response inhibition outside of the laboratory. Indeed, 
individuals outside of the laboratory are regularly required to detect inhibitory signals in 
noisy surroundings (e.g. on a busy junction). Thus, the capacity to detect a stop-signal 
amongst other distractors rapidly may be essential in successful and efficient inhibition 
(Verbruggen, McLaren et al., 2014). This also may have particular relevance for substance 
use behaviour. For example if a heavy drinker is intoxicated or in an substance-cue rich 
environment, their selective attention may be directed towards the substance-related cues 
(Field et al., 2016) or impaired due to intoxication (Plawecki, Koskie, Kosobud, Justiss, & 
O'Connor, 2018; Roberts, Miller, Weafer, & Fillmore, 2014). This may make it harder for 
them to detect inhibitory signals (e.g. Others reacting negatively towards them due to signs of 
intoxication such as talking loudly, stumbling) and lead to higher alcohol intake. 
Consequently, Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) argue that at the 
minimum, some variance in inhibitory control is related to the ability to detect inhibitory 
signals in the environment. Yet despite this, group differences in stopping performance are 
generally attributed to the inhibition of motor responses with the influence of signal detection 
regularly overlooked.  
 
1.11.2 Action selection 
Following the detection of a cue or stop-signal is the requirement to select an appropriate 
action (or response) to meet the appropriate goal-directed behaviour (Bender, Filmer, Garner, 
Naughtin, & Dux, 2016; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). The numerous stages of action 
selection have been described by Sequential-Sampling models and according to these, action 
selection depends on the collection of information from the environment until sufficient 
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information is gathered to support the selection of a certain action (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). 
This collection of evidence may be slower amongst noise in the environment (e.g. the 
presence of distractors) or the internal cognitive system (e.g. multiple ongoing processes). 
This may lead to a longer action selection process and therefore slower response times and 
poorer accuracy (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Furthermore as discussed above, 
individuals require the ability to withhold inappropriate actions if they are to prevent 
impulsive actions and follow goal-directed behaviour (Rae, Hughes, Weaver, Anderson, & 
Rowe, 2014). Interestingly, Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) argue that 
comparable stages occur during the withholding of responses to that which are described 
above. Indeed, the preceding context may suggest that an action is unsuitable before the 
response is activated (Rae et al., 2014). 
 
1.11.3 Action execution 
Finally, the chosen action must be performed. This involves the formation of a motor 
sequence to perform the action which may lead to an interval between action selection and 
action execution  (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). As described above, individuals are 
sometimes required to withhold inappropriate actions. Information that a response needs to be 
withheld can occur after an action has already been selected. However, this action can still be 
withheld or adapted (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) (e.g. when a stop-signal is presented in a 
Stop-Signal task instructing the participants to cancel the go-response (Rae et al., 2014)). 
Taking all of this into account, it is clear that multiple processes are involved in successful 
reactive stopping.  
 
1.11.4 Proactive control 
In addition, it has also been suggested that successful inhibition of a response not only 
requires reactive control, but is also the result of preparation through proactive control 
processes (Criaud, Wardak, Ben Hamed, Ballanger, & Boulinguez, 2012). Importantly, the 
three stages described above are suggested to be influenced by these processes as well as 
learning. Verbruggen and colleagues suggest that we must recognise the influence of these 
processes otherwise we risk providing an incomplete model of inhibitory control 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Specifically, 
Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) note that much of the past inhibitory 
control literature focuses on ‘reactive’ inhibitory control (the act of stopping), however we 
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are also able to plan and modify our behaviour proactively. This is also reflected in the Dual 
Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) which argues that inhibitory 
control can be operationalised into reactive control (retrieving contextual information only 
when required in the ‘here and now’) and proactive control (actively maintaining contextual 
information to prepare a response).  
To give a real-world example, if you think about driving a car when you notice 
another vehicle about to pull out into your pathway. You could either prepare yourself to 
perform an emergency stop or avoid preparation and just take note that the vehicle is going to 
pull out. Then when it does pull out, try to stop at the very last moment of opportunity. 
Taking this example, preparation would be safer as otherwise you would have to respond 
very quickly to stop and avoid an accident with the other vehicle (Richmond, Redick, & 
Braver, 2015). Importantly, Aron (Aron, 2011) suggests that ‘proactive’ control may offer a 
more appropriate model of inhibition in substance use behaviours, and other research has 
gone as far to suggest that proactive control is the default mode of inhibitory control (Criaud 
et al., 2012). Theoretically, it seems more plausible that individuals trying to regulate 
substance use would proactively adjust their behaviour over time to control their cravings 
(e.g. preparing to decline an offer for a drink), rather than relying on reactive control as a late 
correction mechanism (e.g. reaching for a bottle then inhibiting) (Braver, 2012; Braver, 
Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009). However, there is a lack of research, which investigates the 
relationship between proactive control and substance misuse.  
Importantly, research using Stop-Signal tasks have recently been adapted to 
disentangle reactive control from proactive control and allow separate measurement. During 
these tasks, participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible rather than waiting for the 
stop-signal to appear (Logan et al., 1984). However, research has demonstrated that 
participants slow down their responses as stop-signal probability increases (Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, Notebaert, & Vandierendonck, 2005; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 
2006). For example, Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014) incorporated a 
block of trials without stop-signals in their Stop-Signal task and investigated whether 
participants responded faster during this block (i.e. where no inhibition was required) 
compared to the blocks which included stop-signals (i.e. where response inhibition was 
required). Results revealed that participants slowed down their responses when inhibition was 
required suggesting they proactively adjusted their behaviour (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). 
This is supported by further research demonstrating that participants prepare themselves to 
detect stop-signals through proactive adjustments of their behaviour (Elchlepp et al., 2016; 
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Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; Zandbelt, Van Buuren, Kahn, & Vink, 2011). Importantly, one 
study, (Hu, Ide, Zhang, Sinha, & Li, 2015) demonstrated that a lower number of alcohol 
dependent patients (compared to controls) slowed down their responses as stop-signal 
probability increased suggesting poorer proactive control, whereas, there was no differences 
in SSRTs.  
Other research has incorporated a stop-signal cue to indicate stop-signal probability 
(e.g. (Brevers et al., 2017; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b)). Here, the index of proactive 
inhibition is measured by the proportion of inhibition errors. Hence, when using either 
adaptation, reactive control is still operationalised as SSRT (outright stopping) but proactive 
control is operationalised as the preparation to stop in the anticipation of stop-signals (Castro-
Meneses et al., 2015). This research, along with other studies (e.g. (Castro-Meneses et al., 
2015; Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010), have also demonstrated how 
increased preparation is association with faster SSRTs, suggesting that preparation has a 
downstream effect on reactive inhibition. This may be because the same inhibition network 
that is activated when reactive stopping is required is pre-activated by proactive adjustments, 
allowing participants to withhold their responses quickly (Castro-Meneses et al., 2015).  
To summarise so far, Verbruggen et al’s (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) 
framework suggests that inhibition can be broken down into three basic processes, that is, 
signal detection, action selection and action execution. These processes are also modulated 
by other processes such as proactive control (i.e. preparation). Therefore, in order to develop 
our understanding and give a more specific explanation of inhibitory control, we should focus 
our research on these underlying processes rather than a general impairment in inhibitory 
control or executive functions. To my knowledge there is a very limited number of studies 
which have investigated the relationship between proactive control and/or signal detection 
and heavy drinking, two processes which may have particular relevance to substance misuse. 
Therefore, a key aim of my thesis was to investigate these relationships. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms underlying the relationships between inhibitory control and hazardous drinking 
are also poorly understood. Below I discuss two potential mechanisms that may underlie the 
preparation of responses (i.e. proactive control) and that could explain individual differences 




1.11.5 Alcohol sensitivity 
Firstly, a low sensitivity (LS) to alcohol is thought to be a risk factor for alcohol misuse and 
dependence (Fleming & Bartholow, 2014; Schuckit & Smith, 2000). This is because 
individuals with a low response to the acute effects of alcohol may consume more alcohol per 
drinking session in order to experience the desired effects (Schuckit et al., 2011). In support 
of this,  a meta-analysis (Quinn & Fromme, 2011) reported that heavy drinkers (compared to 
light drinkers) were less sensitive to the sedating effects of alcohol but more sensitive to the 
stimulating effects of alcohol. Alcohol sensitivity can be measured by the quantity of alcohol 
required to feel its acute effects through a self-report measure (as described in Chapter two 
General Methods) or through measurement of blood alcohol concentration after consuming a 
dose of alcohol (Schuckit et al., 2011). Importantly, research has demonstrated that relatives 
of those with alcohol dependency exhibit significantly lower responses to alcohol compared 
to healthy controls (Kareken et al., 2013; Schuckit et al., 2000). Other evidence has suggested 
that a LS to alcohol partially mediates the association between a family history of alcohol 
dependence and the development of alcohol dependence (Schuckit & Smith, 1996). Indeed, 
in a more recent study (Schuckit & Smith, 2000), these authors reported there was a robust 
association between a low response to alcohol and Alcohol Use Disorders.  
Alongside this, research measuring event-related potentials has shown that alcohol-
related stimuli especially attract the attention of those who self-report LS to alcohol  (e.g. 
(Bartholow, Lust, & Tragesser, 2010; Fleming & Bartholow, 2014)). In one study  (Bailey & 
Bartholow, 2016), university students were required to complete an Alcohol-Stroop task in 
which they completed two blocks; one of which involved  mostly neutral words and one of 
which consisted of mostly alcohol words. Importantly, those with a LS to alcohol were 
slower to respond and more accurate when responding to alcohol words in the mostly neutral 
block, suggesting they were able to utilise reactive control when conflict was occasional (as a 
late correction mechanism). However, these participants were less accurate in the mostly 
alcohol block, suggesting they still experienced conflict here and were unable to effectively 
utilise proactive control to cope with this more frequent conflict. Therefore, it is suggested 
that individual differences in alcohol sensitivity may contribute to the effective use of 







1.11.6 Working Memory 
In addition, there is also a possibility that individual differences in Working Memory 
Capacity (WMC) may explain differences in the ability to utilise proactive control (Braver, 
2012). This is because WMC is thought to be essential to guide future behaviour and 
therefore individuals with a high WMC may have an increased ability to actively maintain a 
goal (Braver, 2012; Redick, 2014; Richmond et al., 2015). Indeed, research has implied that 
WMC predicts performance in various cognitive tasks (Richmond et al., 2015). Importantly, 
some research (e.g. (Redick & Engle, 2011; Wiemers & Redick, 2018)) has showed that 
performance on the AX-Continuous Performance Test (Lesh et al., 2013) is affected by 
WMC i.e. those with a high-WMC tend to perform better than those with a low-WMC. 
During this task, participants are required to make a target response when presented with a 
specific sequence of stimuli (usually letters e.g. an A followed by an X) and a non-target 
response when other sequences are presented (e.g. an A followed by a Y). Importantly, the 
target sequence is presented frequently to build a pre-potent response and therefore response 
inhibition is required when other sequences are presented. This task (or variations) have been 
regularly used as a measure of proactive and reactive control (e.g. (Gonthier, Macnamara, 
Chow, Conway, & Braver, 2016) see chapter three for more information on this task).  
Other research has also supported this (e.g. (Richmond et al., 2015; Wiemers & 
Redick, 2018) demonstrating that those with a high-WMC tend to be more proactive than 
those with a lower-WMC, who tend to rely more on reactive control as a late correction 
mechanism. Certainly, Finn et al (Finn, Justus, Mazas, & Steinmetz, 1999) also demonstrated 
that individual differences in WMC mediated the effect of acute alcohol intoxication on 
inhibitory control. However, this study only focused on ‘reactive’ inhibitory control and 
therefore there is still a lack of knowledge concerning which sub-processes (if any) of 
inhibitory control are modulated by WMC. Further research investigating the relationship 
between inhibitory control processes and WMC could have useful implications for 
understanding Substance Use Disorders, as there is consistent evidence that both heavy 
drinking individuals and individuals with a Substance Use Disorder display deficits in 





1.12 Interim summary 
To summarise so far, inhibitory control is typically investigated as a reactive stopping 
response in the addiction literature, despite neurocognitive models (Verbruggen, McLaren, et 
al., 2014) suggesting this is an over-simplistic conceptualisation. Therefore, the primary aim 
of this thesis was to break down the homunculus by examining both reactive and proactive 
control in heavy drinkers. Secondly, the mechanisms underlying the preparation of responses 
in heavy drinkers are also poorly understood. Therefore, I also aimed to investigate two 
potential mechanisms (Working Memory Capacity and alcohol sensitivity) that may underlie 
effective use of proactive control. Following on from this, the second primary focus of this 
thesis was to investigate the stability of these inhibitory control processes, discussed below. 
 
1.13 Inhibition as a transient variable 
Although much research has recognised inhibitory control as a risk factor for Alcohol Use 
Disorders, these studies do not explain whether or not the ability to inhibit inappropriate 
behaviour is stable over extended periods within individuals. Indeed, there is strong evidence 
to suggest that inhibitory control may be subject to short-term fluctuations within individuals 
(de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013), suggesting that the capacity to proactively 
prepare, choose and stop a response is fluid. These fluctuations can occur in response to 
physiological, environmental or psychological triggers (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et 
al., 2013) such as alcohol intoxication, substance-cue exposure, and acute stress, all of which 
are further described below.  Indeed, de Wit (de Wit, 2009) suggests that these short-term 
fluctuations may be especially detrimental to abstainers as a short-lived lapse of control could 
lead to a relapse of substance use. However, in relation to the first focus of this thesis, these 
theories of fluctuating disinhibition are based on an over-simplistic view of inhibitory control 
i.e. inhibitory control as a reactive stopping response. As a result, a second key aim of this 
thesis was to explore if some of the environmental and psychological mechanisms suggested 
(alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue exposure, acute stress) lead to short-term fluctuations in 





1.13.1 The pharmacological effects of alcohol 
There is considerable evidence that acute alcohol intoxication increases both subjective (e.g. 
self-reported craving) and objective (e.g. bogus taste test) measures of subsequent alcohol 
seeking in both alcohol dependent patients and healthy social drinkers (de Wit & Chutuape, 
1993; Fernie, Christiansen, Cole, Rose, & Field, 2012; Rose & Grunsell, 2008). However, the 
mechanisms through which this effect occurs are still open to debate (Field, Wiers, 
Christiansen, Fillmore, & Verster, 2010). Indeed, it is well reported that alcohol intoxication 
has a detrimental effect on executive and psychomotor functions such as working memory, 
planning and inhibitory control (e.g. (Christiansen, Rose, Cole, & Field, 2013; Marczinski, 
Abroms, Van Selst, & Fillmore, 2005; Weissenborn & Duka, 2003)). 
Specifically, there is an extensive body of evidence which has reported that inhibitory 
control is impaired by both moderate (0.4g/kg)  and high doses (0.8g/kg) of alcohol (Abroms 
& Fillmore, 2004; de Wit, Crean, & Richards, 2000; Fillmore, Ostling, Martin, & Kelly, 
2009; Marczinski et al., 2005; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008). Indeed, impairments in inhibitory 
control have been reported following alcohol doses that are not large enough to effect general 
psychomotor functions, perhaps suggesting unique impairing effects of alcohol intoxication 
on inhibitory control ((Fillmore, 2003) see also (Fillmore, 2007)). This is supported by a 
recent systematic review (Weafer & Fillmore, 2016) which concluded that alcohol priming 
reliably impairs inhibitory control, at doses which are below the legal driving limit in the 
USA (80mg/100ml). These doses also lead to increased risk-taking behaviour, though delay 
discounting was not impaired; with studies investigating this having produced contradictory 
findings (e.g. (Ortner, MacDonald, & Olmstead, 2003; Reynolds, Richards, et al., 2006; 
Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999)).  
Consequently, the large body of evidence demonstrating that alcohol intoxication 
impairs inhibitory control has led to a suggestion that the alcohol priming effect may be 
mediated by impairments in inhibitory control (Field et al., 2010; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 
2013). Indeed, one study (Weafer & Fillmore, 2008) demonstrated that a 0.65g/kg alcohol 
dose impaired performance on a Go/No-go task and that individual differences in the degree 
of impairment from alcohol intoxication were positively associated with ad-libitum alcohol 
consumption. However, as Knibb et al (Knibb, Roberts, Robinson, Rose, & Christiansen, 
2018) note, this study fails to provide strong evidence that inhibitory control impairments 
mediate the alcohol priming effect, as alcohol-seeking was measured in a separate testing 
session to consumption of the priming drink. Therefore, inhibition was not required during 
the ad libitum taste test session. As a result, it is hard to argue that the alcohol priming effect 
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is the result of a failure of inhibitory control from this study. To my knowledge, no evidence 
that measures alcohol-seeking in the same session as consumption of the alcohol prime, 
demonstrated that inhibitory control impairments mediate the alcohol priming effect (e.g. 
(Christiansen et al., 2013; Fernie et al., 2012)). 
Therefore, it is still unclear whether temporary impairments in inhibitory control 
mediate the alcohol priming effect. Furthermore, to my knowledge only one study has 
investigated the effect of alcohol priming on proactive control. In this study (Campbell et al., 
2017), alcohol intoxication led to impairments in ‘reactive’ motor (but not saccadic) 
inhibitory control but did not significantly impair proactive control. However, it is not 
possible to make robust conclusions regarding this due to a paucity of literature. By 
developing this line of research, we may increase understanding of which inhibitory control 
processes (if any) mediate the alcohol priming effect. 
 
1.13.2 The anticipated effects of alcohol  
Research has also demonstrated that consumption of a placebo-alcohol increases subsequent 
subjective (e.g. self-reported craving) and objective (e.g. bogus taste test) measures of 
alcohol seeking (Christiansen, Jennings, & Rose, 2016; Christiansen et al., 2013; 
Christiansen, Townsend, Knibb, & Field, 2017; Rose, Hobbs, & Drummond, 2013). One 
study (Leeman, Corbin, & Fromme, 2009) also showed that ad libitum alcohol consumption 
was predicted by self-reported craving after consumption of a placebo-alcohol drink. 
However, this was not the case following consumption of an alcoholic drink. These studies 
therefore imply that increases in self-reported craving and alcohol-seeking following an 
alcoholic priming drink are at least partially the result of the anticipated effects of alcohol, 
and not solely the pharmacological effects (Christiansen et al., 2017).  
Regardless, only a small number of studies have investigated the effects of a placebo 
on executive functions such as inhibitory control. For example, Christiansen et al 
(Christiansen et al., 2016) found that the consumption of a placebo-alcohol prime lead to 
increased craving and deficits in inhibitory control compared to a control prime.  
Furthermore, Christiansen et al (Christiansen et al., 2013) tested participants during three 
sessions (alcohol, control, placebo). They demonstrated that although craving was increased 
by both the alcohol and placebo drink compared to the control, only the alcoholic drink 
impaired executive functions and increased alcohol seeking compared to the placebo and 
control primes. There was no difference in these measures following the placebo-alcohol and 
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control primes. Consequently, the authors suggested that those studies which compare the 
effects of a placebo-alcohol to alcohol (and not a control that participants are told does not 
contain alcohol) are failing to recognize that outside of the laboratory, both the anticipated 
and pharmacological effects of alcohol contribute to the alcohol priming effect and the 
impairing effect of alcohol on cognitive functions. Indeed, the common methodology of 
priming studies follows the procedure of comparing alcohol effects to placebo effects. It is 
only with more studies including a control session, can we fully understand the effects of 
alcohol on inhibitory control.   
Lastly, the small number of studies which have investigated the effect of an alcohol-
placebo on inhibitory control have focused only on ‘reactive’ inhibitory control. There have 
been no studies which have investigated the effect of a placebo-alcohol on the other 
inhibitory processes (e.g. signal detection, proactive control). Therefore further research is 
necessary to disentangle the anticipated and pharmacological effects of alcohol on inhibitory 
control processes. 
 
1.13.3 Alcohol Cue reactivity 
Furthermore, it is well recognised that exposure to substance-related cues (e.g. the smell or 
sight of beer) leads to increases in craving, physiological responses (such as increased heart 
rate or salivation (e.g. (Pomerleau, Fertig, Baker, & Cooney, 1983)) and behavioural 
responses (such as increased use of the substance in substance users (e.g. (Carter & Tiffany, 
1999; Veilleux & Skinner, 2015)). This is referred to as ‘cue reactivity’ and is thought to 
contribute to the transition to substance dependence (Drobes, 2002) and relapse (Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2002; Stacy & Wiers, 2010). Alcohol-cue exposure has also been shown to increase 
alcohol seeking in non-dependent samples (Christiansen et al., 2017; Jones, Rose, Cole, & 
Field, 2013; MacKillop & Lisman, 2007), although, differences between these samples have 
also been reported. For example, one study (Thomas, Drobes, & Deas, 2005) reported that 
adolescents with a substance dependence showed increased salivation when exposed to 
substance cues compared to non-dependent adolescents. However, there was no difference in 
heart rates during exposure. 
As such, there is a general consensus that associative learning mechanisms play a key 
role in the above responses to substance-cues (Field & Jones, 2017). Indeed, Incentive-
Sensitization theories (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) argue that individuals build associations 
between the substance-related cues and the positive effects of the substance. Therefore, these 
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cues become more salient to the substance user and promote drug-seeking and consumption. 
Evidence supporting this theory suggests that substance-related cues lead to increases in 
dopamine release (Boileau et al., 2007; Koob & Volkow, 2010), although other evidence has 
showed lower dopamine release or receptors in those with a substance addiction (Martinez et 
al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2007; Volkow et al., 1990). Support for this has also been found 
using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) methods which have demonstrated that 
substance-cue exposure increases craving and substance use in naturalistic environments (e.g. 
(Fatseas et al., 2015; Serre, Fatseas, Swendsen, & Auriacombe, 2015)). 
Despite this, there is some disagreement about other psychological mechanisms that 
may explain this relationship (Field & Jones, 2017). Much evidence has investigated 
inhibitory control as a possible mechanism involved. For example, one study (Papachristou, 
Nederkoorn, Havermans, van der Horst, & Jansen, 2012) reported that inhibitory control 
moderated the relationship between alcohol-cue exposure and increased craving in heavy 
drinkers. Specifically, following alcohol-cue exposure, those with poorer response inhibition 
reported increased alcohol craving compared to those with better response inhibition. 
However, despite also showing increased craving following cue-exposure, inhibitory control 
did not moderate this relationship in light drinkers. Importantly, Field and Jones (Field & 
Jones, 2017) also reported that increases in disinhibition and craving in non-dependent 
drinkers partially mediated the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on alcohol consumption during 
a bogus taste test. 
Other evidence has demonstrated that alcohol-cue exposure impairs inhibitory control 
in alcohol dependent patients (e.g. (Gauggel et al., 2010; Noël et al., 2007)), however, 
another study (Mainz et al., 2012) reported no differences in response inhibition in male 
dependent drinkers following alcohol-cue exposure (compared to neutral). There are also 
some discrepancies in non-dependent drinkers. For example, some research using alcohol 
cues embedded into Stop-Signal and Go/No-go tasks have demonstrated short-term deficits in 
inhibitory control (Muraven & Shmueli, 2006; Petit, Kornreich, Noël, Verbanck, & 
Campanella, 2012), including both problem and non-problem non-dependent drinkers 
(Kreusch, Vilenne, & Quartemont, 2013). ERP research has also demonstrated decreased 
N200 components following alcohol-cue exposure (compared to neutral cue-exposure) in 
non-dependent drinkers, or differences in N200 amplitudes between heavy drinkers compared 
to light drinkers in response to alcohol-cues (Kreusch, Quertemont, Vilenne, & Hansenne, 
2014; Watson, Newton-Mora, & Pirkle, 2016). However, other research has failed to 
demonstrate this. For example, one study (Nederkoorn et al., 2009) reported no impairments 
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in inhibitory control following alcohol-cue exposure (through images) in non-dependent 
social drinkers. Similarly, Jones et al (Jones, Rose, et al., 2013) found no impairments in 
inhibitory control when a sample of non-dependent drinkers smelt and held an alcoholic drink 
compared to a control.  
As such, a recent meta-analysis (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018) reported that the effect 
of alcohol-cue exposure on inhibition was indeed small (Standardised mean difference = -
0.21, 95% CI = −0.32, −0.11) but also robust across Stop-Signal, Anti-Saccade and Stroop 
tasks. Therefore, it is possible that the increased alcohol-seeking demonstrated following 
alcohol-cue exposure may be the result of short-term fluctuations in inhibitory control. These 
fluctuations may prevent individuals from being able to self-regulate their behaviour in 
response to the temptation for alcohol and therefore lead to an increase in alcohol-seeking or 
consumption (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013). It should also be noted that 
there is a suggestion that alcohol-cue exposure may intensify the impairments in inhibitory 
control following alcohol intoxication (e.g. (Adams, Ataya, Attwood, & Munafo, 2013; 
Weafer & Fillmore, 2015)). This may be because of increased salience to these cues during 
intoxication (Field et al., 2010), although see (Duka & Townshend, 2004) who only found 
increased attentional bias to alcohol-cues during a low alcohol dose (0.3g/kg). Nonetheless, 
this exacerbation in deficits experienced when presented with alcohol-cues during 
intoxication may further contribute to a “loss of control” over drinking (Weafer & Fillmore, 
2015). 
However, the research described above only investigated ‘reactive’ inhibitory control 
which may contribute to the discrepancies in findings. Research suggests that alcohol-cue 
exposure may induce cognitive biases, that influence proactive slowing and the execution of 
reactive stopping (Stacy & Wiers, 2010). Indeed, research by Sharma (Sharma, 2017) 
demonstrated how alcohol-cue exposure (compared to neutral-cue exposure) had detrimental 
effects on the performance of heavy drinkers (compared to light drinkers) in a modified 
Stroop task. The performance of these individuals suggested that heavy drinkers were relying 
on reactive control to act as a late correction mechanism (see also (Braver, 2012)), whereas 
the lighter drinkers were utilising proactive control to filter out the context of the prior cues. 
Other substances have also been investigated, for example Brevers et al (Brevers et al., 2017) 
found that participants with a Cannabis Use Disorder (who were pursuing treatment) had 
poorer proactive and reactive inhibition compared to healthy controls. However, the cannabis 
users did demonstrate increased proactive control when presented with cannabis-related cues 
in comparison to neutral-related cues; but this was likely due to their motivation to cut 
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down/quit. Consequently, further research is required to investigate the effect of alcohol-
related cues on proactive control, and whether impairments in inhibitory processes following 
alcohol-cue exposure lead to subsequent alcohol-seeking. 
 
1.13.4 Stress  
Lastly, emotional stress is also thought to be a risk factor for substance use and relapse (see 
(Sinha, 2001) for a review). In support of this, experimental research has demonstrated that 
acute stress increases craving for alcohol (Field & Powell, 2007), various measures of the 
personal value of alcohol (Owens, Ray, & MacKillop, 2015) and ad libitum alcohol 
consumption in heavy drinkers (McGrath, Jones, & Field, 2016). Other research has 
demonstrated that social drinkers will readily consume more alcohol following stress (de Wit, 
Soderpalm, Nikolayev, & Young, 2003; Magrys & Olmstead, 2015), although it should be 
noted that the self-reported measure of stress was unrelated to ad libitum alcohol intake in 
one of these studies (Magrys & Olmstead, 2015). Similar evidence has been reported in 
substance dependent individuals. For example, Thomas et al (Thomas, Bacon, Randall, 
Brady, & See, 2011) demonstrated that non-treatment seeking alcohol dependent individuals 
are more likely to consume all of an ad libitum alcohol beverage following stress. 
Longitudinal evidence has also supported a causal relationship between stress and alcohol use 
(Boden, Fergusson, & Horwood, 2014; Russell, Cooper, Frone, & Peirce, 1999), and a 
literature review (Enoch, 2011) stated that there is causal relationship between exposure to 
chronic stress during childhood and developing a Substance Use Disorder during early 
adulthood. Enoch (Enoch, 2011) suggests that this process develops through a transition from 
heavy drinking during adolescence; however this pathway can be enhanced or nullified due to 
the influence of the individual’s surroundings and genes. 
Despite this seemingly robust evidence for a causal relationship between stress and 
increased alcohol use, it is unclear which psychological mechanism(s) underlie this 
relationship (McGrath et al., 2016). In a review of the literature, Jones et al (Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013) suggest that stress may be another psychological trigger which 
leads to short-term fluctuations in inhibitory control within individuals. Certainly, it has been 
suggested that the same neural systems (specifically activity in the PFC) control the 
emotional regulation of stress and inhibition of incongruous behaviour (Li & Sinha, 2008). 
Therefore, it is possible that the control of behaviour is interrupted during or following 
experiences of stress which may lead to increased drug seeking (Sinha, 2001). Supporting 
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evidence for this has revealed that stress is related to impairments in the PFC (see (Hermans, 
Henckens, Joels, & Fernandez, 2014) for a review), and this area of the brain is seemingly the 
most vulnerable, such that even mild exposure to stress can cause dramatic impairments 
(Arnsten, 2009). 
However, research investigating the effect of acute stress on inhibitory control has 
reported contradictory results. For example, acute stress has been shown to impair inhibitory 
control in healthy participants (Scholz et al., 2009; Starcke, Wiesen, Trotzke, & Brand, 2016) 
and male problem drinkers following exposure to alcohol-related cues (Zack et al., 2011). 
Roos et al (Roos et al., 2017) also reported that undergraduate students in a control group had 
lower SSRTs in a Stop-Signal task at post-manipulation compared to pre-manipulation 
indicating the presence of practise effects.  However, the participants in the stress group did 
not show this improvement in performance leading the authors to suggest that acute stress 
had a detrimental effect on inhibitory control. However, McGrath et al (McGrath et al., 2016) 
reported no effect on performance in a Stop-Signal task in heavy drinkers. Interestingly, there 
are studies which have reported that acute stress enhanced the performance of opiate users 
and controls on a Go/No-go task (Constantinou et al., 2010) and healthy participants on a 
Stop-Signal task (Schwabe, Hoffken, Tegenthoff, & Wolf, 2013). Therefore, it could be that 
the effect of stress on inhibitory control is in accordance with a U-shaped function (Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013). Indeed, in two experiments using a Stroop task, Henderson et al 
(Henderson, Snyder, Gupta, & Banich, 2012) reported that exposure to a moderate level of 
stress was associated with improved performance, whereas exposure to a low or high level of 
stress was associated with poorer performance. Therefore, further research is required to 
expand our understanding of the effect of acute stress on reactive control and there is no 
research to my knowledge, which investigates the effect of acute stress on proactive control.  
To summarise, research has suggested that impairments in inhibitory control are 
subject to fluctuations within individuals following exposure to various psychological 
processes or environmental triggers.  These fluctuations in the ability to inhibit behaviour are 
suggested to play a causal role in alcohol seeking and relapse. In addition to those described 
above, there are other environmental and psychological triggers (e.g. arousal and emotional 
states, ego depletion, beliefs), which are suggested to cause fluctuations in inhibitory control 
within individuals (Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013). However, there is less research 
investigating the effects of these on inhibition and alcohol-seeking. As a result, I opted to 
focus the research in this thesis on the effect of alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue exposure 
and acute stress on inhibitory control processes.  
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1.14 Summary of Aims and Hypotheses  
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between reactive and 
proactive inhibitory control processes and alcohol use in non-dependent, heavy drinkers. 
Specifically, to investigate whether exposure to environmental and psychological triggers 
(alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue exposure and exposure to acute stress) lead to short-term 
impairments in reactive and proactive inhibitory control, and whether these impairments were 
related to increased alcohol-seeking. This was based on evidence from Verbruggen et al 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) who suggest that there is an over-simplistic 
conceptualisation of inhibitory control as a reactive stopping response  in the literature. I also 
based our aims and hypotheses on evidence from two literature reviews (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013) that suggest inhibitory control fluctuates within individuals when 
presented with environmental and psychological triggers (e.g. alcohol intoxication, alcohol-
cues, and acute stress). Therefore, I aimed to specify which inhibitory processes (if any) are 
impaired by these triggers, and which of these processes (if any) predict increased alcohol 
seeking. This research could potentially contribute to the development of addiction 
interventions that centre around improving reactive or proactive control and protecting 
individuals from temporary fluctuations in these processes. Throughout these studies, I 
recruited heavy drinkers and excluded individuals who self-reported a previous or current 
diagnosis of alcohol dependency or had received treatment. This was partly due to ethical 
constraints, but also to allow an investigation into individuals who are at risk of developing 
an alcohol dependence.  Lastly, I also investigated potential mediators of the relationship 
between inhibitory control processes and alcohol seeking. These included measures of poor 
Working Memory Capacity and low alcohol sensitivity, both of which have been related to 
increased alcohol consumption. 
In chapter three, I focused on isolating reactive control and proactive slowing in 
heavy drinkers to support the notion that a focus only on reactive stopping is over-simplistic, 
and to identify a task which I could use moving forward in my research. I also investigated 
whether individual differences in these processes were associated with individual differences 
in self-reported alcohol consumption. In chapter four, I used a modified Stop-Signal task 
from chapter three to investigate whether reactive stopping, proactive slowing and signal 
detection were impaired by exposure to alcohol-related cues (study two) and alcohol priming 
(study three). I also investigated whether alcohol seeking increased following cue-exposure 
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and priming, and whether individual differences in the inhibitory processes predicted 
individual differences in ad libitum alcohol consumption.  
Chapter five sought to investigate the relationship between inhibitory control 
processes and alcohol consumption, in the presence of alcohol-related cues, outside of the 
laboratory using two online studies. I also aimed to investigate potential mediators of these 
relationships, including Working Memory Capacity and low alcohol sensitivity.  
Chapter six then sought to provide neuropsychological evidence. I aimed to 
investigate the effect of acute stress on inhibitory processes, and the neurological correlates 
of inhibitory control, in the presence of alcohol-cues. I also aimed to investigate whether 
exposure to a psychosocial stressor increased alcohol seeking, and whether the magnitude of 
impairments in behavioural inhibition and the neurological responses to alcohol-related cues, 
predicted increased alcohol consumption. Lastly, I aimed to investigate whether individual 
differences in alcohol sensitivity and Working Memory Capacity were associated with ad 












General Methods and Materials 
2.1 Self-report measures 
At the start of each laboratory study (studies one, two, three and six), participants were 
required to fill in various baseline measures to assess their personality and alcohol 
consumption. During the online studies (studies four and five), participants were only 
required to complete baselines measures of alcohol consumption. All of these measures are 
described in detail below. Following this, is a description of the Subjective Intoxication Scale 
which was distributed in study three, and the Ad libitum taste test which was used in studies 
two, three and six. The Alcohol sensitivity questionnaire is also described which was 
distributed in studies five and six, as is the State Trait Anxiety Inventory which was 
distributed in study six. Lastly, participants also filled in a funnelled debriefing at the end of 
each laboratory study which was mostly consistent across studies. This is also described 
below.  
 
2.1.2 The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT: (Saunders, Aasland, 
Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993))  
The AUDIT questionnaire (see Appendices 1.A) was administered to participants to measure 
hazardous drinking. This was originally developed to screen for alcohol misuse and 
dependence so that individuals who would benefit from cutting down or abstaining from 
drinking could be quickly identified (Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001). 
This questionnaire includes 10 fixed-response items with varying answers. The first three 
questions measure the frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption (for example, “How 
often do you have a drink containing alcohol?”). Often these three questions are used in a short 
from of the AUDIT, known as the AUDIT-C. However, in these studies the full version was 
administered. Question 4 to 10 relate to behaviours and consequences that may or may not 
have occurred following alcohol consumption (for example, “Have you or someone else been 
injured because of your drinking?”) The 10 items give an overall score between 0 and 40 
with higher scores indicating greater alcohol consumption. Specifically, the WHO  suggest 
that a score between 0 and 7 implies a low risk of alcohol problems, a score between 8 and 15 
indicates an increased risk (or medium level) of hazardous drinking, a score between 16 and 
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19 suggests a higher risk of alcohol problems and a score over 20 is thought to suggest 
probable alcohol dependence (Babor et al., 2001). Furthermore, the WHO suggests that 
simple or brief feedback and advice on drinking would be the most appropriate intervention 
for an individual who scores between 8 and 15. However, if an individual’s score is between 
16 and 19 it would be more appropriate to suggest that the individual seeks some counselling 
advice, and a score above 20 indicates the need for a referral to further alcohol harm 
assessment to evaluate a diagnosis of alcohol dependence (Babor et al., 2001). 
As a one-factor measure, the AUDIT has been shown to have good internal 
consistency in both non-clinical (Cronbach’s α = .82) and clinical samples (Cronbach’s 
α = .88) (Shields, Guttmannova, & Caruso, 2004). The test-retest reliability has also been 
reported as generally good in general population samples (Dybek et al., 2006). Other research 
has demonstrated that the AUDIT is a valid and a sensitive screening method to recognise 
hazardous drinkers and those with an Alcohol Use Disorder in the general population (intra-
class correlation coefficient for the total score =.95) (Dybek et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
AUDIT is thought to be a useful measure of hazardous drinking and potential alcohol 
dependence.  
 
2.1.3 The Timeline Follow-Back (TLFB: (Sobell & Sobell, 1990)) 
Participants were also asked to fill in a TLFB (see Appendices 1.B) to measure retrospective 
alcohol consumption in units (one UK unit = 8 g of alcohol). Participants were asked to fill in 
the number of units they consumed on a day-to-day basis for the previous 7 (study four) or 14 
days (studies one to three, five to six) up until the day before the study took place. 
Participants were able to use their diaries or mobile phones to remind them of their 
consumption and a guide providing the number of units in standard UK drinks (e.g. A 330ml 
bottle of beer or cider, 5% ABV is 1.7 UK Units or 25ml (a single measure) of spirit 40% 
ABV is 1 UK Unit) was also provided to assist participants in calculating their alcohol 
consumption.   
 The TLFB can also be administered for specific periods up to 12 months (e.g. 30 
days), however research has shown discrepancies in accuracy for longer lengths of recall (e.g. 
(Hoeppner, Stout, Jackson, & Barnett, 2010)). Indeed, this study found that social drinkers 
reported an increased number of total drinks, an increased number of days with consumption 
of 4 or more drinks and less abstinent days in repeated one-week TLFBs compared to a 30-
day TLFB. However, other research has demonstrated good test-retest reliability when 
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comparing a 30-day to a 90-day TLFB in psychiatric outpatients (r’s > .73) (Carey, Carey, 
Maisto, & Henson, 2004). High test-retest reliability has been demonstrated in social drinkers 
between telephone and online administration (r’s > .75) (Rueger, Trela, Palmeri, & C King, 
2012) and problem drinkers when comparing standard paper-and-pencil method to versions 
on a computer (Pearson r correlation coefficients  > .83), or when comparing administration 
on the telephone to the standard self-administered method (r’s > .77) (Sobell, Brown, Leo, & 
Sobell, 1996). This is also acceptable when gathering data on self-reported smoking (r’s > 
.75), cocaine (r’s > .65) and cannabis (r’s > .70) (Robinson, Sobell, Sobell, & Leo, 2014). 
Therefore, the TLFB is considered to a reliable and useful measure of alcohol consumption 
with psychometrically sound properties. 
 
2.1.4 The Brief Comprehensive Effects Of Alcohol Questionnaire (B-CEOA: (Ham, 
Stewart, Norton, & Hope, 2005))  
The B-CEOA (see Appendices 1.C) consists of 15 items, which measure alcohol outcome 
expectancies (what individuals expect to happen when they have consumed alcohol) and 
evaluations of these expectancies. These items are measured using a four-point Likert scale 
between strongly disagree to strongly agree. The questionnaire measures both positive 
expectancies (Tension reduction; Social facilitation; Liquid courage; Self perception) and 
negative expectancies (Cognitive-behavioural impairment; Risk taking/aggression; Negative 
self-evaluation). Participants first indicate how likely a specific effect will occur from 
drinking alcohol (e.g. ‘When I drink alcohol I would feel dizzy’) on 15 items, measured from 
1 (‘disagree’) to 4 (‘agree’). Respondents also indicate to what degree each specific effect 
would be desirable or adverse, measured from 1 (‘bad’) to 5 (‘good’) (Ham, Wang, Kim, & 
Zamboanga, 2013). 
This questionnaire is a short version of the original Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol 
Questionnaire (Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 1993). The items included here were extracted 
from the original questionnaire, with eight items extracted from the positive expectancy 
factor and seven from the negative expectancy factor. The internal consistency of the brief 
measure has been shown to replicate the original version in university students with alpha’s 
ranging from .60 to .81. The concurrent validity is also similar to the original version in this 
study (Ham et al., 2005). Other studies have supported this in students demonstrating 
Cronbach’s alpha’s of .85 to .90 (Hatzenbuehler, Corbin, & Fromme, 2008) and .77 to .83 
(Zamboanga et al., 2012). Lastly, Ham et al (Ham et al., 2013) also found support for the use 
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of these subscales in university students across genders and different ethnicities. Specifically, 
the factor structure and the associations between these subscales and hazardous drinking were 
similar across genders and individuals with various ethnic backgrounds, suggesting this is a 
reliable measure of alcohol outcome expectancies. 
 
2.1.5 The Temptation Restraint Inventory (TRI: (Collins & Lapp, 1992))  
The TRI (see Appendices 1.D) was distributed to measure drinking restraint (preoccupation 
with and efforts to reduce drinking). This consists of 15 items which focus on how often 
individuals think about or attempt to manage their alcohol consumption. Each item is scored 
on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all or never) to 9 (extremely or always). These 15 
items comprise five factors; Govern, Emotion, Restrict, Concern about drinking and 
Cognitive Preoccupation, which have demonstrated good internal reliability (e.g. (Collins, 
George, & Lapp, 1989) α = 0.76 to 0.91). In addition, these five factors comprise two higher 
order factors known as Cognitive Behavioural Control (CBC) which measures drinking 
control and Cognitive Emotion Preoccupation (CEP) which measures temptation to consume 
alcohol (Lyvers, Hasking, Hani, Rhodes, & Trew, 2010). 
The use of this two-factor structure has been supported in undergraduate samples. For 
example, MacKillop et al (MacKillop, Lisman, & Weinstein, 2006) reported good overall 
internal consistency (α = .87) for hazardous and harmful drinkers. Specifically, each higher-
order factor (CEP α= .85; CBC α = .80) also had high internal reliability for both hazardous 
drinking and harmful drinking groups. Other studies (e.g. (Collins, Koutsky, & Izzo, 2000) 
using social drinkers have also demonstrated good internal reliability (CEP α= .91; CBC α= 
.79), as well as good discriminant and convergent validity. Therefore, the TRI is suggested to 
have sound psychometric properties and is a reliable measure of drinking restraint. 
 
2.1.6 The Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS: (Patton et al., 1995))  
The BIS (see Appendices 1.E) was administered to measure self-reported trait impulsivity 
across three dimensions (Motor, Non-Planning and Attentional). This consists of 30 items, 
each scored from 1-4 (rarely, occasionally, often and always). A total score can be calculated 
for each of the three subscales; however, it is also possible to compute an overall measure of 
impulsivity (usually referred to as BIS Total Score) by adding together the total scores on all 
three subscales.  Higher scores indicate increased impulsivity in each dimension, but also 
overall. Indeed, this scale is one of the most frequent measures of impulsivity in both clinical 
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and research environments (Stanford et al., 2009). This study demonstrated moderate-high 
internal reliability and test-retest reliability on total scores of the BIS (α = .83; rs = .83) and 
the Attentional (α =.74; rs =.61), Motor (α =.59; rs = .67) and Non-Planning (α = .72; rs= .72) 
dimensions, in a combined sample of both college students and healthy adults.  
 
2.1.7 The Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire (AAAQ: (McEvoy, 
Stritzke, French, Lang, & Ketterman, 2004))  
The AAAQ- right now version (see Appendices 1.F) was used to measure the motivation of 
participants to approach and avoid drinking alcohol in the current moment. This scale 
consists of 14 items scored from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very strong) to measure three sub-scales 
of craving; mild inclinations to drink (Inclined-Indulgent), intense inclinations to drink 
(Obsessed-Compelled) and inclinations to avoid alcohol (Resolved-Regulated). These 
subscales have showed good internal reliability in heavy drinkers  (e.g. (Field & Jones, 2017) 
Inclined-Indulgent (α = .87), Obsessed-Compelled (α = .83) and Resolved-Regulated 
(α = .73)) and alcohol dependent inpatients (e.g. (Field, Di Lemma, Christiansen, & Dickson, 
2017), Inclined-Indulgent (α = .77), Obsessed-Compelled (α = .72) and Resolved-Regulated 
(α = .82)). Another study (Klein & Anker, 2013) provided similar reliability estimates in 
alcohol dependent patients (14 items  α = .71), showing the Obsesses-Compelled subscale to 
have the highest reliability (α = .90), followed by the Inclined-Indulgent (α= .87) and the 
Resolved-Regulated (α= .75). The convergent validity and predictive validity in this study 
also suggested that the AAAQ was a psychometrically sound measure of alcohol craving. 
 
Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS: ((Mayer & Gaschke, 1988)) 
The BMIS (Appendices 1.G) was also administered in study one as part of the baseline 
measures. This contains sixteen adjectives of feelings (e.g. Lively, Sad, Tired, Grouchy) and 
participants are required to indicate how these describe their present mood on a four-point 
scale (‘definitely do not feel,’ ‘do not feel,’ ‘slightly feel’ or ‘definitely feel’). These 
individual adjectives are then loaded onto four factors; Arousal-Calm, Negative-Relaxed, 
Pleasant-Unpleasant and Positive-Tired. This has been used in previous research in similar 
samples to those recruited in the research for this thesis (e.g. (Field & Jones, 2017; Jones, 
Field, et al., 2013)). The four factors of the scale have been found to be reliable (Mayer, 
Allen, & Beauregard, 1995) with Cronbach’s alphas generally ranging from 0.76 to 0.83, 
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although some slightly lower have been reported e.g. 0.60 to 0.80 (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 
2001). 
2.1.8 The Subjective Intoxication Scales (SIS: (Duka, Tasker, & Stephens, 1998))  
The SIS (see Appendices 1.H) was administered in study three, following the alcohol, 
alcohol-placebo and control priming drinks. This was used to measure six subjective feelings, 
which included ‘lightheaded,’ ‘irritable’, ‘stimulated’, ‘alert’, ‘relaxed’ and ‘contented.’ 
These were scored using a 1-10cm Likert scale rated from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Extremely.’ This 
scale has demonstrated good reliability in previous studies using similar samples to the 
current studies (e.g. (Knibb et al., 2018) (Study 1: α = .83, Study 2: α = .86)). 
 
2.1.9 Ad libitum taste test 
In studies two, three and six, participants were required to complete an ad libitum taste test 
(see Appendices 1.I). During these, participants were presented with 250ml of chilled Skol 
(2.8% vol. ABV)  and 250ml of chilled fresh orange juice, the volumes of which were 
increased to 500ml in study six. These were provided to participants in two unmarked pint 
glasses ensuring that participants were not aware of the brands provided. Participants were 
also provided with a set of 10 questions for each drink that were scored from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (extremely). Using these, participants were asked to taste and score both drinks on their 
gustatory dimensions (e.g. “How bitter was drink 1?” or “How light was drink 1?”). To do 
this, participants were also directed to  ‘drink as much or as little as you like in order to make 
accurate judgements’. Furthermore, in order to heighten participants’ motivation to control 
their alcohol intake, participants were also informed that alcohol may negatively impact their 
performance on a task to be completed after the taste test, in which they may be able to win 
money to add to their payment for taking part. This was based on previous studies (e.g. 
(Christiansen, Cole, & Field, 2012; Field & Jones, 2017)). After the experimental session 
concluded, the volume of the Skol lager and orange juice consumed was measured, and the 
amount of beer as a percentage of the total fluid consumed was calculated as the measure of 
ad libitum consumption.  
 The construct validity of the use of this method to measure alcohol consumption in 
the laboratory has been demonstrated by Jones et al (Jones, Button, et al., 2016). Through 
secondary analysis of 12 studies from the University of Liverpool’s laboratories using a taste 
test (N = 762), they demonstrated that ad libitum alcohol consumption was significantly 
predicted by typical alcohol consumption measured using the TLFB (p= .04), craving (p< 
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.001) and pleasantness ratings of the drinks (p= .04). However, neither time of day (p= .10), 
day of the week (p= .14) nor awareness of the experimental aims of the taste test (p= .72) 
were correlated with ad libitum consumption. Thus, the ad libitum taste test is suggested to be 
a valid and sensitive measure of alcohol consumption in the laboratory. 
 
2.1.10 The Alcohol-Sensitivity Questionnaire (ASQ: (Fleming et al., 2016)). 
The ASQ (see Appendices 1.J) includes 15 items, which ask participants how many alcoholic 
drinks they must typically drink to experience alcohol-related effects. Nine of these items are 
associated with lower doses of alcohol and stimulation (e.g. feeling more relaxed, becoming 
more talkative) and six are associated with heavier doses of alcohol and sedation (e.g. passing 
out, throwing up). Participants are first asked whether or not they have experienced each 
alcohol-related effect and if the answer is YES, they are asked to estimate the minimum 
number of drinks required to experience the lower dose effects or the maximum number of 
drinks they could consume without experiencing the higher dose effects.  
High scores on this questionnaire are thought to indicate low sensitivity to the 
sedative effects of alcohol and increased sensitivity to the stimulating effects of alcohol 
(Bailey & Bartholow, 2016). ASQ scores can be calculated using a standardised person mean 
imputation (SPMI) method (see (Lee, Bartholow, McCarthy, Pedersen, & Sher, 2015)). This 
helps to prevent biased low ASQ scores due to an increase in missing data in response to the 
items associated with the heavier doses of alcohol in comparison to the items associated with 
lower doses. This method involves converting each ASQ item to a z-score and then averaging 
across the items which are not missing to calculate a composite measure of ASQ. In healthy 
adults, the ASQ has demonstrated good construct validity and has reliably predicted multiple 
subjective effects of alcohol in a laboratory setting (Fleming et al., 2016). The internal 
consistency has also been shown to be excellent (α = .92) in a sample of undergraduate 
students (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016). 
 
 
2.1.11 The State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: (Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen, & 
Marsh, 1999)) 
The STAI (see Appendices 1.K) was used to measure a stress manipulation in study six. This 
is comprised of two subscales, each consisting of 20 items. The first subscale was 
administered before and after a stress manipulation to measure current feelings of anxiety, 
asking participants how they feel “right now” with regards to tension, worry, apprehension, 
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nervousness and arousal of the autonomic nervous system from “not at all” to “very much so” 
on a four-point Likert scale. The second subscale was administered to measure trait anxiety 
investigating general calmness, security and confidence from “almost never” to “almost 
always” on a four-point Likert scale (Julian, 2011). This inventory has been used to  
differentiate low and high stressful conditions (Metzger, 1976) and has been used as a 
measure of stress in previous studies (Field & Powell, 2007; Field & Quigley, 2009; Starcke 
et al., 2016). Good internal consistency has been reported in samples of students (e.g. α 
=0.81; (Kaupuzs, Vazne, & Usca, 2015)).  
 
2.1.12 Funnelled debriefing 
Lastly, participants also completed a short questionnaire to measure awareness of the 
experimental aims of each laboratory study (see Appendices 1.L). This included an open 
question asking what the aims of the experiment were and two fixed-response questions 
asking the purpose of the computer task (studies one, two, three, six) and the taste test (study 
two, three, six). In study six, participants were also asked what the purpose of a 5 minute 










Isolating proactive slowing from reactive inhibitory 
control in heavy drinkers. 
 
This chapter presents the first experimental chapter in this thesis, specifically a laboratory 
study that has been published as a brief report in Substance Use & Misuse (2019). The online 
supplementary materials are also presented after the article.  Data is freely available on Open 
Science Framework (link presented in main text). The format of the original article has been 
modified to match the other chapters in this thesis, however the content remains the same as 
that of which was published. With regards to contributions, I designed the study which was 
approved by Andrew Jones, Paul Christiansen and Matt Field. I collected the data, analyzed 
this and wrote up the manuscript. Before the original submission and in response to 
reviewer’s comments, all three co-authors provided feedback on the manuscript. 
 
Chapter Foreword: This chapter contributed to the overall aims of this thesis by investigating 
whether proactive slowing could be isolated from reactive control in heavy drinkers. 
Importantly, this chapter also investigated whether individual differences in proactive 
slowing and reactive control were associated with individual differences in alcohol 
consumption. Lastly, this chapter utilized three inhibition tasks from the literature to ensure 
that they were feasible to be taken forward into the manipulation studies, particularly so that 












Background: Impaired inhibitory control is thought to contribute to alcohol (mis)use. 
However, current definitions of inhibitory control are over-simplified by a failure to 
distinguish reactive inhibitory control from proactive slowing. Objectives: To distinguish 
‘reactive’ inhibitory control and proactive slowing in heavy drinkers, and characterise 
associations between both constructs and individual differences in alcohol consumption. 
Methods: Sixty heavy drinkers completed self-reported measures of alcohol consumption, 
followed by two modified Stop-Signal tasks and an AX-Continuous Performance task in a 
laboratory setting. Results: Heavy drinkers demonstrated proactive slowing when inhibition 
was more likely but individual differences in proactive slowing and reactive stopping were 
unrelated to individual differences in alcohol consumption. Conclusions/Importance: Within 
a sample of heavy drinkers, individual differences in reactive inhibitory control and proactive 























Inhibitory control – the inability to inhibit inappropriate behaviour - is argued to play a key 
role in alcohol (mis)use (e.g. (de Wit, 2009; Fillmore, 2003; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; 
Yucel et al., 2019)). This is often measured using the Stop-Signal or Go/No-Go task 
paradigms in the laboratory. During these tasks, participants are usually required to respond 
to go stimuli (e.g. press a key indicating the direction of an arrow (left or right)) and inhibit 
their response on a minority of trials when no-go stimuli or a stop-signal (e.g. the 
presentation of a cross) is presented (Verbruggen et al., 2019). From these, Stop-Signal 
Reaction Time (SSRT) - the approximate time to suppress a response following the 
appearance of a stop-signal (Brevers et al., 2017) - can be calculated as a covert index of 
inhibitory control, or the number of commission errors can be calculated as an index of 
inhibitory control failures. 
Research utilising these tasks has demonstrated that inhibitory control deficits predict 
harmful drinking in non-dependent samples (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012; Colder 
& O'Connor, 2002; Houston et al., 2014; Murphy & Garavan, 2011), as well as the progress 
from hazardous drinking to alcohol dependence (Rubio et al., 2008). However, there is some 
equivocal evidence, particularly in non-dependent samples (e.g. (Bø & Landro, 2017; Fernie 
et al., 2010)). One possible reason for this is that the present research focuses on reactive 
control processes (SSRT; ‘the act of stopping’), despite cognitive neuroscience models 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) suggesting that individuals are able to prepare inhibitory 
behaviour in advance and modify this ‘proactively.’  This may have particular relevance to 
substance-use behaviour (Brevers et al., 2017) as individuals often utilise proactive strategies 
to restrict their drinking, (i.e. preparing to have a drink-free day or to reject an offer for a 
drink), rather than global reactive control (i.e. inhibiting an arm movement to reach for a 
drink). Therefore, proactive control may offer a more informative endophenotype for 
substance-use behaviours (Aron, 2011). 
Importantly, inhibitory control tasks can be adapted to isolate proactive control and 
slowing through the addition of a cue indicating stop-signal probability or a block without 
stop-signals (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). If individuals are utilising proactive control 
when completing the task, they should slow down their responses as stop-signal probability 
increases, as they prepare to inhibit their behaviour (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 
2014). The AX- Continuous Performance Task, a modified version of the traditional 
Continuous Performance Test (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome Jr, & Beck, 1956), has 
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also been used to measure reactive and proactive control (discussed below) in healthy young 
adults (Gonthier et al., 2016) and children (Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2009). During 
these tasks, participants are typically tasked with responding to a target stimulus or sequence 
(e.g. letters, numbers) and are required to withhold their response to other stimuli or 
sequences (Berger, Slobodin, & Cassuto, 2017). 
 The current study isolated ‘reactive’ inhibitory control and proactive slowing in heavy 
drinkers, and investigated whether these processes were related to individual differences in 
alcohol consumption. Our primary hypothesis was that individual differences in proactive 
slowing and reactive stopping would predict unique variance in individual differences in 
alcohol consumption. However, to first confirm that heavy drinkers employed proactive 
control strategies, we predicted that participants would: (i) slow down their responses as stop-
signal probability increased in the Stop-Signal Tasks (SST) and (ii) respond to the target-
response (‘AX’) trials faster than non-target response trials (‘AY, BX, BY’) in the AX-




Heavy drinkers (N = 60; 40 females, mean age 22.13 ±7.99) were recruited from the 
University of Liverpool community, using online advertisements. The number of participants 
was decided upon using a power calculation to find a medium effect size (F² = .20, α = .05, 1-
β = 90%) with two predictors (reactive control, proactive slowing). Inclusion criteria included 
heavy drinking (defined using UK government guidelines i.e. consume > 14 UK units of 
alcohol per week (1 UK unit = 8g of pure alcohol)). Exclusion criteria included a self-
reported previous or current diagnosis of a Substance Use Disorder, ADHD or a psychiatric 
disorder. The study was approved by the University of Liverpool’s Research Ethics 
Committee. Data is freely accessible on Open Science Framework [Link: 




Participants completed a 14-day Timeline follow back drinking diary (TLFB: (Sobell & 
Sobell, 1990)), the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT: (Saunders et al., 
1993)) (α=.69), the Temptation and Restraint Inventory (TRI: (Collins & Lapp, 1992)) (α’s = 
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.51 to .75) and the Barratt Impulsivity Scales (BIS: (Patton et al., 1995)) (α’s = .46 to .71). 
They also completed the ‘right now’ version of the Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol 
Questionnaire (AAAQ: (McEvoy et al., 2004)) (α’s = .49 to .82) followed by the Brief Mood 
Introspection Scale (BMIS: (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988)) (α’s =.63 to .83). 
 
Inhibitory control tasks 1 
In the modified SST (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014), each trial began with the 
presentation of a white fixation line (approximately 40 mm) in the centre of the screen for 
500ms. Following this, two words were presented, one immediately above and below the 
line. One of the words described natural objects (e.g. ‘pony’, ‘crab’) and the other described 
man-made objects (e.g. ‘flag’, ‘shed’). Participants were required to respond to the position 
of the natural object (target) word relative to the fixation line (above or below) by a key press 
(no-signal trials). Words related to man-made objects were presented as distractors in the 
opposite location in relation to the fixation line. The task comprised two blocks (no-signal 
block, stop-signal block) which were completed in a counterbalanced order: 
No-signal block: During this block, participants were asked to identify the position of 
the target word relative to the line as quickly as possible, without interruption on 100% of 
trials (N = 128).  
Stop-signal block: During this block, 75% of trials (N=96) were the same as the trials 
in the no-signal block as described above. The outstanding 25% of trials (N=32) were stop-
signal trials in which the white fixation line in the centre of the screen increased in size by 
300%. When this occurred, participants were asked to try and withhold their response. 
Participants were given standard Stop-Signal task instructions that sometimes this would be 
easy and sometimes this would be difficult or even impossible, but that they should not wait 
for the line to appear (Verbruggen et al., 2019). 
In the Stop-signal block, we used a tracking procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a) 
to adjust the stop-signal delay (the delay between the presentation of the target and distractor 
word and the increase in size of the stop-signal) on a trial-by-trial basis. The initial stop-
signal delay was 250ms, however if participants failed to withhold their response, the delay 
decreased by 50ms to make subsequent response inhibition easier. If participants correctly 
withheld their response, the delay increased by 50ms to make subsequent response inhibition 
more challenging. Reactive control was inferred from the mean Stop-Signal Reaction Times 
 
1 Task schematics are presented in the supplementary materials. 
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(SSRT) on no-signal trials in the stop-signal block. Proactive slowing was inferred from the 
degree of reaction time slowing in the stop-signal block compared to the no-signal block. 
In the Stop Signal-anticipation task (SST-anticipation: (Zandbelt et al., 2011)) 
participants completed a single block of 342 trials. At the beginning of each trial, a horizontal 
line was presented at the bottom, centre and top of the screen for 500ms. The central line was 
assigned as the target line.  Following this, a bar shaped object moved upwards at a constant 
speed from the bottom line to the top line. This bar reached the target response line (central 
line) in 800ms and the top line in 1000ms at which the trial ended. Participants were required 
to stop the bar as close to the target line as possible by a key press (‘space bar’). These trials 
were no-signal trials. However, participants were also informed that on some trials the bar 
would stop moving automatically (stop-signal) and that they should try to withhold their 
response when this happened. These trials were stop-signal trials. If participants responded 
during a stop-signal trial or failed to respond during a no-signal trial, a red cross (+) was 
presented in the centre of the screen to inform participants that their response was incorrect. 
They were also given standard Stop-Signal task instructions as described above.  
In this block, the target response line was presented in one of five different colours 
across trials, which was indicative of stop-signal probability. Each colour had a different 
stop-signal probability level; Green (0%), Yellow (17%), Orange-red (20%), Dark orange 
(25%) and red (33%). There were 282 no-signal trials (0% = 102; 17% = 30; 20% = 48; 25%, 
= 54; 33% = 48) and 60 stop-signal trials (17% = 6; 20% = 12; 25% = 18; 33% = 24). A 
similar tracking procedure (Zandbelt et al., 2011) was used to adjust the stop-signal delay on 
a trial-by-trial basis. The initial stop-signal delay was 550ms, however if participants failed to 
inhibit the stop-signal delay decreased by 25ms to make subsequent stopping easier. If 
response inhibition was successful, then the stop-signal delay increased by 25ms to make 
subsequent stopping harder. Reactive control was inferred from mean SSRTs on no-signal 
trials. Proactive slowing was indicated by the degree of slowing on trials with a 17%, 20%, 
25% or 33% stop-signal probability compared to trials with a 0% stop-signal probability.  
Finally in the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT: (Lesh et al., 2013)), a 
white fixation cross (+) was presented in the centre of the screen for 500ms which indicated 
the beginning of a trial. Following this, a probe letter (A or B) was presented for 300ms 
followed by a target letter (X or Y) for 300ms. Participants pressed one key (‘V’) as quickly 
as possible when the ‘AX’ sequence was presented or a different key (‘N’) when other probe-
target letter combinations (‘AY,’ ‘BX,’ ‘BY’) were presented. The maximum duration of a 
trial was 1500ms and correct/incorrect feedback was provided after each trial. Participants 
64 
 
completed one block of 120 randomised trials which consisted of 70% (N=84) of ‘AX’ trials 
in order to establish this response as dominant. The additional probe-target letter 
combinations comprised 10% (N=12) of trials each, based on previous research (e.g. (Redick 
& Engle, 2011)). Reactive inhibition was inferred from errors on AY trials. This is because 
these trials require the individual to override a tendency to respond to the probe letter ‘A’ as 
this is frequently followed by an ‘X’ target letter, which leads to a bias in responding 
(Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008; Rush, Barch, & Braver, 2006). Hence, increased 
errors on ‘AY’ trials is indicative of worse reactive control (Gonthier et al., 2016). Proactive 
slowing was indicated by RT slowing on ‘BX’ and ‘BY’ trials compared to ‘AX’ trials. 
 
3.3.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaires followed by the computerised tasks in a 
counterbalanced order (testing time was approximately 50 minutes).  Participants were then 
debriefed and reimbursed through University course credit or a voucher. 
 
3.3.4 Data reduction and analysis  
One participant did not report consuming alcohol and was excluded. RTs < 100ms, > 
2000ms, and outside 2.5 standard deviations from the individual’s mean on the inhibitory 
control tasks were removed according to previous criteria (Jones & Field, 2015; Verbruggen 
& De Houwer, 2007). For the modified SST, data did not record for two participants and 
three were removed following an outlier analysis of errors. SSRTs were computed using the 
mean method [meanRT - meanStopSignalDelay].  
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Sample characteristics  
Participants drank an average of 49.71 (±34.29) units in the 14 days prior to taking part and 
reported an average AUDIT score of 11.86 (±4.76). There were no significant differences 
between males (52.68 ±22.53) and females (48.30 ±38.83) in units consumed (t (57) = 0.46, 
p= .65, d= 0.13) or AUDIT scores (males: 11.63 ±4.84; females: 11.98 ±4.78; t (57) = -0.26, 
p= .80, d= 0.07). Correlations between demographic variables and inhibitory control are 




3.4.2 Proactive slowing across three inhibitory control tasks 
In the modified SST, RTs were significantly slower in the stop-signal block (940.54 ±168.68) 
compared to the no-signal block (714.26 ±102.23; t (53) = -10.41, p< .001, d = 1.62) 
demonstrating proactive slowing.  
In the SST-anticipation task, there was a significant main effect of stop-signal 
probability on RTs (F (1, 68) = 9.72, p= .002, ηp2 = 0.14). Participants responded significantly 
faster on trials with a 0% stop-signal probability compared to trials with a 17% (p= .003), 
20% (p= .002), 25% (p=.002) and 33% (p=.002) probability. Participants also responded 
significantly slower on 33% probability compared to 17% (p=.019), 20% (p=.022) and 25% 
(p=.049) probability trials. This indicates the presence of proactive slowing although there 
were no other significant differences (ps >.05; see table 1 for descriptive statistics).  
Lastly, in the AX-CPT there was a significant main effect of trial type on RTs (F (3, 
103) = 55.34, p< .001, ηp2 = .57). Participants responded significantly slower to AY trials 
compared to AX trials (p< .001), BX trials (p< .001) and BY trials (p< .001) indicating 
proactive slowing. They also responded significantly slower to AX trials compared to BX 
(p=.001) and BY trials (p=. 029). There was no difference between BX and BY trials 
(p=.387) (see table 2 for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 1: Reaction times (ms) in the SST-anticipation task (N=59) split according to stop-
signal probability (values are mean and SD) 
                                        
     0%      17%     20%           25%          33%  
RT     796.85 (112.69)  838.20 (67.95)  842.19 (74.97)    841.02 (69.47)  851.35 (87.48) 
 
Table 2: Reaction times (ms) in the AX-CPT (N=42) split by probe-target letter combinations 
(values are mean and SD). 
             
  AX   AY          BX        BY   






3.4.3 Prediction of alcohol consumption 
Multiple regression analyses showed that the full regression models did not predict a 
significant amount of variance in self-reported alcohol consumption. For the modified SST 
(R² = .03; F (2, 51) = 0.80, p= .454), neither SSRTs (β= -.21, p= .212) nor proactive slowing 
(β= .10, p= .550) were significant predictors. Similarly, for the SST-anticipation (R2=.02; F 
(2, 56) =0.57, p= .571), neither SSRT (β= -.17, p= .601) nor proactive slowing (β= -.03, p= 
.931) predicted alcohol consumption. Finally, for the AX-CPT (R2= .07; F (2, 42) = 0.09, p= 
.912), neither reactive control (β= -.04, p= .810) nor proactive slowing (β= .05, p= .727) were 




The current study demonstrated that heavy drinkers employed proactive slowing strategies 
when the likelihood of an inhibitory response was increased. This supports the notion that a 
focus only on ‘reactive’ control is simplistic as inhibitory control is comprised of multiple 
processes (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) and therefore 
researchers should aim to be more precise when measuring and referring to inhibitory-related 
functions. However, individual differences in reactive stopping and proactive slowing were 
unrelated to individuals’ alcohol consumption. This lack of significant association between 
reactive control and alcohol use is in contrast to previous findings (e.g. (Christiansen, Cole, 
Goudie, et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014; Paz et al., 2016)). However, the evidence for this 
relationship is equivocal (see (Bø & Landro, 2017; Fernie et al., 2010)). Furthermore, 
research has demonstrated no significant differences in inhibitory control between controls 
and heavy drinkers (e.g. (Bednarski et al., 2012; Nederkoorn et al., 2009) or binge drinkers 
(e.g. (Czapla et al., 2015)). A meta-analysis also suggests impairments in non-dependent 
drinkers are less evident than in dependent drinkers (Smith et al., 2014). 
Therefore it is possible that the relationship between inhibitory control and alcohol 
consumption has been overemphasized in the literature, at least in non-dependent samples. 
Additionally, although the null findings for proactive slowing are informative due to the 
paucity of literature regarding this, these must be considered in the broader context of an 
inconsistent relationship between reactive control and alcohol consumption. However, our 
 
2 TLFB data was skewed. However, log transforming this did not affect the results and therefore the non-
transformed data is presented.  
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findings should also be interpreted in light of limitations. Certainly, the absence of a control 
group (e.g. light drinkers, abstainers) to compare the performance of the current sample of 
heavy drinkers would be a useful line of future research. Additionally, as the evidence of 
impairments in inhibition is more apparent in individuals who are alcohol dependent (Smith 
et al., 2014), it would be useful to clarify whether proactive slowing is impaired in these 
individuals. Finally, future research could examine the role of individual differences such as 
socioeconomic status, as previous research has demonstrated a direct effect on inhibitory 
control (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010), but also a moderating effect of the association 
between inhibitory control and nicotine use (Riggs & Pentz, 2016). 
In conclusion, results demonstrated that heavy drinkers employed proactive slowing 
when the requirement for inhibition was higher. However, individual differences in proactive 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations between alcohol use, reactive control and proactive control in the Stop-Signal tasks and 
AX-Continuous Performance Test.  
                    
        Mean (SD)  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Alcohol use      49.71 (34.29)  -.15  -.01  -.14  .12  .07  .05 
SSRT (Mod. SST)       391.27 (82.11)  -  .54**  -.15  .13  -.06  -.14 
Proactive slowing (Mod. SST)    226.28 (159.71)   -  -.31*  .28*  -.11  -.10 
SSRT (SST-antic.)                  243.18 (49.52)     -  -.91**  -.04  .11 
Proactive slowing (SST-antic.)   46.34 (110.04)        -  .06  -.17 
Reactive control (AX-CPT)         4.22 (3.36)          -  -.01 
Proactive slowing (AX-CPT)      -30.62 (84.44)            - 
                    
Reaction times are given in milliseconds. Alcohol use =alcohol units consumed in previous 14 days measured using The Timeline follow back (1 
UK unit = 8g of alcohol). Mod. SST = modified Stop-Signal Task. SST-antic. = Stop Signal-anticipation task. AX-CPT = AX-Continuous 
Performance Task 
 
*Correlations significant at p<. 05 
**Correlations significant at p<. 01 
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3.6 Supplementary Information 
3.6.1 Method 
Inhibitory control Tasks 
 
Fig 1. Task schematic of the modified SST. 
 
Fig. 2 Task schematic of the SST-anticipation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations between age, gender, impulsivity and inhibitory control measures.  
                 
     Mean (SD)  2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9  
Age     22.13 (7.99)  -.17  -.11  .10  -.03  -.26   .21  -.17  -.15 
Gender (M/F)    20/40      -  -.14  -.27*  -.26  -.03  -.02  -.22  .16  
Total BIS scores   67.56 (8.58)    -     -   .15   .17   -.16   .20    .12   .07 
SSRT (Mod. SST)   391.27 (82.11)    -     -     -   .54**    -.15   .13   -.06  -.14 
Proactive slowing (Mod. SST) 226.28 (159.71)   -    -    -    -    -.31*    .28*   -.11  -.10 
SSRT (SST-antic.)   243.18 (49.52)    -    -    -    -      -    -.91**  -.04   .11 
Proactive slowing (SST-antic.) 46.34 (110.04)  -    -    -    -      -      -      .06    -.17 
Reactive control (AX-CPT)  4.22 (3.36)  -   -   -    -     -      -      -     -.01 
Proactive slowing (AX-CPT)  -30.62 (84.44)  - - -    -     -     -      -     - 
                 
Total BIS scores = Total scores on Barratt Impulsivity scale. Mod. SST = modified Stop-Signal Task. SST-antic. = Stop Signal-anticipation task. 
AX-CPT = AX-Continuous Performance Task. *p<.05 **p<.01





For the modified-SST, we ran paired samples t-tests to investigate differences in the number 
of incorrect responses between blocks. Participants made significantly more errors on no-
signal trials in the no-signal block (6.69 ±7.96) compared to the stop-signal block (4.37 
±5.76; t (53) = 3.98, p< .001, d = 0.33), which may reflect the slowing of responses in the 
stop-signal block. In the signal block, participants also made significantly more errors on 
stop-signal trials (10.91 ±2.32) compared to no-signal trials (4.37 ±5.76; t (53) = -8.13, 
p<.001, d =1.49).  
For the SST-anticipation task, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA to investigate 
differences in the number of incorrect responses as stop-signal probability increased. There 
was a significant main effect of stop-signal probability on the number of incorrect responses 
(F (2, 119) = 122.66, p<.001, ηp2 = 0.68), which demonstrated that stopping became harder as 
stop-signal probability increased. Participants made significantly less errors when a 17% 
stop-signal probability was presented (3.31 ±1.37)  compared to 20% (5.88 ±1.66; p<.001), 
25% (9.12 ±2.25; p<.001) and 33% stop-signal probability (10.90 ±2.69; p<.001). 
Participants also made significantly less errors when an 20% stop-signal probability was 
presented compared to a 25% (p<.001) and 33% stop-signal probability (p<.001). Lastly, 
participants made significantly less errors when a 25% stop-signal probability was presented 
compared to 33% (p= .004). 
For the AX-CPT, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA to investigate differences in 
the number of incorrect responses between trial types. There was a significant main effect of 
trial type on response errors (F (2, 121) = 37.55, p< .001, ηp2 = 0.39). Participants made 
significantly more errors on AY trials (4.22 ±3.36) compared to AX trials (2.75 ±3.17; 
p=.006), BX (0.92 ±1.90; p< .001) and BY trials (0.71 ±1.41; p< .001), which reflects the 
requirement to over-ride a pre-potent response to respond to the letter ‘A.’ Participants also 
made more errors on AX trials compared to BX (p< .001) and BY trials (p<.001). There was 
no significant difference between BX and BY trials (p=.273).  
 
The reliability of the tasks. 
To investigate the internal reliability of reaction times, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha using 
the split-third method. For the modified Stop-Signal task, estimates ranged from .87 to .93 
(see table 2). Similarly, for the SST-anticipation task, estimates for internal reliability ranged 
from .86 to .97 (see table 3). Lastly for the AX-CPT, estimates for internal reliability ranged 




from .80 to .88 (see table 4). Therefore, all measures of reaction times were above the .7 cut-
off for satisfactory internal reliability (Kline, 1999). 
Table 2: Internal reliability of reaction times  in modified SST. 
        
    Cronbach’s alpha  
No-signal block   0.93 
Stop-signal block   0.89 
Stop-signal block (no-signal trials) 0.87   
 
Table 3: Internal reliability of reaction times split by stop-signal probability (0%, 17%, 20%, 
25%, 33%) in the SST-anticipation. 
        
    Cronbach’s alpha  
0% no-signal trials   0.96 
17% no-signal trials   0.86 
17% stop and no-signal trials  0.89 
20% no-signal trials   0.93 
20% stop and no-signal trials  0.92 
25% no-signal trials   0.92 
25% stop and no-signal trials  0.91 
33% no-signal trials   0.97 







3 Too few cases to produce Cronbach’s alpha due to increased % of stop-signal trials. 




Table 4: Internal reliability of reaction times in the AX-CPT.  
      
  Cronbach’s alpha  
AX RT  0.88 
AY RT   0.80 
BX RT  0.81 
BY RT  0.84   
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA): reactive and proactive inhibitory measures 
Lastly to investigate whether there are independent measures of inhibitory control, we 
conducted Principal Component Analyses. Based on Kaiser’s rule (Kaiser, 1960), we retained 
components that had eigenvalues of  > 1.  We also used a scree plot to check the maintenance 
of components. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) was used to check for sampling 
adequacy; values of 0.5 to 0.7 are deemed acceptable, values above 0.7 are deemed good to 
excellent (Hutchenson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also performed to 
check for adequate correlations between items. We used oblique rotation methods; 
specifically Oblimin rotation, when performing the PCAs based on the assumption that the 
factors are correlated. Lastly, since our sample size was 60, factor loadings greater than 0.7 
were considered robust factor loadings (see (Stevens, 2009)).  
 
Proactive and Reactive inhibitory control measures in the SST-anticipation, modified SST 
and AX-CPT. 
Firstly, we ran a PCA to investigate if the proactive and reactive measures of inhibitory 
control loaded onto the same factor across all three tasks. The sampling adequacy was 
acceptable (KMO =0.53), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity demonstrated that correlations 
between items were large enough for PCA (χ² (15) = 90.56, p<.001). The PCA revealed three 
components which explained 78.37% of the variance; component one Eigenvalue = 2.28 
(variance explained 37.95%), component two Eigenvalue = 1.37 (variance explained 22.79%) 
and component three Eigenvalue = 1.06 (variance explained 17.62%). Table 5 shows the 
factor loadings, following Oblimin rotation, which suggests that the proactive and reactive 
control measures load onto the same factor for each task. Therefore, factor one represents 
proactive and reactive control in the AX-CPT, although proactive slowing is not quite above 




the .07 threshold for robust loadings, factor two represents proactive and reactive control in 
the SST-anticipation and factor three represents these measures in the modified SST.   
 
Table 5: Principal Component Analysis for reactive and proactive measures of inhibition in 
the SST-anticipation, modified SST and AX-CPT. 
             
      Rotated components     
Variable    Component 1     Component 2      Component 3  
Reactive control (AX-CPT)         -.04  -.23       .80   
 Proactive slowing (AX-CPT)        -.12  -.29                 -.62 
SSRT (SST-antic.)                           -.98    .03       .02 
Proactive slowing (SST-antic.)         .97  -.04       .08 
SSRT (modified SST)          -.19    .92       .10 
Proactive slowing (modified SST)         .31    .76                 -.21 
             
Factors highlighted load above 0.7 and are deemed robust factor loadings.  
 
Proactive and Reactive inhibitory control measures in the SST-anticipation and modified 
SST. 
We also decided to check the independence of these measures using only the Stop-Signal 
tasks. The sampling adequacy was acceptable (KMO =0.55), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
demonstrated that correlations between items were large enough for PCA (χ² (6) = 115.84, 
p<.001). The PCA revealed two components which explained 86.92% of the variance; 
component one Eigenvalue = 2.21 (variance explained 55.24%), component two Eigenvalue 
= 1.27 (variance explained 31.68%). Table 6 shows the factor loadings, following Oblimin 
rotation. However, this suggests that factor one represents proactive and reactive control in 
the SST-anticipation and factor two represents proactive and reactive control  in the modified 









Table 6: Principal Component Analysis for reactive and proactive measures of inhibition in 
the SST-anticipation and modified SST. 
            
       Rotated components    
Variable         Component 1  Component 2   
SSRT (SST-anticipation)    -.97   -.02 
Proactive slowing (SST-anticipation)   .98   -.01 
SSRT (modified SST)     -.10   .92 
Proactive slowing (modified SST)   .13   .83 
             
Factors highlighted load above 0.7 and are deemed robust factor loadings.  
 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter contributed to the overall aims of this thesis through the isolation of proactive 
slowing and reactive control in heavy drinkers. This supports the suggestion that there is an 
over-simplification of inhibitory control in the literature. These findings also strengthened the 
rationale to examine state fluctuations in these processes in the next chapter, despite the 
finding of no relationship between individual differences in proactive or reactive control and 
alcohol use. Furthermore, I was able to take a reliable task forward, which was feasible to 
















The effect of alcohol cue-exposure and acute intoxication 
on inhibitory control processes and ad libitum alcohol 
consumption. 
 
This chapter presents two pre-registered laboratory studies that were published as an original 
research article in Psychopharmacology (2019, 236(7), 2187-2199). The online 
supplementary materials are also presented after the article. These studies were pre-registered 
on Open Science Framework (see Appendices 2 and 3) and data is freely available (links are 
provided in text). The format of the original article has been modified to match the other 
chapters in this thesis, however the content remains the same to that of which was published. 
To summarize contributions to this chapter, I designed both studies which were approved by 
Andrew Jones, Matt Field and Paul Christiansen. I collected and analyzed the data and wrote 
the manuscript. Matt Field, Paul Christiansen and Andrew Jones provided feedback on the 
article before submission to Psychopharmacology and after the peer review process.   
 
Chapter Foreword: This chapter added to the key aim of this thesis by testing transient 
impairments in inhibitory processes (reactive control, proactive slowing, signal detection) 
based on seemingly reliable manipulations of alcohol-cues (study one in this chapter) and 
alcohol intoxication (study two in this chapter). This was based on the successful isolation of 
proactive slowing and reactive control in chapter 3. The task used to measure these processes 
in the current chapter was based on the reliability analyses in chapter 3. Lastly, this chapter 
also contributed to the overall aims of this thesis by investigating whether fluctuations in 
these inhibitory processes predicted increased alcohol-seeking, and whether these fluctuations 
mediated the relationship between alcohol-cue exposure/alcohol intoxication and increased 
alcohol-seeking. Taking into account the null findings in chapter 3, a more objective measure 










Background: Alcohol intoxication and alcohol cue-exposure impair ‘reactive’ inhibitory 
control and increase motivation to drink. However, inhibitory control is a multi-component 
process that also comprises signal detection and proactive control. It is unknown whether 
intoxication and cue-exposure selectively influence these sub- processes in heavy drinkers. 
Objectives: In two pre-registered studies, we investigated whether exposure to alcohol-related 
cues (study 1) and alcohol priming (study 2) impair each of these sub-processes of inhibitory 
control and increase motivation to drink. Methods: In study 1, 64 heavy drinkers completed a 
modified Stop-Signal task in an alcohol context (with embedded alcohol-cues) and a neutral 
context (with embedded neutral-cues) followed by a subjective measure of craving and a 
bogus taste test to measure ad-libitum alcohol consumption. In study 2, 36 heavy drinkers 
consumed an alcoholic beverage (0.6 g/kg bodyweight), an alcohol-placebo beverage, and 
water on a within-subjects basis, followed by the modified Stop-Signal task and a bogus taste 
test. Results: In study 1, alcohol cue-exposure did not impair inhibitory control sub-
processes.  Reactive control was unexpectedly better following alcohol cue-exposure 
(compared to neutral cue-exposure).  However, craving and ad-libitum consumption 
increased as expected. In study 2, reactive control was significantly impaired following the 
alcohol and control primes, relative to the placebo, but there was no effect on proactive 
slowing or signal detection. As expected, intoxication increased motivation to drink and ad-
libitum consumption (compared to placebo and control). Conclusions/Importance: Alcohol 
intoxication and cue-exposure increase motivation to drink in the absence of impairments in 


















Inhibitory control is defined as the (in)ability to suppress, postpone or alter a response that is 
no longer appropriate (Logan et al., 1984) and can be measured using the Stop-Signal and 
Go/No-Go computerised tasks. These tasks require the inhibition of a pre-potent motor 
response following a ‘stop-signal’ or ‘no-go’ cue, and provide an index of inhibitory failures 
(commission errors) or latency to inhibit (Stop Signal Reaction time; SSRT).  Theoretical 
models of addiction suggest a failure or impairment in inhibitory control is a candidate 
psychological mechanism for the development and maintenance of substance misuse (e.g. (de 
Wit, 2009; Fillmore, 2003; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Yucel et al., 2019). These predictions 
are supported by empirical evidence indicating that impairments in inhibitory control predict 
variance in hazardous drinking (Colder & O'Connor, 2002; Houston et al., 2014), and meta-
analyses demonstrating that inhibition is impaired in heavy drinkers and substance dependent 
patients compared to controls (Smith et al., 2014). Longitudinal studies have also 
demonstrated that impaired inhibitory control predicts the onset of alcohol-related problems 
in at-risk adolescents (Nigg et al., 2006), the transition from heavy drinking to alcohol 
dependence (Rubio et al., 2008), and treatment success (Rupp et al., 2016). 
 Whilst the association between inhibitory control and alcohol (mis)use is seemingly 
well established, several ‘null’ findings have also been published (e.g. (Kamarajan et al., 
2005; Nederkoorn et al., 2009)), and on closer inspection inhibitory control may only explain 
a modest amount of variance in substance-use behaviour (Smith et al., 2014). One potential 
explanation for this is a simplistic conceptualization of inhibitory control. Cognitive 
neuroscience models (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) emphasise the importance of the 
underlying mechanistic processes that contribute to engagement of inhibitory control. For 
example, SSRT - the estimated time to withhold a response following the presentation of a 
stop-signal (Brevers et al., 2017) - is regularly used as an index of inhibitory control. 
However, SSRT represents more than simply the time taken to inhibit a response, because 
effective stopping relies on initial detection of the stop-signal (‘signal detection’), the 
selection of an appropriate response (‘response selection’), followed finally by execution of 
the stopping response. Importantly, Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014) 
demonstrated that signal detection contributed to the response inhibition process and can be 
isolated in Stop-Signal tasks through calculating differences in SSRTs on blocks when the 
stop-signal is presented in the centre of the screen, compared to blocks when the stop-signal 
is presented in the periphery. Additionally, although reactive control (SSRT; the act of 




stopping) is an important aspect of executive control and has been the focus of most research 
in substance use, we also have the ability to plan our behaviour and alter this ‘proactively’ 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). This preparatory response has a downstream impact on 
‘reactive stopping.’ Proactive slowing can be inferred by examining the difference in reaction 
times in blocks where inhibitory signals are present and blocks where these signals are absent 
and no inhibition is required (Aron, 2011). Indeed, research has shown that participants 
employ proactive adjustments in order to ready themselves to detect a stop-signal and 
therefore, slow down their responses (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; 
Zandbelt et al., 2011). Although these additions may increase task difficulty, we can 
investigate whether these additional processes influence performance on Stop-Signal tasks 
and if reactive control alone is limited as a model of executive control (Aron, 2011). 
Importantly, both signal detection and proactive control may have a significant role in 
substance use-behaviour (Brevers et al., 2017). First, substance users selective attention is 
guided by substance-related cues (Townshend & Duka, 2001) and impaired by alcohol 
(Plawecki et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2014), which may make it difficult to detect inhibitory 
signals in the environment. Second, substance users rarely engage global reactive stopping  
responses in the real world (i.e. reaching for a glass but then inhibiting), but regularly engage 
proactive control processes (i.e. preparation in advance, such as declining to order an 
alcoholic drink). Therefore, to better understand  the association between inhibitory control 
and alcohol use we need to account for  the influence of preparation and signal detection on 
inhibitory control (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
A second issue which may impact the association between inhibitory control and 
alcohol use is the stability of the processes. The majority of research suggests inhibitory 
control is stable over long periods. However, more recent evidence suggests inhibitory 
control may fluctuate over time within individuals, suggesting that the capacity to proactively 
prepare, choose and stop a response are fluid. In a narrative review (Jones, Christiansen, et 
al., 2013), we identified various situational and internal triggers, for example, alcohol-related 
cues, alcohol intoxication, ego-depletion and stress, which may cause short term deficits in 
inhibitory control (see also (de Wit, 2009)). Subsequent empirical research has demonstrated 
limited evidence for stress-related impairments in inhibitory control (Scholz et al., 2009) and 
the veracity of the ego-depletion effect is under debate (Hagger et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
the effects of acute intoxication and cue-exposure on inhibitory control are seemingly robust; 
with a systematic review (Weafer & Fillmore, 2016) demonstrating alcohol intoxication 




consistently impairs inhibitory control and a recent meta-analyses demonstrating small but 
robust effects of alcohol-cue exposure on inhibitory control (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018).  
Across the majority of studies included in these evidence syntheses the focus was 
global reactive control indices (SSRTs or No/Go errors), and currently there is little research 
investigating the effects of alcohol cues and intoxication on inhibitory sub-processes 
(specifically, proactive slowing and signal detection). In one study, Sharma (Sharma, 2017) 
showed how preceding alcohol-cues (compared to neutral cues) impaired the performance of 
heavy drinkers,  but not light drinkers, on a modified Stroop task. These results implied that 
heavy drinkers were relying on reactive control, whereas light drinkers were employing 
proactive control to filter out the context of the prior image. Conversely, Campbell et al 
(Campbell et al., 2017) demonstrated that alcohol intoxication increased motor SSRTs but did 
not influence proactive slowing. Indeed, this emphasises the simplistic conceptualization of 
inhibitory control in the majority of prior research and the need to break inhibitory control 
down into its component processes to further understanding. 
Consequently, the current studies aimed to directly investigate the effect of alcohol 
cue-exposure (study 1), and alcohol intoxication (study 2) on the different components of 
inhibitory control (namely reactive stopping, signal detection and proactive control), and 
subsequent craving and ad-libitum alcohol consumption. We included these alcohol-seeking 
measures due to substantial evidence demonstrating that both alcohol-related cues (Fatseas et 
al., 2015; MacKillop & Lisman, 2007) and alcohol intoxication (Christiansen et al., 2013; de 
Wit & Chutuape, 1993) increase motivation to consume subsequent alcohol. We also aimed 
to investigate whether increased alcohol-seeking was the product of impairments in the 
different components of control as past research has demonstrated that impairments in 
inhibitory control predict hazardous drinking (Colder & O'Connor, 2002; Houston et al., 
2014). We pre-registered the design, statistical power-calculations, hypotheses and analysis 
strategy, with data freely available on Open Science Framework (study 1: [ 
https://osf.io/qf72a/], study 2: [ https://osf.io/dg27x/]).  
 
4.3 Study 1 
We hypothesised that exposure to alcohol-related cues compared to neutral cues would (i) 
impair reactive control, signal detection and proactive slowing; (ii) increase self-reported 
craving and subsequent ad-libitum alcohol consumption. We also hypothesised that (iii) 
deficits in proactive slowing and signal detection would predict unique variance in alcohol 




consumption after controlling for reactive inhibition. Finally, we hypothesised that (iv) the 
effects of alcohol-cue exposure on ad libitum alcohol consumption would be partially 




Heavy drinkers (N=64; 37 females, 27 males) took part in a laboratory study across two 
sessions, approximately one week apart. Participants were aged between 18 and 59 (M = 
23.73, SD = 9.33) and were recruited from the University of Liverpool and wider community 
through online advertisements.   We conducted a power analysis to detect a within-subjects 
interaction (d = .39, α = .05, 1-β = 90%) based on a pooled effect size from studies which 
have examined the effect of alcohol-related cues on inhibitory control in heavy drinkers (e.g. 
(Czapla et al., 2015; Kreusch, Vilenne, & Quartemont, 2013)). Heavy drinking was defined 
using UK government guidelines: males and females who consume > 14 UK units of alcohol 
per week (1 UK unit = 8g of pure alcohol). Eligibility criteria included; age 18 or over, a 
fluent English speaker and a self-reported motivation to reduce their alcohol consumption. 
We recruited individuals who reported motivation to restrict consumption as these individuals 
should be employing inhibitory control to restrict their intake (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012). Exclusion criteria included; self-reported current or previous diagnosis of 
Substance Use Disorder, ADHD, psychiatric disorder, a current/recent illness (e.g. flu) that 
could increase sensitivity to alcohol, taking medications (e.g. antidepressants) that are 
adversely affected by alcohol, pregnancy or breastfeeding. The study was approved by the 




Participants completed a battery of questionnaires; this included a two-week Timeline follow 
back (TLFB: (Sobell & Sobell, 1990))  to measure retrospective alcohol consumption in 
units, the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT: (Saunders et al., 1993)) to 
measure hazardous drinking (study 1: α = .66, study 2: α = .66), the Brief Comprehensive 
Effects of Alcohol Questionnaire (B-CEAQ: (Ham et al., 2005)) to measure alcohol outcome 
expectancies (study 1: α = .84   study 2: α = .80), the Temptation Restraint Inventory (TRI: 
(Collins & Lapp, 1992)) to measure drinking restraint (preoccupation with and efforts to 




reduce drinking)  (study 1: α’s > .61, study 2: α’s > .54) and the Barratt Impulsivity Scale 
(BIS: (Patton et al., 1995)) to measure self-reported impulsivity across three dimensions 
(Motor, Non-planning and Attentional) (study 1: α’s > .61, study 2: α’s > .44). 
To measure self-reported craving before and after the Stop-Signal task, participants 
completed the Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire ‘right now’ version 
(AAAQ: (McEvoy et al., 2004)) which consists of three sub-scales of craving 
(Inclined/Indulgent, Obsessed/Compelled, Resolved/Regulated) (study 1: α’s > .64, study 2: 
α’s > .78). Participants also completed a funnelled debrief to measure awareness of the 
experimental aims of the study. This included an open question asking what the purpose of 
the experiment was and two fixed-response questions asking the purpose of the computer task 
and the taste test (see supplementary materials).  
 
Modified Stop-Signal task (SST;(Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014)). 
Participants completed a modified Stop-Signal task, designed to isolate proactive slowing, 
reactive control and signal detection. At the beginning of each trial, a white fixation line 
appeared in the middle of the screen for 500ms, as well as a white border around the edge of 
the screen display. Following these, two words appeared, one immediately above the line and 
one immediately below the fixation line. These words described natural- (e.g. lion, swan) or 
man-made (e.g. desk, shed) objects, based on (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Natural 
words were assigned as targets and participants had to respond as quickly as possible to their 
position in relation to the line (above or below) by a key press. Man-made words were 
distractors. Depending on condition, a neutral-related image (e.g. a scene from an office) or 
alcohol-related image (e.g. a scene from a bar) appeared in the background on each trial. 
There were 10 of each image type, and they were 230 mm x 130 mm in size. The task 
consisted of three blocks (no-signal block, central-signal block, peripheral-signal block), 
which were presented in a randomised, counterbalanced order. 
No-signal block: In this block participants had to identify the position of the target 
word in relation to the line without interruption on 100% of trials (128 in total).  
Central-signal block: In this block participants had to identify the position of the 
target word in relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). The 
remaining 25% (32 in total) trials were stop-signal trials, in which the white fixation line 
between the words increased in size by 300%. Participants were told to try and withhold their 
response to the target word position if this happened. 




Peripheral-signal block: In this block participants identified the position of the target 
word in relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). The remaining 
25% (32 in total) trials were stop signal trials, in which the white square around the edge of 
the display increased in size by 300%. Participants were told to try and withhold their 
response to the target word position if this happened. 
Participants were also given standard stop-signal instructions in which they were 
explicitly told that they should not to wait for the signal and should instead, respond as 
quickly as possible. In both the central-signal and peripheral signal block the delay between 
presentation of the target and distractor word and the increase in size of the stop signals 
(fixation line or square around the display) was adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis using a 
tracking procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In each block the initial delay was 250ms, 
if participants failed to inhibit the delay decreased by 50ms making subsequent inhibition 
easier, if participants successfully inhibited then the delay increased by 50ms making 
subsequent inhibition more difficult.  
In line with our pre-registration, reactive control was inferred as the mean SSRT 
(Verbruggen et al., 2013) collapsed across central and peripheral signal blocks.  However, we 
also examined SSRTs based only on central signal blocks in order to provide a more direct 
comparison with previous literature. Proactive slowing was inferred from the degree of 
reaction time slowing on both stop-signal blocks compared to no-signal blocks (RTstop-
signal – RTno-signal). Signal detection was inferred from the difference in SSRT 
(SSRTperiphery signal – SSRTcentral signal) between central-signal and periphery-signal 
blocks. The effects of alcohol-cues on each process were measured by comparing 
performance across conditions (alcohol context, neutral context). 
 
Ad libitum taste test 
Participants received 250 ml of chilled Skol beer (2.8% vol. ABV) and 250 ml of chilled 
fresh orange juice (non-alcoholic beverage). They were not informed of the brands used and 
were given each drink simultaneously in unmarked glasses.  Participants were asked to taste 
and rate the drinks on various gustatory dimensions e.g. ‘How bitter did you find the drink?’ 
using visual analogue scales and were told to ‘drink as much or as little as you like in order 
to make accurate judgements’. Before completion, participants were also told that alcohol 
would impair performance on the next task, in which they had the opportunity to win small 
amounts of money, in order to increase their motivation to restrict their intake (taken from 




(Christiansen et al., 2013; Field & Jones, 2017)). The volume of each drink consumed was 
recorded unobtrusively at the end of each session, and ad-libitum alcohol consumption was 
expressed as the amount of beer as a percentage of total fluid consumed. 
 
4.4.3 Procedure 
Participants attended two sessions approximately one week apart, the order of which was 
counterbalanced. One session was completed in a standard neutral laboratory, the other was 
completed in the University of Liverpool’s Bar Laboratory  
(https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/psychology-health-and-society/departments/psychological-
sciences/facilities/bar-lab/) which resembles a typical UK bar containing advertisements for 
alcohol, beer pumps etc. Participants were breathalysed at the beginning of each session and 
were required to have a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.0mg/l in order to take part. 
Participants first provided demographic information and completed the battery of 
questionnaires measuring alcohol use and personality and the AAAQ to measure craving 
before the SST. Before each block of the task, participants were asked to smell a drink and 
allow a small amount to touch their lips (beer in the alcohol session, water in the neutral 
session), to increase cue-reactivity further (see (Field & Jones, 2017)). Following the SST, 
participants completed a second AAAQ to measure craving following the task. They then 
completed the taste test followed by a Balloon Analogue Risk task (BART; (Lejuez, Aklin, 
Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003)). During this task, participants had to click a mouse to pump up 
10 simulated balloons. Each pump was worth £0.05 which they could collect in a “permanent 
bank.” However, if the balloon burst before collection, participants lost the money from that 
trial. This task was presented to ensure participants believed our cover story, that alcohol 
might impair their performance. Our hypotheses did not concern performance on this task, 
and as a result it is not reported here (see supplementary materials for further details). 
Participants then provided a final breath alcohol sample, and in the final session completed a 
funnelled debrief assessing awareness of experimental measures (see supplementary 
analyses). 
 
4.4.4 Data reduction and analysis 
For the Stop-Signal task, outliers were removed following criteria suggested in previous 
research (Field & Jones, 2017; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007). Reaction times that were 
greater than 2000ms or less than 100ms were removed; as were reaction times that were 




greater than 2.5 standard deviations greater or less than individual means. We also checked 
for outliers during examination of box-and-whisker plots.4 Two participants were removed 
from the Stop-Signal task analysis as the data did not record for one block. One participant 
did not complete the taste test during the neutral session as they stated they had not eaten 
during the day of testing. Details of how each hypothesis was analysed is included in the pre-
registration. Post-hoc comparisons were carried out using LSD tests. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Sample characteristics (see supplementary table 1) 
Participants consumed 53.64 (±35.64) units on average in the two weeks prior to their 
participation in the study, and reported an average AUDIT score of 12.59 (± 4.65), indicative 
of hazardous drinking. An independent t-test revealed no significant differences in AUDIT 
scores between males (13.48 ±5.21) and females (11.95 ±4.16; t (62) = 1.31, p = .195, d = 
0.33). However, males consumed significantly more units (68.87 ±46.16) in the two weeks 
prior to the study compared to females (42.53 ±19.56; t (33) = 2.79, p = .009, d = 0.71). 
 
4.5.2 Hypothesis 1: Does alcohol cue-exposure cause deficits in inhibitory processes (see 
table 1) 
Deficits in signal detection and reactive control were analysed using a 2 (block: central 
signal, peripheral signal) x 2 (condition: alcohol cue-exposure, neutral cue-exposure) 
repeated measures ANOVA on SSRTs. This revealed a significant main effect of block, (F 
(1, 61) = 36.99, p< .001, ηp2= .38) where SSRTs were significantly faster for central 
compared to peripheral blocks. This indicates greater reactive stopping when the stop-signal 
was presented centrally compared to in the periphery. There was also a main effect of 
condition, (F (1, 61) = 4.52, p= .038, ηp2= .07) but contradictory to our hypothesis, SSRTs 
were significantly faster (indicating better reactive stopping) during alcohol-cue exposure 
compared to neutral cue-exposure. Furthermore, there was no interaction between block and 
condition (F (1, 61) = 3.02, p= .087, ηp2= .05) suggesting that cue-exposure did not impair 
signal detection. We also compared SSRTs in central stop-signal blocks only and this 
revealed no significant differences in SSRTs following alcohol cue-exposure compared to 
 
4 Two participants were identified during the outlier analysis with a high frequency of errors. However, their 
removal did not change the pattern of results. 




neutral cue-exposure (t (61) = -.74, p= .463, d= -0.11) again suggesting that alcohol-cues did 
not impair reactive control. 
Proactive slowing was analysed using a 2 (block: no-signal block, central and 
peripheral signal blocks) x 2 (condition: alcohol cue-exposure, neutral cue-exposure) 
repeated measures ANOVA on reaction times. This showed a main effect of block, (F (1, 61) 
= 134.47, p< .001, ηp2= .69) whereby participants slowed down their responses more in the 
stop-signal blocks compared to the no-signal blocks indicative of proactive slowing. 
Furthermore, there was a main effect of condition, (F (1, 61) = 5.34, p= .024, ηp2= .08) 
whereby participants were slower to respond during neutral cue-exposure compared to 
alcohol cue-exposure. However, there was no significant interaction between block and 
condition, (F (1, 61) = 1.11, p= .295, ηp2= .02) suggesting that alcohol cue-exposure did not 
impair proactive slowing.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for SSRTs and mean go-reaction times (ms) shown separately 
for each condition (values are Mean, SD) 
             
 
     Alcohol cue-exposure  Neutral cue-exposure  
 
SSRT (central)   426.13 (108.39)  437.32 (102.34) 
 
SSRT (peripheral)   475.48 (132.71)  526.12 (156.64) 
 
Overall SSRT    450.81 (103.27)  481.72 (116.30) 
 
No-signal block RT   714.75 (101.78)  757.15 (114.72) 
 
Signal block RT (central)  946.11 (233.52)  963.67 (182.66) 
 
Signal block RT (periphery)  945.29 (229.26)  971.08 (168.05) 
             
Lower score = faster SSRT. Overall SSRT = mean of the periphery and central SSRTs 
 
4.5.3 Hypothesis 2: Does alcohol cue-exposure increase craving and ad-libitum alcohol 
consumption (see table 2) 
To examine whether alcohol cue-exposure increased craving, scores on the AAAQ were 
analysed using a 3 (subscale: mean scores on inclined/indulgent, obsessed/compelled, 
resolved/regulated) x 2 (time: pre-manipulation, post-manipulation) x 2 (condition: alcohol 




cue-exposure, neutral cue-exposure) repeated measures ANOVA.  This revealed that there 
was no main effect of condition (F (1, 63) = 1.31, p= .257, ηp2= .02) or time (F (1, 63) = 2.41, 
p= .125, ηp2 = .04). However, there were significant condition x time (F (1, 63) = 11.96, p= 
.001, ηp2 = .16) and condition x time x AAAQ subscale (F (2, 114) = 5.95, p= .005, ηp2 = .09) 
interactions.  
To examine these interactions further, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on each 
subscale separately. For the Inclined/Indulgent subscale there was no main effect of condition 
(F (1, 63) = 0.79, p= .378, ηp2 = .01). However, there was a main effect of time (F (1, 63) = 
4.15, p= .046, ηp2 = .06) with scores decreasing post-manipulation. There was also a 
significant condition x time interaction (F (1, 63) = 13.45, p= .001, ηp2 = .18). This revealed a 
decrease from pre- to post-manipulation following neutral cue-exposure (p<.001) but no 
difference between pre- and post-manipulation following alcohol-cue exposure (p=.279). 
This suggests craving did not significantly increase following alcohol-cue exposure. Lastly, 
there was no difference at post-manipulation between the two conditions (p=.437). For the 
Obsessed/Compelled subscale, there was a condition x time interaction (F (1, 63) = 6.82, p= 
.011, ηp2 = .10) demonstrating that participants reported greater craving post-manipulation 
compared to pre-manipulation following alcohol cue-exposure (p= .025) but no difference 
following neutral cue-exposure (p= .768). There was also no difference between the 
conditions at post-manipulation (p = .524). Lastly, there was only a main effect of time on the 
Resolved/Regulated scale (F (1, 63) = 6.21, p= .015, ηp2 = .09) which showed scores 
decreased at post-manipulation in both conditions.  
To examine differences in ad-libitum alcohol consumption we conducted paired 
samples t-tests on beer consumed (as a percentage of total fluid). This revealed that 
participants drank significantly more beer following alcohol cue-exposure compared to 
neutral cue-exposure (t (62) = 2.66, p= .01, d = 0.34; see figure 1). Finally, there was no 
significant difference in ratings of alcohol pleasantness following alcohol cue-exposure (6.33 
± 2.31) compared to neutral cue-exposure (6.11 ± 2.13; t (62) = 0.96, p=.34, d= 0.12) (see 
supplementary materials for further details). 
We also hypothesised that deficits in proactive slowing and signal detection would 
predict unique variance in alcohol consumption after controlling for reactive inhibition, and 
that the effects of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol consumption would be partially 
mediated by changes in the different components of control. However, we did not 
demonstrate impairments due to alcohol cue-exposure and deficits in inhibitory control did 




not predict alcohol consumption. Hence, we do not meet the assumptions required to examine 
within-subjects mediation (see supplementary materials).   
 
Table 2: AAAQ scores before and after the modified Stop-Signal Task split by experimental 
condition (values are mean, SD). 
             
      Alcohol cue-exposure               Neutral cue-exposure  
   Pre-task Post-task  Pre-task Post-task  
Inclined/Indulgent 4.61 (1.54) 4.74 (1.58)  5.05 (1.44) 4.59 (1.68) 
Obsessed/Compelled 0.75 (0.89) 0.95 (1.05)  0.91 (1.04) 0.88 (1.03) 
Resolved/Regulated 1.28 (1.14) 1.15 (1.22)  1.38 (1.22) 1.38 (1.22)  
              
 
Fig 1 Boxplot to show beer consumed as a percentage of total fluid following alcohol cue-
exposure and neutral cue-exposure (N=63) 
 
 





4.6 Interim discussion 
Study one demonstrates that alcohol cue-exposure did not impair inhibitory sub-processes. 
Indeed, reactive control was unexpectedly better following alcohol cue-exposure (compared 
to neutral cue-exposure) when examining central and peripheral stop-signal blocks, although 
there was no difference when analysing central blocks only. Furthermore, although there was 
the presence of proactive slowing and increased signal detection of central stop-signals 
(compared to periphery), neither proactive slowing nor signal detection were directly 
impaired by alcohol-cues. In line with previous research, alcohol cue-exposure increased 
craving (albeit weakly) and subsequent ad-libitum alcohol consumption. However, this was 
not the result of impairments in inhibitory sub-processes. 
 
4.7 Study 2 
In study two, we administered a control, placebo-alcohol and alcohol prime to investigate the 
pharmacological and anticipated effects of alcohol on inhibitory sub-processes and 
motivation to drink. Typical alcohol priming studies compare the effects of an alcohol dose 
and a placebo dose to investigate the pharmacological effects of alcohol (e.g. (Fillmore et al., 
2009; Marczinski et al., 2005; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008)). However, this comparison has low 
ecological validity as in the real world it is likely that the effect of alcohol is the result of both 
the pharmacological and the anticipated effects. Therefore, with the addition of a control 
condition we are able to distinguish the anticipated from the pharmacological effects of 
alcohol (Christiansen et al., 2013). 
We hypothesised that acute alcohol intoxication compared to placebo and control 
would (i) cause deficits in reactive control, signal detection and proactive slowing; (ii) 
increase alcohol-seeking measures5. We also hypothesised that (iii) following alcohol 
intoxication, proactive slowing, signal detection and reactive control would predict unique 
variance in alcohol consumption. Finally, we hypothesised that (iv) the effects of alcohol 
intoxication on ad libitum alcohol consumption would be partially mediated by changes in 
the different components of control. 
 
 
5 We also predicted that the placebo-alcohol beverage would increase subjective intoxication ratings, motivation 
to drink, beer consumed in the taste test and deficits in proactive and reactive control compared to the control 
condition, but not to the same extent as alcohol. 






Heavy drinkers (N = 36; 19 males) took part in a laboratory study with three sessions, 
approximately one week apart. Participants were aged between 18 and 44 (M = 24.75, SD = 
±7.33). The number of participants was decided upon using a power calculation to find a 
medium effect size (d = .50) at α = .05, and 90% power. Studies have demonstrated larger 
effect sizes of alcohol impairments on inhibitory control (Stroop) tasks (e.g. (Rose & Duka, 
2008) d = .89)), however as no research has examined the effects on inhibitory 
subcomponents we opted for a more conservative estimate of d = .50.  Inclusion exclusion 




Participants completed the same questionnaires and awareness of experimental aims 
questions (see supplementary materials) that are described in the method of study 1. They 
also completed the Subjective intoxication scales (SIS; (Duka et al., 1998)) to measure 
subjective feelings of ‘lightheaded,’ ‘irritable’, ‘stimulated’, ‘alert’, ‘relaxed’ and ‘contented’ 
following alcohol priming. We also asked participants how many alcohol units they believed 
they had consumed in the priming drink in each session. 
 
Stop-signal task (SST; (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014))  
Participants completed a modified Stop-Signal task, which was near identical to task 1. The 
only difference being that we removed the alcohol and neutral-related images in order to 
prevent contamination of findings with cue-exposure. Therefore, the task was presented on a 
black background across each block and session. 
 
4.8.3 Procedure 
Participants attended three sessions (alcohol, placebo and control) in a neutral laboratory. 
Each session took place between 12pm and 6pm and had to be at least one week apart. The 
sessions were completed in a pseudo-counterbalanced order. In line with previous studies 
participants completed the control session first, followed by either the placebo or alcohol 
session in a counterbalanced order. Participants were informed that the experiment was 
investigating the effect of a high, low and no dose of alcohol on taste perception. Participants 




were breathalysed at the beginning of each session and BAC of 0.0mg/l was required in order 
to take part. 
Participants first completed the demographic questions and a battery of questionnaires 
measuring personality and alcohol use (first session only). They then completed the AAAQ 
and dependent on condition, received either the alcohol, placebo or control drink (in 2 
glasses) and were asked to consume this within 10 minutes, followed by a 20-minute 
absorption period.  
The alcoholic drink contained vodka (Smirnoff Red, 37.5% alcohol by volume (ABV)) and 
chilled tonic water. The alcohol dose was calculated as 0.6g/kg of body weight (maximum 
dose of 200 ml vodka / 8 UK units) and the drink mixed one-part vodka, three parts tonic 
water. The placebo-alcohol drink contained chilled tonic water, the total volume of which 
was the same as the alcoholic drink. Vodka mist was sprayed onto the surface of the drink 
and smeared onto the rim of the glass to simulate the smell and taste of alcohol. Tabasco 
sauce was also added to the drink to give the burning sensation of alcohol. The control drink 
consisted of chilled water; the total volume was identical to the alcoholic and placebo drink. 
This procedure is similar to previous research carried out (e.g. (Christiansen et al., 2013)). 
Participants then completed the AAAQ, SIS, and provided a breath alcohol sample, 
before completing the SST. Following the SST, participants completed the ad-libitum taste 
test (see study 1 method) and were informed that alcohol may impair their performance on 
the last task, in which they had the opportunity to win small amounts of money. Lastly, 
participants completed the BART task (see study 1 procedure/supplementary materials) and 
provided a final breath alcohol sample.  
 
4.8.4 Data Analysis 
SST data was handled using the same procedures as study 1. Two participants were excluded 
from the SST analysis due to outliers.  One participant was removed from the analysis of the 
taste test as they did not complete this during one session. Further details on the analysis of 




4.9.1 Sample characteristics (see supplementary table 1) 
Participants consumed an average of 48.90 (±25.72) UK units in the two weeks prior to the  




first session of the study and reported a mean AUDIT score of 11.78 (±4.81), indicative of 
hazardous drinking. There was no significant difference in AUDIT scores between males 
(11.32 ±3.89) and females (12.29 ±5.75; t (34) = -.60, p= .55, d= 0.20), however males did 
consume significantly more units (60.32 ±25.68) than females (36.15, ±19.43; t (34) = 3.16, p 
= .003, d= 1.06) in the two weeks prior to taking part. There were no significant differences 
in drinking patterns of the participants across the two studies (see supplementary materials).   
 
4.9.2 Hypothesis 1: Does alcohol intoxication cause deficits in inhibitory processes (see 
table 3) 
Deficits in signal detection and reactive control were analysed using a 2 (block: central, 
periphery) x 3 (condition: control, alcohol, placebo) repeated measures ANOVA on SSRTs. 
There was a significant main effect of block (F (1, 33) = 48.05, p< .001, ηp2= .59) with 
SSRTs significantly faster in the central stop-signal blocks compared to the peripheral stop-
signal blocks. Similar to study 1, this indicates that reactive stopping was better when stop-
signals were presented centrally compared to in the periphery. There was also a main effect 
of condition (F (2, 66) = 3.44, p= .038, ηp2= .09) which revealed that as predicted SSRTs 
were significantly slower (indicating poorer reactive control) following alcohol intoxication 
compared to the placebo (p= .008). However, there was no difference following alcohol 
compared to the control prime (p= .841). Contrary to predictions, SSRTs were also 
significantly faster following the placebo compared to the control (p= .033) suggesting that 
the anticipated effects of alcohol did not impair reactive control. Lastly, there was no 
interaction between block and condition (F (2, 66) = 2.09, p = .132, ηp2= .06) indicating 
alcohol intoxication did not impair signal detection. For direct comparisons with previous 
research we also investigated differences in SSRTs computed from central stop-signal blocks 
only. This also revealed a main effect of condition (F (2, 66) = 3.39, p= .04, ηp2= .09) which 
demonstrated that SSRTs were significantly slower following alcohol compared to a placebo 
(p=.018) but only demonstrated weak evidence for a difference following alcohol compared 
to a control (p= .084). However, there was also no difference between control compared to 
the placebo primes (p= .449), again demonstrating no anticipated impairing effects of alcohol 
on reactive control.  
Deficits in proactive slowing were analysed using a 2 (block: no-signal, stop-signal) x 
3 (condition: control, alcohol, placebo) repeated measures ANOVA on mean go-reaction 
times. In line with study 1, this revealed a significant main effect of block (F (1, 33) = 81.13, 




p<.001, ηp2= .71). Participants responded significantly faster in the no-signal block compared 
to the stop-signal blocks indicating the presence of proactive slowing. There was also a main 
effect of condition (F (2, 66) = 3.64, p=.032, ηp2= .10) which revealed that participants were 
slower to respond in the control session compared to the alcohol (p=.011). However, there 
was no difference following the alcohol prime compared to the placebo (p=.292) or following 
the placebo compared to the control (p=.132). Most importantly, there was no interaction 
between block and condition (F (2, 66) = 0.89, p= .415, ηp2= .03) suggesting that alcohol 
intoxication did not impair proactive slowing.   
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for SSRTs and mean go-reaction times (ms) shown separately 
for each condition (values are Mean, SD) 
             
       Control     Alcohol     Placebo  
SSRT (central)  378.39 (76.26)  410.39 (81.39)  364.86 (84.59) 
SSRT (periphery)  512.11 (176.87) 490.48 (174.51) 431.50 (105.64) 
Overall SSRT   445.25 (109.54) 450.44 (109.69) 398.18 (85.58) 
No-signal block RT  708.67 (90.77)  670.85 (77.59)  691.27 (113.87) 
Signal block RT(central) 948.71 (180.38) 887.37 (187.88) 879.85 (192.15) 
Signal block RT(periphery) 976.68 (170.86) 894.70 (218.66) 940.19 (206.74) 
             
Lower score = faster SSRT. Overall SSRT = mean of the periphery and central SSRTs 
 
4.9.3 Hypothesis 2: Does alcohol intoxication increase alcohol-seeking and consumption 
(see Table 4) 
Changes in craving subscales were assessed using a 3 (subscales: mean score on 
inclined/indulgent, obsessed/compelled and resolved/regulated) x 3 (condition: control, 
alcohol, placebo) x 2 (time: pre-drink, post-drink) repeated measures ANOVA. There was no 
main effect of condition, (F (2, 70) = 0.90, p= .41, ηp2= .03) or time, (F (1, 35) = 2.54, p= .12, 
ηp2= .07). However, there was a significant condition x time interaction (F (2, 70) = 7.96, 
p=.001, ηp2= .19).  
To examine the interaction, we conducted 3 (condition: control, alcohol, placebo) x 2 
(time: pre-drink, post-drink) repeated measures ANOVAs on each subscale individually. For 




both the Inclined/Indulgent and Obsessed/Compelled subscales, there was a significant 
condition x time interaction (Inclined (F (2, 70) = 5.71, p= .005, ηp2= .14); Obsessed (F (2, 
70) = 3.98, p=.023, ηp2=.10)). The nature of these interactions demonstrated that participants 
reported lower scores on the Inclined subscale at post-control compared to pre-control 
(p=.005) but there were no significant differences across time in the alcohol or placebo 
sessions (ps >.05). Across conditions, participants reported higher scores on the 
Inclined/Indulgent subscale following the alcohol prime compared to the placebo (p=.044) 
but there were no other significant differences between conditions. On the 
Obsessed/Compelled subscale, participants reported higher scores at post-drink in the alcohol 
session compared to pre-alcohol (p=.018) but there was no difference following the placebo 
or control drinks. Participants also reported higher scores following alcohol compared to the 
control (p= .004) but there were no other significant differences across conditions. For the 
Resolved/Regulated subscale, there was only a main effect of time (F (1, 35) = 10.90, p= 
.002, ηp2= .24) which demonstrated that participants felt less avoidant towards alcohol post-
drinks compared to pre-drink. Notably, there were no significant differences in any of these 
measures pre-drink (ps >.05).  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for craving scores before and after the priming drinks (Values 
Are Mean, SD) 
             
          Inclined/Indulgent        Obsessed/Compelled Resolved/Regulated  
Pre-control   5.12 (1.92)  1.22 (1.65)  1.33 (1.37)  
Post-control  4.34 (2.36)  1.11 (1.59)  1.18 (1.33) 
Pre-placebo  4.74 (1.89)  1.38 (1.87)  1.48 (1.45) 
Post-placebo  4.27 (2.23)  1.41 (1.88)  1.08 (1.28) 
Pre-alcohol  4.68 (1.67)  1.41 (1.80)  1.34 (1.47) 
Post-alcohol  4.98 (2.11)  1.83 (2.04)  1.13 (1.50) 
             
 
We also investigated if alcohol priming increased ad-libitum alcohol consumption. 
There was a main effect of condition on beer consumed in the taste test (F (2, 68) = 5.98, 
p=.004, ηp2=.15). Participants drank significantly more beer following the alcohol prime 




compared to both control (p=.002) and placebo (p=.045) primes, however, there was no 
difference following the control compared to placebo prime (p=.199) (see figure 2). There 
was no main effect of condition on pleasantness ratings of beer (F (2, 68) = 1.89, p=.159, 
ηp2=.05).  
For BACs a 3 (Condition: alcohol, placebo, control) x 2 (time: post-drink, end of 
session)  repeated measures ANOVA with 3 levels demonstrated a significant main effect of 
condition, (F (1, 34) = 399.94, p< .001, ηp2= .92) with significantly higher BACs following 
the alcohol prime compared to the placebo (p< .001) and control (p< .001) primes. As 
expected there was no significant difference following the placebo prime compared to the 
control (p= .518). There was also a significant main effect of time (F (1, 34) = 27.94, p < 
.001, ηp2= .45). As expected, BACs were significantly higher at end of session compared to 
post-drink. Finally, there was also a significant condition x time interaction (F (2, 68) = 3.95, 
p = .038, ηp2= .10) with significantly higher BACs following the alcohol prime (0.27 ±0.09) 
compared to the placebo-alcohol (0.00 ±0.00) and control (0.00 ±0.00) at post-drink (p<.001). 
Following the taste test, BACs were also significantly higher at the end of the session 
following the alcohol prime (0.32 ±0.09) compared to the placebo (0.02 ±0.03; p<.001) and 
control (0.02 ±0.04; p<.001). There was no difference between the placebo and control drinks 
at post drink or end of session (p=.518). Analyses for subjective intoxication and estimation 
of units can be found in the supplementary materials. 
We also hypothesised that deficits in inhibitory sub-processes would predict unique 
variance in beer consumed during the bogus taste test and that the effect of alcohol 
intoxication on beer consumed would be partially mediated by the different components of 
control. However, the effect of alcohol priming on SSRTs was weak and deficits in inhibitory 
sub-processes did not predict unique variance in beer consumption, therefore these analyses 















Fig 2 Boxplot of the mean consumption of beer (as a % of total fluid consumed) in the ad 





The current studies aimed to investigate the effect of alcohol cue-exposure and alcohol 
intoxication on proactive slowing, reactive control, signal detection and subsequent craving 
and ad-libitum alcohol consumption. In study 1, there were no impairments of proactive 
slowing or signal detection following alcohol cue-exposure (compared to neutral cue-
exposure), and contrary to hypotheses reactive control was unexpectedly faster following 
exposure to alcohol-cues compared to neutral-cues. Alcohol-cues did have a weak effect on 
craving (on the Obsessive scale of the AAAQ) and increased ad-libitum alcohol 
consumption. In study 2, neither proactive slowing or signal detection were impaired by 
alcohol intoxication. SSRTs were slower (indicative of worse inhibitory control) following 
alcohol compared to the placebo prime supporting our hypothesis, but there was no difference 
 
6 The removal of outliers from the control session did not significantly influence the comparison in beer 
consumption following the alcohol prime compared to the control, however the comparison following the 
alcohol prime compared to the placebo was no longer significant.  




compared to the control condition. SSRTs were also significantly faster following the placebo 
compared to the control suggesting the anticipated effects of alcohol did not impair reactive 
control. As expected, alcohol priming did increase self-reported craving and ad-libitum 
alcohol consumption (compared to placebo and control). 
Taken together, these findings provide limited support for theoretical models which 
suggest that inhibitory control is a state variable which fluctuates in response to internal 
(alcohol intoxication) and environmental (cue-exposure) events (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013). Specifically, we failed to replicate numerous studies which have 
demonstrated impairments following alcohol cue-exposure in both non-dependent (Field & 
Jones, 2017; Kreusch, Vilenne, & Quartemont, 2013; Monk, Sunley, Qureshi, & Heim, 2016; 
Petit et al., 2012; Weafer & Fillmore, 2012) and dependent drinkers (Gauggel et al., 2010; 
Muraven & Shmueli, 2006). Indeed, SSRTs were faster during alcohol cue-exposure 
compared to neutral cue-exposure when analysing both central and peripheral stop-signal 
blocks and there was no difference across central blocks only. However, a recent meta-
analysis (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018) demonstrated this effect is likely to be small in 
magnitude (Standardised Mean Difference = 0.217), and other research has also failed to 
demonstrate these effects across non-dependent and dependent drinkers (Jones, Rose, et al., 
2013; Nederkoorn et al., 2009). 
Importantly, we demonstrated support that acute alcohol intoxication impaired 
reactive control compared to a placebo which supports previous research (e.g. (Fillmore et 
al., 2009; Marczinski et al., 2005; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008)). However, the addition of a 
control group revealed that the effect of alcohol intoxication on SSRTs is limited.  We also 
failed to support the observation that placebo intoxication impairs inhibitory control 
compared to control groups (Christiansen et al., 2016) as when analysing both central and 
periphery blocks, SSRTs were unexpectedly faster following the placebo compared to the 
control, although there was no difference across central blocks only. These results may be 
partially explained by compensatory effects in which participants in the placebo condition 
may attempt to compensate for impairments (Fillmore, Mulvihill, & Vogel-Sprott, 1994), and 
research demonstrates that individuals who show larger compensatory effects following a 
placebo usually show more tolerance to impairment following alcohol (Testa et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, although Campbell et al (Campbell et al., 2017) reported an impairment of 
motor (but not saccadic) inhibition following alcohol intoxication, their effect was smaller 
 
7 Note that this meta-analysis was published after recruitment of this study, hence the larger estimate of d=.39 
used for the power calculation. 




than predicted. This led them to suggest that there is a lack of power and the existence of 
publication bias in the literature. Similarly, Jones et al (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018) also 
recently questioned the clinical significance of any impairments due to the small effect size 
and lack of associations with substance use behaviours. 
Our findings provide support for recent cognitive models which suggest that 
inhibitory control is a multi-process behaviour (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). We were 
able to adapt tasks from the literature to isolate signal detection and proactive control, and 
across both studies showed that heavy drinkers demonstrate proactive slowing when 
inhibition is more likely and also increased stopping times when stop-signals are in the 
periphery, which demonstrates the contribution of signal detection to reactive stopping 
processes. Notably, the requirement of participants to detect a visual central or peripheral 
stop-signal and differentiate between natural and man-made words may have improved the 
ecological validity of the task as in the real world, signal detection and response inhibition 
occur under complex conditions (e.g. multiple environmental demands) and in ‘noisy’ 
surroundings (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). However, this may have contributed to a 
failure to replicate previous findings due to the increased task difficulty and therefore, 
attention requirements. The use of a visual stop-signal did however decrease the need for 
divided attention as this was the same modality as the go-stimuli (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 
2014). Furthermore, it should be noted that Campbell et al (Campbell et al., 2017) also failed 
to demonstrate a reliable decrease in proactive slowing following alcohol priming, however 
as previously noted there is a lack of research focusing on this aspect of executive control and 
therefore it is still possible that proactive slowing is impaired by alcohol. Despite limited 
evidence for impairments within individuals, future research should therefore investigate 
whether these impairments are exacerbated in clinical populations, or evident in individuals 
who do not drink to hazardous levels (Sharma, 2017).  
Finally, our findings provide further empirical support of studies which have 
demonstrated that alcohol-related cues (Fatseas et al., 2015; Koordeman, Anschutz, & 
Engels, 2011; MacKillop & Lisman, 2007) and alcohol intoxication (e.g. (Christiansen et al., 
2013; de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Rose & Grunsell, 2008)) increase subsequent alcohol 
seeking.  Furthermore, although the placebo-alcohol increased subjective feelings of light-
headedness supporting previous research (e.g. (Rose et al., 2013)), there was no difference in 
beer consumption following the placebo-alcohol and control as predicted. Nevertheless, this 
replicates the findings of Christiansen et al (Christiansen et al., 2013) and implies that the 
pharmacological effects (not the anticipated effects) of alcohol are key to the priming effect 




on subsequent motivation to consume alcohol. However, those studies (e.g. (Marlatt, 
Demming, & Reid, 1973)) which have found an increase in alcohol consumption following a 
placebo compared to a control tend to have a short interval between administration of the 
drinks and the taste test. In both Christiansen et al’s study (Christiansen et al., 2013) and the 
current study, there was a longer interval (approximately 40 minutes passed between 
beverage consumption, the Stop-Signal task and the bogus taste test in the current study), 
therefore, the effect of the placebo on subsequent motivation to drink may have reduced over 
time (Christiansen et al., 2013). Additionally, despite the increase in ad-libitum consumption 
in both studies we did not demonstrate robust increases in craving. Although contradictory to 
our hypothesis and previous findings (e.g. (Christiansen et al., 2013; Fatseas et al., 2015; 
Field & Jones, 2017; Rose et al., 2013)), this suggests that alcohol seeking can increase 
without an accompanied increase in self-reported craving, which has also been reported in 
previous studies (e.g. (Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010) see also (Tiffany, 
1990; Wiers et al., 2007)). 
 Our findings should be interpreted in light of limitations. In study 1 our cue-exposure 
manipulation may not have been strong enough to influence inhibitory control. Although we 
used similar methods to (Field & Jones, 2017), their manipulation may have been 
strengthened by asking participants to sniff beer after every 16 trials rather than at the 
beginning of each block, and responding directly to alcohol related cues (rather than neutral 
words). Additionally, their sample had greater levels of weekly alcohol consumption (~34.18 
units) and AUDIT scores (~14.18), suggesting these individuals demonstrate a greater 
sensitivity to cue-reactivity (Herrmann, Weijers, Wiesbeck, Böning, & Fallgatter, 2001). 
Second, we are unable to separate the effects of these different cue modalities on inhibitory 
processes and ad-libitum alcohol consumption and future studies should attempt to isolate 
these effects (Monk et al., 2016). 
In conclusion, alcohol-related cues and alcohol priming increase motivation to 
consume subsequent alcohol, however this is unlikely due to an impairment in the ability to 
inhibit behaviour(s). Future research should attempt to clarify the mechanisms underlying this 
relationship and investigate additional processes which may lead to impairments in inhibitory 
control, in order to increase our understanding of hazardous drinking. 
 




4.11 Supplementary Information 
4.11.1 Methods 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; ((Lejuez et al., 2003)) 
In both studies, participants completed a short cognitive task in which they had to click a 
mouse to pump up simulated balloons. They were presented with one balloon per trial and 
completed 10 trials. Each time participants clicked to pump up the balloon, the balloon 
increased in size and they hypothetically collected $0.05 in a temporary bank. They could 
transfer this money to a “permanent” bank by clicking collect. However, they were informed 
that if the balloon bursts, they would lose the money stored in the temporary bank. Once the 
balloon had burst or the participant had collected the money, a new trial began whereby the 
size of the balloon was reset and the temporary bank was set back to $0. We programmed the 
balloons to burst on a variable ratio, with 64 pumps as the average explosion point. 
Participants completed this task after the bogus taste test in both studies; they were told that 
alcohol would impair their performance on this task in which they had the opportunity to win 
small amounts of money in order to increase their motivation to reduce their intake (see 
(Christiansen et al., 2013; Field & Jones, 2017)). Actual performance on this task was of 
secondary importance but data is available upon request. 
 
4.11.2 Results 
Sample characteristics (see table 1) 
We conducted independent samples t-tests to compare the participants in study 1 (alcohol-cue 
exposure) to participants in study 2 (alcohol priming) on baseline variables and drinking 
variables. There were no significant differences in the age of participants (t (98) = -.56, p= 
.575, d= .12), AUDIT scores (t (98) = .83, p= .408, d= .17), units consumed in the two weeks 
prior to the study (t (98) = .70, p= .485, d= .15) or total scores on the Barratt Impulsivity 










Table 1: Sample characteristics and baseline variables of participant samples in study 1 and 
study 2 split by gender (values are mean, SD) 
                  
     Study 1     Study 2    
 Males  Females  Sample  Males  Females  Sample  
 
N     27       37       64        19       17      36 
 
Age 22.04(9.26) 24.97(9.30) 23.73(9.33) 26.11(8.05) 23.24(6.33) 24.75(7.33) 
 
AUDIT 13.48(5.21) 11.95(4.16) 12.59(4.65) 11.32(3.89) 12.29(5.75) 11.78(4.81)
    
TLFB 68.87(46.16) 42.53(19.56) 53.64(35.64) 60.32(25.68) 36.15(19.43) 48.90(25.72) 
 
BIS 69.81(10.54) 65.22(8.40) 67.16(9.56) 66.00(11.68) 69.65(9.97) 67.72(10.91) 
 
Audit=Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test. Scores above 8 are indicative of hazardous drinking. 
TLFB=Timeline follow back. Units consumed in 14 days prior to taking part. BIS=Total scores on Barratt 
Impulsivity Scale. 
 
4.11.3 Study 1 
Hypothesis 2: Does alcohol-cue exposure increase craving and ad-libitum alcohol 
consumption? 
Participants also had marginally significantly higher BACs following alcohol cue-exposure 
(0.03 ± 0.04) compared to neutral cue-exposure (0.02 ± 0.03; t (62) = 2.00, p=.05, d= 0.33).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Do deficits in proactive slowing and signal detection predict unique variance 
in alcohol consumption after controlling for reactive inhibition? 
We conducted multiple regression analyses on each condition separately. Variation Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) ranged between 1.05 and 1.43 suggesting there were no issues with multi-
collinearity. The full regression model did not predict a significant amount of variance (R² = 
.05) in beer consumed (as a percentage of total fluid consumed) following alcohol-cue 
exposure (F (3, 57) = 0.90, p= .447). SSRT (β= .22, p= .154, 95% CI -.02 to .09), signal 
detection (β= -.07, p= .593, 95% CI -.05 to .03) or proactive slowing (β= -.01, p= .958, 95% 
CI -.03 to .03) were not significant predictors. Similarly, the overall regression model did not 
predict a significant level of variance (R² =.12) in beer consumed following neutral cue-
exposure (F (3, 57) = 2.29, p= .088). Again, neither SSRT (β= -.18, p= .219, 95% CI -.07 to 




.02), signal detection (β= -.19, p= .196, 95% CI -.06 to .01) or proactive slowing (β= -.09, p= 
.498, 95% CI -.04 to .02) were significant predictors. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The effects of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol consumption will be 
partially mediated by changes in the different components of control (see figure 1-3). 
To examine whether changes in the different components of control partially mediate the 
effect of alcohol-cue exposure on ad libitum alcohol consumption, we ran a within-subjects 
mediation analysis using MEMORE macro for SPSS (Montoya & Hayes, 2016). We used 
bias-corrected, bootstrapped (1000 samples) confidence intervals. Firstly, there was no 
indirect effect of alcohol-cue exposure on beer consumed during the bogus taste test via 
SSRT (B= -1.02 (SE= 1.00), 95% CI -3.47 to 0.63). However, the direct effect of alcohol-cue 
exposure on beer consumed was significant after controlling for SSRT (B= 7.80 (SE= 2.50), 
95% CI 2.80 to 12.79). Secondly, there was also no indirect effect of alcohol-cue exposure on 
ad libitum consumption via proactive slowing (B= 0.46 (SE= 0.69), 95% CI -0.30 to 2.79), 
although there was a direct effect after controlling for proactive slowing (B=6.32 (SE= 2.48), 
95% CI 1.36 to 11.28). Thirdly, there was no indirect effect via signal detection (B= 0.31 
(SE= 0.79), 95% CI -0.76 to 2.78), however the direct effect was significant after controlling 
for signal detection (B= 6.46 (SE= 2.50), 95% CI 1.45 to 11.47). Lastly, there was a 
significant total effect of alcohol cue-exposure on ad libitum beer consumption (B= 6.77 
(SE= 2.46), 95% CI 1.86 to 11.69). 
 
Fig 1: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol-cue exposure on ad libitum alcohol 










Fig 2: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol-cue exposure on ad libitum alcohol 




Fig 3: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol-cue exposure on ad libitum alcohol 




4.11.4 Study 2 
Hypothesis 2: Does alcohol intoxication increase alcohol-seeking measures? 
There was a significant main effect of condition of subjective feelings of light-headedness (F 
(2, 70) = 39.23, p < .001, ηp2= .53). Participants felt significantly more light headed following 
the alcohol priming drink (38.97 ±27.82) compared to the control (2.40 ±5.49; p < .001) and 
placebo-alcohol drink (12.89 ±19.69; p < .001). Participants also reported feeling 
significantly more light headed following the placebo-alcohol drink compared to the control 
(p= .004). There was also a significant main effect of condition of subjective feelings of 
alertness, (F (2, 60) = 10.61, p < .001, ηp2= .23). Participants reported feeling significantly 
more alert following the control drink (65.71, ±26.10) compared to the alcohol (42.44 
±26.17; p< .001) and placebo-alcohol drinks (54.56 ±23.10; p = .023). Participants also 
reported feeling significantly more alert following the placebo-alcohol drink compared to the 




alcohol drink (p = .008).  There were no other significant differences in the subjective 
intoxication measures between sessions (ps >.05). 
There was a significant main effect of condition on estimation of units in the priming 
drink (F (2, 60) = 92.84, p < .001, ηp2= .73). Participants thought they had consumed 
significantly more units in the alcohol drink (4.61 ±2.38) compared to the placebo-alcohol 
(2.69 ±1.63; p < .001) and control drink (0.00 ±0.00; p < .001). They also reported 
consuming significantly more units in the placebo-alcohol drink compared to the control 
drink (p < .001). Notably, two participants believed that the placebo drink contained no 
alcohol but removal of these did not significantly influence our results. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Do inhibitory sub processes predict variance in beer consumed during bogus 
taste test? 
We ran multiple regression analyses on each condition separately. VIFs ranged between 1.04 
to 2.58 suggesting no issues with multi-collinearity. The full regression model did not predict 
a significant amount of variance in beer consumed (as a percentage of total fluid consumed) 
in the alcohol session (R2 = 0.06, F (3, 29) = 0.64, p= .598). SSRT (β= -.33, p= .195, 95% CI 
-.15 to .03), signal detection (β= .25, p= .323, 95% CI -.03 to .09) and proactive slowing (β= 
.10, p= .608, 95% CI -.03 to .05) were not significant predictors of beer consumed following 
alcohol intoxication. The full regression model also did not predict a significant amount of 
variance in beer consumed during the placebo session (R2 = .08, F (3, 29) = 0.89, p= .457). 
Neither SSRT (β = .20, p = .339, 95% CI -06 to .17), signal detection (β =-.26, p = .186, 95% 
CI -.19 to .04) nor proactive slowing (β = .03, p= .90, 95% CI -.05 to .06) were significant 
predictors of beer consumed following the placebo-alcohol prime. Lastly, the full regression 
model also did not predict significant variance in beer consumed during the control session 
(R2 = .01, F (3, 29) = 0.06, p= .982). Again, neither SSRT (β = .06, p= .839, 95% CI -.10 to 
.12), signal detection (β = -.10, p= .729, 95% CI -.08 to .06) nor proactive slowing (β = .02, p 
=.922, 95% CI -.05 to .05) were significant predictors of beer consumed following the control 
prime.  
 




Hypothesis 5: The effect of alcohol intoxication on beer consumed would be partially 
mediated by the different components of control. 
Alcohol-control priming (see figure 4-6) 
There was no indirect effect of alcohol priming (compared to the control) on ad libitum 
consumption via SSRT (B = -.20 (SE = 0.99), 95% CI -5.58 to 0.79). However, the direct 
effect of alcohol priming on consumption was significant after controlling for SSRT (B = 
13.02 (SE = 4.04), 95% CI 4.76 to 21.28). Similarly, there was no indirect effect of alcohol 
priming on consumption via proactive slowing (B = 0.77 (SE = 1.15), 95% CI -0.67 to 4.06), 
although the direct effect was significant after controlling for proactive slowing (B= 12.05 
(SE = 4.05), 95% CI 3.77 to 20.32). Thirdly, there was no indirect effect via signal detection 
(B = 0.15 (SE= 1.14), 95% CI -1.73 to 3.07), however, the direct effect was significant after 
controlling for signal detection (B= 12.67 (SE = 4.10), 95% CI 4.30 to 21.03). Lastly, there 
was a significant total effect (B = 12.82 (SE = 3.94), 95% CI 4.80 to 20.84) of alcohol 
priming on ad libitum alcohol consumption.  
Fig 4: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol priming (control-alcohol) on ad libitum 
alcohol consumption via SSRT. 
 
 
Fig 5: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol priming (control-alcohol) on ad libitum 
alcohol consumption via Proactive slowing. 
 
 




Fig 6: The direct and indirect effect of alcohol priming (control-alcohol) on ad libitum 




Alcohol-placebo priming (see figure 7-9) 
Furthermore, there was no indirect effect of priming (alcohol compared to placebo) on beer 
consumed via SSRT (B = 1.27 (SE = 2.96), 95% CI -2.04 to 11.09) or direct effect of priming 
on beer consumed after controlling for SSRT (B= 6.84 (SE= 4.72), 95% CI -2.80 to 16.47). 
There was also no indirect effect of priming on beer consumed via proactive slowing (B = -
0.04 (SE = 0.82), 95% CI -2.24 to 1.06) or no direct effect after controlling for proactive 
slowing (B = 8.14 (SE = 4.21), 95% CI -0.46 to 16.74). Additionally, there was no indirect 
effect of priming on beer consumed via signal detection (B= 0.01 (SE = 0.87), 95% CI -1.85 
to 1.89) and no direct effect after controlling for signal detection (B= 8.09 (SE = 4.23), 95% 
CI -0.55 to 16.74). Lastly, there was no total effect of priming on beer consumed (B = 8.10 
(SE = 4.09), 95% CI -0.23 to 16.44). 
 
Fig 7: The direct and indirect effect of priming (alcohol-placebo) on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption via SSRT.  
 
 




Fig 8: The direct and indirect effect of priming (alcohol-placebo) on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption via proactive slowing.  
 
 
Fig 9: The direct and indirect effect of priming (alcohol-placebo) on ad libitum alcohol 




Placebo-control priming (see figure 10-12). 
Lastly, there was no indirect effect of priming (placebo compared to control) on consumption 
via SSRT (B= -0.44 (SE= 1.58), 95% CI -3.96 to 2.60) or no direct effect of priming on 
consumption after controlling for SSRT (B = 5.16 (SE = 4.00), 95% CI -3.01 to 13.33). There 
was also no indirect effect via proactive slowing (B = 0.12 (SE = 1.00), 95% CI -1.60 to 2.17) 
or direct effect after controlling for proactive slowing (B = 4.60 (SE = 3.87), 95% CI -3.31 to 
12.50). Thirdly, there was no indirect effect via signal detection (B = 2.23 (SE = 2.26), 95% 
CI -0.90 to 8.00) or direct effect after controlling for signal detection (B = 2.49 (SE = 4.09), 
95% CI -5.86 to 10.83). Lastly, there was no significant total effect of priming on alcohol 
consumption (B = 4.72 (SE = 3.67), 95% CI -2.76 to 12.19).  
 
 




Fig 10: The direct and indirect effect of priming (placebo-control) on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption via SSRT.  
 
 
Fig 11: The direct and indirect effect of priming (placebo-control) on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption via proactive slowing. 
 
 
Fig 12: The direct and indirect effect of priming (placebo-control) on ad libitum alcohol 




4.11.5 Awareness of experimental aims 
In both studies we checked participants’ awareness of our experimental aims and none of the 
participants guessed the full aims (inferred from an open ended question). However, in study 
1, 13 participants guessed the aim of the taste test was to measure how much they drank, but 
removing these had no significant effect on the results. Additionally, we removed 17 




participants who correctly selected that the purpose of the computer task was to ‘Assess my 
behavioural impulsivity (response inhibition).’ This removed the main effect of condition on 
SSRTs, however contrary to predictions this had shown SSRTs were faster following 
alcohol-cue exposure (compared to neutral-cue exposure). Similarly, in study 2, five 
participants guessed the aim of the taste test but when removed, the main effect of condition 
remained significant. Eight participants also correctly guessed the purpose of the computer 
task but removal of these only altered the main effect of condition on proactive slowing 
which had simply shown participants were slower to respond overall in the control priming 
session compared to the alcohol priming session. 
 
4.11.6 exploratory analyses  
We also conducted exploratory analyses to investigate the effect of alcohol-cue exposure 
(study 1) and alcohol intoxication (study 2) on the number of errors made during the Stop-
Signal task. This also allowed an investigation into differences in the number of errors 
between stop-signal blocks. 
 
Study 1 
To investigate the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on the number of errors made during the 
stop-signal task, we conducted a 2 (block: Central, Peripheral) x 2 (condition: Alcohol-cue 
exposure, Neutral-cue exposure) repeated measures ANOVA on incorrect no-signal trials and 
incorrect stop-signal trials. This showed no significant main effect of block on the number of 
incorrect no-signal responses (F (1, 61) = 0.15, p= .703, ηp2= .002). There was however, a 
main effect of condition (F (1, 61) = 8.09, p= .006, ηp2= .12) which revealed that participants 
made significantly less errors to no-signal trials in the bar laboratory compared to the neutral 
laboratory. Finally, there was no significant interaction between block and condition (F (1, 
61) = 0.11, p= .746, ηp2= .002). With regards to incorrect responses on stop-signal trials, there 
was a significant main effect of block (F (1, 61) = 10.72, p= .002, ηp2= .15), which revealed 
that participants made more errors in the central blocks compared to the peripheral blocks. 
However, there was no main effect of condition (F (1, 61) = 0.84, p= .362, ηp2= .01) or 
interaction (F (1, 61) = 2.21, p= .142, ηp2= .04). Lastly, a paired samples t-test revealed no 
significant differences in the number of incorrect responses in the no-signal block in the bar 
laboratory compared to the neutral laboratory (t (61) = -1.49, p= .141, d= .17).   
 




Table 2: The number of incorrect responses shown separately for each block of the SST and 
experimental condition (values are mean, SD). 
             
     Alcohol cue-exposure  Neutral cue-exposure  
No-signal block    7.35 (4.97)   8.21 (4.83) 
No-signal trials (central block)  6.06 (6.92)   7.74 (4.62) 
Stop-signal trials (central block)  11.81 (4.40)   11.82 (3.66) 
No-signal trials (periphery block)  5.68 (4.47)   7.69 (4.70) 
Stop-signal trials (periphery block)  12.58 (4.53)   13.56 (5.24)  
 
Study 2 
We ran a 2 (block; Central, Peripheral) x 3 (condition: alcohol, placebo, control) repeated 
measures ANOVA on incorrect no-signal trials and incorrect stop-signal trials. This revealed 
there was no main effect of block on incorrect no-signal trials (F (1, 33) = 1.27, p= .269, 
ηp2=.04), nor was there an effect of condition (F (2, 66) = 1.29, p= .284, ηp2= .04) or an 
interaction (F (2, 66) = 0.01, p= .989, ηp2= .00). With regards to incorrect stop-signal trials, 
there was a main effect of block (F (1, 33) = 9.39, p= .004, ηp2= .22) which showed that 
participants made less errors in central blocks compared to periphery blocks. There was also 
a main effect of condition (F (2, 66) = 4.95, p= .01, ηp2= .13) which demonstrated that 
participants made more errors on stop-signal trials following alcohol compared to the control 
(p= .014) and placebo-alcohol primes (p= .018). However, there was no significant difference 
following the control prime compared to the placebo-alcohol prime (p= .412).  Furthermore, 
there was no significant interaction between block and condition (F (2, 66) = 1.28, p= .285, 
ηp2= .04). Lastly, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition on 
incorrect responses in the no-signal blocks (F (2, 54) = 14.24, p< .001, ηp2= .30). However, 
this revealed that participants made significantly more errors during the control session 
compared to the alcohol (p< .001) and placebo (p< .001) sessions, but no difference in errors 








Table 3: The number of incorrect responses shown separately for each block (no-signal, 
central stop-signal, peripheral stop-signal) of the SST and experimental condition (values are 
mean, SD). 
             
 
    Control  Alcohol  Placebo  
 
No-signal block  5.74 (3.66)  7.35 (5.31)  6.56 (6.24) 
  
No-signal trials (central) 4.44 (2.94)  5.44 (5.05)  4.53 (4.61) 
 
Stop-signal trials (central) 11.06 (2.91)  12.97 (3.52)  12.15 (2.54) 
 
No-signal trials (periphery) 4.12 (3.01)  5.09 (4.51)  4.09 (3.54) 
 
Stop-signal trials (periphery)  12.62 (4.53)  14.53 (5.23)  12.47 (3.74)  
 
 
4.12 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter contributed to the overall aims of this thesis by replicating the findings of 
chapter 3 that heavy drinkers demonstrate proactive slowing, but also that the stopping 
process is influenced by the successful detection of stop-signals. Thus, this supports the 
suggestion that there is an over-simplistic conceptualisation of inhibitory control in the 
literature. However, although alcohol-cue exposure and alcohol intoxication increased 
alcohol-seeking, these results were unlikely due to impairments in inhibitory processes 
(reactive stopping, signal detection and proactive slowing). Indeed, there were only limited 
impairing effects of alcohol intoxication on reactive control, and neither intoxication nor 
alcohol-cue exposure impaired proactive slowing or signal detection. In particular, the results 
regarding the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on reactive control were surprising considering 
the seemingly robust impairing effect. This strengthened the rationale to clarify the role of 
proactive control and reactive control in heavy drinking, and to examine potential the 
mechanisms which may contribute to these effects. 
 
 





The associations between proactive slowing, working 
memory, alcohol sensitivity and alcohol use. 
This chapter presents two online studies, the second of which was pre-registered on Open 
Science Framework (see Appendices 5), that were submitted as an original research article in 
the Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs. The online supplementary materials are also 
presented after the article. Data for both studies is freely available on Open Science 
Framework (links are provided in main text). Task schematics are also presented in the 
Appendices (see Appendices 4 and 5). The format of the original article has been modified to 
match the other chapters in this thesis, however the content remains the same to that of which 
was submitted to the journal. To summarize contributions, I designed both studies which 
were approved by Andrew Jones. I collected the data with the help of second year 
undergraduate students. I analyzed the data and wrote the manuscript. Andrew Jones 
provided feedback on the manuscript before submission to the Journal of Studies on Alcohol 
and Drugs.  
 
Chapter Foreword: This chapter contributed to the key aims of this thesis by further 
attempting to clarify the role of proactive slowing and reactive control in heavy drinkers, in 
the presence of alcohol-related cues. Due to the null findings in the laboratory thus far, these 
studies were conducted outside of the laboratory to increase sample sizes and ecological 
validity. Lastly, I also sought to examine potential mechanisms underlying the relationship 
between inhibitory processes and alcohol use. Specifically, I aimed to investigate the 
mediating effects of Working Memory Capacity in response to neutral-images and alcohol-











Background: ‘Reactive’ inhibitory control is associated with heavy drinking and alcohol 
dependence. However, the majority of research ignores the downstream influence of 
proactive control – the preparation to withhold responses when examining alcohol-use 
behaviours. The potential mechanisms behind these relationships are also poorly understood. 
Objectives: These studies aimed to investigate the role of proactive and reactive control in 
heavy drinkers, in the presence of alcohol-related cues and to examine the potential mediating 
effects of Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and alcohol-sensitivity (AS). Methods: In two 
studies, heavy drinkers completed online self-reported measures of alcohol use followed by a 
modified Stop-Signal task in the presence of alcohol related cues (images – study 1; words – 
study 2) and a Self-Ordered Pointing Task using neutral-related images (study 1) and alcohol-
related images (study 2). Results: In both studies, individual differences in proactive slowing 
and reactive control were not associated with individual differences in overall alcohol use. 
There was also no evidence that WMC or AS mediated the relationship between proactive 
slowing and alcohol use. However, poorer WMC was associated with increased alcohol use 
in study 1 and poorer proactive slowing in study 2. Conclusions/Importance: This study 
offers limited support for the associations between poorer WMC and increased drinking as 
well as poorer proactive slowing. However, individual differences in reactive control and 
proactive slowing were not associated with overall alcohol use, and these relationships were 















Inhibitory control is the (in)ability to inhibit behaviours that are inappropriate under current 
circumstances, and is closely linked to impulsivity and self-regulation (Baumeister, 2014; 
Bickel et al., 2012). The inability to inhibit incongruous behaviour has been associated with 
hazardous drinking (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014; Paz et al., 
2016)) and Alcohol Use Disorders (Smith et al., 2014). Inhibitory control is thought to 
fluctuate within individuals in response to various psychological and environmental triggers, 
including alcohol intoxication and alcohol-cue exposure (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, 
et al., 2013), with these fluctuations playing a causal role in alcohol consumption/(re)lapse. 
Meta-analyses suggest small but robust impairments in inhibitory control following alcohol 
cue-exposure (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018),  however there are also failures to demonstrate 
this effect (Baines, Field, Christiansen, & Jones, 2019a; Jones, Rose, et al., 2013). 
 To date the majority of research in the field has focused on ‘reactive’ inhibitory 
control, which is the (unobservable) act of stopping or withholding a response, and is 
operationalized as inhibition errors/success or Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) on the 
Go/No-Go and Stop Signal tasks, respectively (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
However, to effectively inhibit behavior requires a number of distinct downstream processes 
including action selection, the detection of an environmental signal to inhibit, and response 
execution, all of which may be influenced by proactive slowing (i.e. preparation) 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). A failure to consider the role of preparation on these 
processes leads to over simplistic assumptions of the relationship between alcohol-related 
cues and inhibitory control. Indeed, Aron (Aron, 2011) suggests that proactive slowing may 
be a more appropriate model of inhibitory control in explaining real-world substance use 
behaviours. It seems more likely that individuals who are attempting to limit alcohol 
consumption will proactively adjust their behaviour to suppress urges over a prolonged 
period of time, rather than relying on fast, reactive inhibition that acts as a late correction 
mechanism (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). 
Research suggests that alcohol-related cues may induce cognitive biases that influence 
proactive slowing and the execution of a reactive stopping response (Stacy & Wiers, 2010).  
Recent research has developed methods to disentangle proactive from reactive control, in 
order to separately measure their effects. Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014) 
incorporated a block of trials in which there was no inhibition signal on a Stop-Signal task 
(SST), and compared the reaction times on this block to a block of trials where inhibition was 




required. The slowing of reaction times when inhibitory control is required (compared to not 
being required) is indicative of strategic proactive adjustments in control (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b). In two recent studies (Baines et al., 2019a), we used a similar version of this 
task to examine if i) heavy drinkers employed proactive control and ii) if this was impaired 
by alcohol intoxication or exposure to alcohol-related cues. We demonstrated that heavy 
drinkers did utilise proactive control (i.e. they proactively slowed responses in anticipation of 
inhibiting), but there was limited impairing effects of alcohol intoxication or cue-exposure. 
These findings contrast previous research by Sharma (Sharma, 2017) who demonstrated that 
light drinkers proactively adjusted behaviour in response to alcohol-related cues in a Stroop 
task, whereas heavy drinkers relied on their reactive control as a late correction mechanism 
(see also (Braver, 2012)).  
It is important to attempt to clarify the contrasting findings above, and one potential 
reason for these conflicting results is that the mechanisms underlying the preparation to 
inhibit responses are not well understood (Criaud et al., 2012). Theoretical models suggest 
that individual differences in Working Memory Capacity (WMC) might account for variance 
in the ability to implement both proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Richmond et 
al., 2015). Individuals with greater capacity and more efficient WMC are more able to 
actively maintain goal-directed behaviour, by actively remembering and updating task rules 
(e.g. ‘inhibition is (not) required at this time, under these circumstances’) (Braver, 2012; 
Richmond et al., 2015). In support of this hypothesis, research has demonstrated that 
individuals with a high-WMC perform better than those with a low-WMC on the AX-
Continuous Performance Test (e.g. (Redick & Engle, 2011; Wiemers & Redick, 2018)), a 
task which measures proactive and reactive control (Gonthier et al., 2016). Performance on 
this task has suggested that individuals with a lower-WMC tend to be less proactive than 
those with higher-WMC (Wiemers & Redick, 2018), and rely more on their reactive control 
(Richmond et al., 2015). Therefore, these studies support the notion that individual 
differences in the use of proactive control may depend on WMC. This could have important 
implications for understanding substance misuse as evidence suggests that both substance 
dependent individuals and heavy drinkers show impairments in WMC (Bechara & Martin, 
2004; Mahedy et al., 2018; Noël et al., 2001).  
Event-related potential (ERP) research has also demonstrated that alcohol-related 
stimuli capture the attention of individuals who self –report low sensitivity (LS) to alcohol 
(e.g. (Bartholow et al., 2010; Fleming & Bartholow, 2014)). These individuals have a low 
level of response to the acute effects of alcohol, which may lead to increased consumption of 




alcohol per drinking session in order for the individual to experience the desired effects 
(Schuckit et al., 2011). A LS to alcohol is therefore considered a risk factor for alcohol 
misuse and dependence (Fleming & Bartholow, 2014; Schuckit & Smith, 2000). Alcohol 
sensitivity can be measured using self-report measure (discussed below) or by measuring 
blood alcohol concentration following a dose of alcohol (Schuckit et al., 2011). Importantly, 
it has been demonstrated that when LS individuals are faced with task irrelevant alcohol-
related stimuli, they experience conflict. When conflict is infrequent, individuals can 
overcome it by using reactive control effectively, however, when this conflict increases, these 
individuals have difficultly using proactive control efficiently (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016). 
Therefore, it is possible that individual differences in alcohol sensitivity may contribute to the 
effective use of proactive and/or reactive control in the presence of alcohol-cue exposure. 
Therefore, the aim of these two online studies was to clarify the role of proactive and 
reactive control in heavy drinkers, in the presence of alcohol-related cues (images – study 1, 
and words – study 2). We also sought to examine the potential mediating effects of WMC 
specifically in response to neutral images (study 1) and alcohol-related images (study 2), and 
also the mediating role of alcohol-sensitivity (study 2).8 Study 1 was not pre-registered, 
however the design, statistical power calculations, hypotheses and analyses for study 2 were 
pre-registered on Open Science Framework [https://osf.io/ctp2w/]. Data is available for both 
studies on Open Science Framework [study 1; https://osf.io/4jkwd/  study 2; 
https://osf.io/j5hd3/].  
 
5.3 Study 1 
In this study heavy drinkers completed a modified SST (based on (Baines et al., 2019a)) 
designed to measure proactive slowing and reactive control in the presence of alcohol-related 
images. They also completed the Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT) to measure their WMC 
and self-reported measures of alcohol consumption. We predicted that (i) individual 
differences in reactive control, proactive slowing and WMC would be associated with 
individual differences in overall alcohol use. We also predicted that (ii) individual differences 
in WMC would be associated with individual differences in proactive slowing and (iii) WMC 
would mediate the relationship between proactive slowing and alcohol use.  
 
8 In the pre-registration we did not specifically state that we would examine the mediating effects of WMC and 
AS. However, we believe this could add to the implications of the studies. We have labelled these sections of 
the results as exploratory. 






Heavy drinkers (N=108; 82 female), with a mean age of  24.11 (±8.55) participated. The 
number of participants was decided upon using an a-prioi power calculation to detect a 
medium effect size (F² = .15) at α = .05, and 90% power with four predictors (craving, 
reactive control, proactive slowing, WMC). Participants were recruited via opportunity 
sampling from the university and wider community using social media and advertisements. 
Inclusion criteria were; aged 18+, heavy drinking (> 14 units per week) and access to a 
PC/laptop/Ipad. Exclusion criteria involved a current or previous diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence, determined via self-report. All participants provided informed consent before 





The Timeline follow back (TLFB:(Sobell & Sobell, 1990)) was administered to measure 
retrospective alcohol consumption over the previous seven days in units (one UK unit = 8 g 
of alcohol). A visual guide providing the number of units in standard UK drinks was provided 
to assist participants in calculating their alcohol consumption.  The Alcohol Use Disorders 
Identification Test (AUDIT: (Saunders et al., 1993)) was also administered to measure 
hazardous drinking (study 1 α = .78; study 2 α = .78). Participants were asked when they last 
consumed alcohol (‘When was the last time you drank alcohol?’ with the following options; 
more than one week ago, within the last week, in the last couple of days, yesterday, today, 
within the last couple of hours) (see (Jones & Field, 2015)). They were also asked about their 
motivation to reduce alcohol consumption (‘On a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) how 
motivated are you to reduce your alcohol consumption?’) and their current urge to drink 
alcohol (‘What is your current craving for alcohol from 0 (no urge) to 10 (extreme urge)?’) 
(or ‘100 (extreme urge)?’ in study 2). Lastly, participants were asked if they were distracted 
(‘Were you distracted during the computer tasks?’ with the answers Yes or No). In both 
studies we included an attention check to ensure participants were paying attention as 
recommended for online research (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), by including 
a question (‘If you are paying attention leave this question blank’: with the answers No, Yes 
but not in the last year and Yes during the last year) in the middle of the AUDIT.  





Computer tasks  
Modified Stop-Signal task (SST: (Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008) 
Participants completed a modified SST, which isolated proactive slowing and reactive 
control.  On each trial, a letter (‘X’) or (‘O’) was displayed in the centre of the screen. 
Participants were asked to respond as fast and as accurate as possible to these ‘go’ stimuli. 
They were asked to press the left (‘D’) key with the left index finger if an (‘X’) was displayed 
and the right (‘K’) key with the right index finger if an (‘O’) was displayed. An alcohol-
related image (e.g. a scene in a bar) appeared in the background on each trial. There were 10 
of these images that were approximately 230 mm x 130 mm in size. Participants first 
completed a practice block of 10 trials (not recorded). The main task then consisted of two 
blocks: 
No-signal block: In this block participants were asked to respond to the letters (‘X’ or 
‘O’) without interruption on 100% of trials (N=40). Participants were informed that there 
would be no stop signals during this block.  
 Signal block: During this block, participants were asked to respond to the go-stimuli 
without interruption on 75% of trials (N=90). On the remaining 25% (N=30), two red lines 
“=” (stop-signal) appeared superimposed over the go stimulus. Participants were informed to 
attempt to inhibit their response if they saw this. The Stop-Signal Delay (SSD i.e. the delay 
between the presentation of the go stimulus and the stop signal) was adjusted on a trial-by-
trial basis using a tracking procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). The initial delay was 
250 ms, if participants failed to inhibit the delay decreased by 50 ms making succeeding 
inhibition easier, if participants effectively inhibited then the delay increased by 50 ms 
making succeeding inhibition harder. Before starting the task, participants were also informed 
that they should respond as quickly as possible (i.e. not to wait for the stop-signal to appear) 
in line with standard SST instructions (Verbruggen et al., 2019). 
Reactive control was inferred from SSRTs in the stop-signal block. This was 
calculated using the mean method (Verbruggen et al., 2013), which subtracts the mean SSD 
from the mean Go Reaction time on Go trials in the signal block (Go RT stop signal block-
SSD). Proactive slowing was calculated by subtracting the mean reaction times for the no-
signal block from the signal block (RTstop signal − RTno signal), with greater scores 
indicative of increased proactive slowing. 





The Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT: (Petrides & Milner, 1982) 
Participants were shown a set of neutral images (e.g. couch, kettle) and asked to select one  
using the left hand mouse button. Following the selection of a picture, these were re-arranged 
into different positions. Participants were asked to try and avoid clicking the same picture 
more than once in a block and avoid clicking the same position in the array of images each 
time. Participants were first shown 6 images in a 2x3 array followed by 8-items in a 2x4 
array, a 10-item block in a 2x5 array and finally a 12-item block in a 4x3 array. The number 
of trials in each block was in accordance with the number of images in the array. Participant’s 
scores were displayed at the end of the task informing them of the number of errors made in 
each block (i.e. clicking on the same image more than once) and the total number of errors. 
The total number of errors was used as a measure of WMC. Task schematics are presented on 
OSF [https://osf.io/ucwj4/ ]. 
 
5.4.3 Procedure 
The study was completed using Inquisit Web 5.0 (Millisecond software). Participants were 
first presented with an information sheet and gave informed consent. Next, they completed 
the SST followed by the SOPT in a counterbalanced order. Participants then gave 
demographic information and completed the questionnaires. Lastly, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for participation. The session took approximately 10-15 minutes to 
complete, and participants could opt in to a prize draw for £50 in high street vouchers.  
  
5.4.4 Data reduction and analysis 
A composite measure of alcohol use was computed as our dependent variable. This was used 
as in previous research (see (Baines, Jones, & Christiansen, 2016; Christiansen & Bloor, 
2014; Fernie et al., 2013)) to capture a better picture of the general pattern of alcohol use 
rather than specific behaviours such as binge drinking.  The overall measure of alcohol use 
consisted of the units consumed (measured by the TLFB), scores on the AUDIT and the 
frequency of heavy episodic drinking days (6+ units in a single session for females, 8+ for 
males (Office for National Statistics, 2018)), z-scored and combined. We ran a Principal 
Component Analysis, which confirmed that total AUDIT scores, units consumed, and heavy 
days drinking loaded onto a single component (eigenvalue = 2.25; accounting for 77.48% of 
variance with all factor loadings  ≥ .74). In line with previous research (Jones & Field, 2015), 




we also removed participants from the analyses if they self-reported consuming alcohol on 
the same day of testing (study 1: n = 8; study 2: n = 7), to ensure that inhibitory control and 
working memory were not affected by acute alcohol intoxication. For the SST, outliers were 
removed following criteria suggested in previous research (Field, Kiernan, Eastwood, & 
Child, 2008). Reaction times that were greater than 2000ms or less than 100ms were 
removed; as were reaction times that were greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
individual mean score. We also removed any SSRTs which were negative, in line with 
previous research (Congdon et al., 2012).  We used a similar method for the SOPT (Thush et 
al., 2008) in that the total scores which were greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
mean score were removed. Three participants failed the attention check; however removal of 
these did not significantly alter the interpretation of our results. 
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Sample characteristics (see table 1) 
There were no significant differences between males and females in AUDIT scores (t (98) = -
.360, p= .720, d= -0.07), heavy drinking days (t (98) = 0.09, p= .929, d= 0.02) or TLFB 
scores (t (28) = 1.52, p= .140, d= 0.57). There were also no significant differences in craving 
scores (t (98) = 1.86, p= .067, d= 0.38) or motivation to reduce alcohol consumption (t (98) = 
0.02, p= .983, d= 0.00). 
 
5.5.2 The associations between individual differences in reactive control, proactive 
slowing, WMC and overall alcohol use (see table 2). 
We conducted a multiple regression analysis to investigate if individual differences in 
SSRTs, craving, proactive slowing and WMC predicted individual differences in overall 
alcohol use. Variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged between 1.14 and 1.21 suggesting there 
were no issues with multi-collinearity.  The overall model predicted approximately 19% of 
variance (R²= .19; F (4, 94) = 5.39, p< .001). Increased craving for alcohol was associated 
with increased overall alcohol use (β= .25, p= .013, 95% CI .06 to .46). WMC (β= .26, 
p=.010, 95% CI .04 to .29) also significantly predicted overall alcohol use with increased 
errors on the SOPT being associated with higher alcohol use (see fig 1 in Supplementary 
materials). However, neither SSRTs (β= -.01, p= .940, 95% CI -.01 to .01) nor proactive 
slowing (β= .10, p= .342, 95% CI -.00 to .01) were significant predictors of alcohol use. 
 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for overall alcohol use, craving, 
reactive control, proactive slowing and working memory. 
            
    Mean (SD)  2      3 4 5  
Overall alcohol use  0.00 (2.58)  .33* .11 .11 .34* 
Craving   2.00 (2.50)  - .16 .05 .33*  
SSRTs    287.51 (69.85)  - - .37* .15 
Proactive slowing  125.83 (141.84) - - - -.02 
Working memory   6.18 (4.10)  - - - -  
Overall alcohol use = units consumed (measured by the TLFB), scores on the AUDIT and the 
frequency of heavy episodic drinking days (6+ units in a single session for females, 8+ for 
males; (Office for National Statistics, 2018)), z-scored and combined. Craving = 0 (no urge 
for alcohol) to 10 (extreme urge for alcohol). SSRTS = reactive control. Higher scores = 
worse reactive control. Higher Proactive slowing = better proactive slowing. Working 
memory = errors on SOPT. Higher scores = worse working memory. *p<.01 
 
5.5.3 Exploratory Analyses 
We also aimed to investigate whether individual differences in WMC mediated the 
relationship between proactive slowing and overall alcohol use. However, although WMC 
significantly predicted overall alcohol use, there was no association between individual 
differences in WMC and proactive slowing (see table 2; p= .867). Therefore, we did not meet 
the assumptions required to examine mediation. 
 
5.6 Interim discussion 
Study 1 demonstrates that increased craving and poorer working memory were associated 
with increased overall alcohol use in a sample of heavy drinkers. However, individual 
differences in neither proactive slowing nor reactive control did not significantly predict 
individual differences in overall alcohol use or WMC.  




Table 1: Descriptive statistics for AUDIT scores, TLFB scores, heavy drinking days, craving scores and motivation to reduce alcohol 
consumption, split by gender in Study 1 and Study 2 (values are mean (SD)). 
                    
      Study 1     Study 2   
    Males (n=22)     Females (n=78) Sample (N=100) Males (n=49)     Females (n=60) Sample (N=109) 
AUDIT   10.00 (5.59)     10.50 (5.81)  10.39 (5.73)   13.51 (6.20)      12.55 (6.20)  12.98 (6.19) 
TLFB    24.77 (19.59)     17.95 (14.53) 19.45 (15.93)  43.73 (28.51)      29.13 (19.60) 35.70 (24.99)  
Heavy drinking days  1.41 (1.30)     1.38 (1.10)  1.39 (1.14)  2.18 (1.81)      2.35 (1.71)  2.28 (1.75) 
Craving   2.86 (2.98)     1.76 (2.31)  2.00 (2.50)  17.49 (22.54)      16.25 (21.89) 16.81 (22.09) 
Motivation   2.59 (2.91)     2.58 (2.62)  2.58 (2.67)  2.59 (2.41)      2.53 (1.91)  2.56 (2.14)  
AUDIT=Total scores on the AUDIT. TLFB = Total units reported in the TLFB. Heavy drinking days = occurrences of heavy episodic drinking 
days in the 7-day TLFB (Study 1) and 14-day TLFB (study 2) (6+ units in a single session for females, 8+ for males; (Office for National 
Statistics, 2018)). Craving = 0 (no urge) to 10 (extreme urge) or 100 (extreme urge; study 2). Motivation to reduce alcohol consumption =  0 
(not at all) to 10 (extremely). 
 




5.7 Study 2 
In study 2, participants completed a SST in which they responded directly to alcohol-related 
words (rather than ambiguous letters) in order to increase alcohol cue-reactivity. They also 
completed a SOPT in which they had to remember alcohol-related stimuli (rather than 
neutral-related stimuli), and completed a questionnaire assessing their alcohol sensitivity. We 
predicted that (i) individual differences in proactive slowing, reactive control, WMC and 
alcohol sensitivity would be associated with individual differences in overall alcohol use. We 
also predicted that (ii) individual differences in WMC would be associated with individual 
differences in proactive slowing and (iii) individual differences in alcohol sensitivity would 
predict the ability to implement proactive slowing and reactive control. Lastly, we 
hypothesised that (iv) WMC and AS would mediate the relationship between proactive 




Heavy drinkers (N=116; 63 female), with a mean age of 22.01 (±6.09) were recruited from 
the university and wider community using social media and advertisements. The number of 
participants was decided upon using a power calculation to find a medium effect size (F² = 
.15) at α = .05, and 90% power with five predictors (craving, reactive control, proactive 
slowing, working memory, alcohol sensitivity). The inclusion and exclusion criteria were 




Modified Stop-Signal task (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014) 
Participants also completed a modified SST, which isolated proactive slowing and reactive 
control.  On each trial participants were shown a white horizontal line (approximately 70 
mm) in the middle of the screen for 500ms. An alcohol-related word (e.g. ‘beer’) then 
appeared either above or below the line. If the word appeared above the line, participants 
pressed one key (‘T’), if the word appeared below the line, participants pressed another key 
 
9 We did not pre-register this hypothesis. Therefore it is labelled as exploratory in the results section. 




(‘V’) using the keyboard (these ‘keys’ appeared at the bottom on the screen on touch screen 
devices). A neutral word (e.g. ‘sponge’) also appeared simultaneously but participants were 
asked not to respond to this. These were no-signal trials. We chose the words based on those 
used in previous research which developed matched alcohol and control words, specifically 
(Cox, Brown, & Rowlands, 2003). There were 10 generic alcohol-related words (beer, vodka, 
shorts, whiskey, bar, alcopops, stout, cocktails, spirits, alcohol) and 10 generic neutral-related 
words (brush, duster, polish, squeegee, shammy, shampoo, sponge, flannel, bucket, hoover). 
On stop-signal trials, the white line turned red and participants were told to try and withhold 
their response when this occurred. The blocks, stop-signal probability, tracking procedure 
and calculations of proactive/reactive control were the same described in study 1. 
Modified Self-Ordered Pointing Task (Petrides & Milner, 1982) 
This task was identical to the task described in study 1. However, instead of neutral images 
participants completed the task using alcohol-related images (e.g. pint of beer, glass of wine). 
Task schematics are presented on OSF [https://osf.io/fybgv/]. 
 
Questionnaires 
The questionnaires administered were identical to that of study 1, except the TLFB was 
administered for fourteen days instead of seven to capture a better picture of individuals’ 
drinking patterns. Additionally, participants also completed The Alcohol Sensitivity 
Questionnaire (ASQ: (Fleming et al., 2016)) (α = .94). This included 15 items asking 
participants how many alcoholic drinks they must typically drink to experience alcohol-
related effects. Specifically, 9 of these items are associated with lower doses of alcohol and 
stimulation (e.g. increasing talkativeness) and 6 are associated with heavier doses of alcohol 
and sedation (e.g. passing out). Participants were first asked whether or not they have 
experienced each alcohol-related effect and if the answer was YES, they were asked to 
estimate the minimum number of drinks required to experience the lower dose effects or the 
maximum number of drinks they could consume without experiencing the higher dose 
effects. The total score is the number of drinks stated with higher scores on this questionnaire 
indicating low sensitivity to alcohol.  
 
5.8.3 Procedure 
The procedure is identical to that described in study 1. 
 




5.8.4 Data Analysis 
The data was handled using identical procedures to those in study 1. We computed the same 
overall measure of alcohol use. We ran a Principal Component Analysis which confirmed 
that total AUDIT scores, units consumed (measured by the TLFB) and heavy drinking days 
loaded onto a single component (eigenvalue = 2.07; accounting for 68.97% of variance with 
factor loadings of .64 to .93). Additional details regarding this and the analysis of each 
hypothesis can be found in the pre-registration on Open Science Framework. However, for 
the ASQ we calculated a composite score as missing data has previously been shown to result 
in biased ASQ scores. Therefore we used the standardized person mean imputation approach 
(Bailey & Bartholow, 2016; Lee et al., 2015). We first standardised ASQ scores by 
transforming these into z-scores and then calculated the mean score across all non-missing 
items. On average participants answered 11.69 (± 2.86) questions, which is a similar average 
reported in previous research (e.g. Mean = 11.40 (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016)). This 
procedure was not pre-registered, however it provides more robust data estimates. Ten 
participants did not fully complete the SST and these were removed from the analysis. Three 




5.9.1 Sample characteristics (see table 1) 
There was no significant difference between males and females in AUDIT scores (t (107) = 
0.81, p = .423, d= 0.16) or heavy drinking days (t (107) = -0.49, p= .623, d= -0.09). There 
were also no significant differences in craving (t (107) = 0.29, p= .772, d= 0.06) or 
motivation to reduce alcohol consumption (t (91) = 0.14, p= .890, d= 0.03). However, males 
did consume significantly more units than females (t (82) = 3.05, p= .003, d = 0.67).  
 
5.9.2 The associations between individual differences in proactive slowing, reactive 
control, WMC, alcohol sensitivity and overall alcohol use (see table 3).  
We conducted a multiple regression analysis to investigate if individual differences in 
SSRTs, proactive slowing, WMC and alcohol sensitivity predicted individual differences in 
overall alcohol use. Variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged between 1.00 and 1.08 suggesting 
there were no issues with multi-collinearity. The overall model predicted approximately 13% 
of variance (R²= .13; F (5, 89) = 2.74, p =. 024). Increased craving (β= .25, p= .014, 95% CI 




.01 to .05) was a significant predictor of increased alcohol use. However, SSRTs (β= -.19, p= 
.066, 95% CI -.01 to .00), proactive slowing (β= .03, p= .747, 95% CI -.00 to .01), working 
memory (β= -.06, p= .593, 95% CI -.21 to .12), and alcohol sensitivity (β= .18, p= .073, 95% 
CI -.06 to 1.34) were not significant predictors of overall alcohol use. 
 
5.9.3 Exploratory Analyses 
We also aimed to investigate whether individual differences in WMC/AS mediated the 
relationship between proactive slowing and overall alcohol use. However, although poorer 
WMC predicted poorer proactive slowing, there was no relationship between overall alcohol 
use and WMC or AS (see above). AS was also not related to proactive slowing (see table 3; 
p= .540). Therefore, we did not meet the assumptions required to examine mediation.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for overall alcohol use, craving, 
reactive control, proactive slowing, working memory errors and alcohol sensitivity. 
            
    Mean (SD)  2      3 4 5 6  
Overall alcohol use  0.00 (2.53)  .21* -.16 .07 -.09 .13  
Craving   16.81 (22.09)  - -.04 -.03 -.05 .06 
SSRTs    340.05 (101.90) - - -.13 .04 -.01  
Proactive slowing  15.24 (102.29)  - - - -.24* -.06  
Working memory errors 5.07 (3.27)  - - - - .09  
Alcohol sensitivity  0.02 (0.70)  - - - - -  
Overall alcohol use = units consumed (measured by the TLFB), scores on the AUDIT and the 
frequency of heavy episodic drinking days (6+ units in a single session for females, 8+ for 
males; (Office for National Statistics, 2018)) ,z-scored and combined. Craving = 0 (no urge 
for alcohol) to 100 (extreme urge for alcohol). SSRTS = reactive control. Higher scores = 
worse reactive control. Higher Proactive slowing = better proactive slowing. Working 
memory = errors on SOPT. Higher scores = worse working memory. Alcohol sensitivity = 
composite measure of Alcohol sensitivity. Higher scores = lower sensitivity to alcohol. 
*p<.05. See fig 2 in supplementary materials illustrating the relationship between proactive 
slowing and working memory errors. 





The current studies investigated if individual differences in reactive control and proactive 
slowing were associated with individual differences in overall alcohol use in heavy drinkers. 
We also aimed to investigate if WMC and AS mediated the relationship between the 
proactive slowing and overall alcohol use. However, contrary to our predictions neither 
individual differences in proactive slowing nor reactive control were associated with 
individual differences in overall alcohol use in either study. Although poorer working 
memory was associated with increased alcohol use in study 1, it was unrelated to the ability 
to implement proactive slowing and the opposite relationship was observed in study 2. 
Individual differences in AS were also unrelated to alcohol use or proactive slowing in study 
2. Therefore there was no evidence that WMC or AS mediated the relationship between 
proactive slowing and alcohol use. 
 These findings support models (e.g. (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014)) which 
suggest that investigating reactive inhibition only is of limited theoretical benefits. We were 
able to isolate proactive slowing and reactive control in both studies. However, we failed to 
replicate studies that have demonstrated a relationship between reactive control and alcohol 
use (e.g. (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012; Colder & O'Connor, 2002; Paz et al., 
2016)), thus finding limited empirical support for models of addiction which posit inhibitory 
control as a candidate mechanism of action (e.g. (de Wit, 2009; Fillmore, 2003; Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2002)). It is still plausible that a relationship exists between proactive slowing and 
alcohol use, however, it is also possible that the relationship between inhibitory control and 
alcohol use has been over-emphasised or is influenced by publication bias and small study 
effects. There are numerous studies which have reported null findings (e.g. (Czapla et al., 
2015; Fernie et al., 2010; Nederkoorn et al., 2009)). Furthermore, an updated meta-analyses 
by Smith et al (Smith & Mattick, 2018) suggested that inhibitory deficits are not associated 
with heavy drinking. Continuing well-powered and pre-registered studies should begin to 
correct any biases in the literature and elucidate the true nature of the relationship.  
 We demonstrated some support for research that has shown WMC is associated with 
alcohol use in study 1 (e.g. (Mahedy et al., 2018; Peeters et al., 2015; Thush et al., 2008)). 
However this relationship did not exist in the presence of alcohol-related cues (study 2). We 
also found limited support for the relationship between WMC and the ability to implement 
proactive slowing (e.g. (Richmond et al., 2015; Wiemers & Redick, 2018)). This relationship 
may have useful real-world implications i.e. high-WMC individuals may have an increased 




ability to initiate and maintain goals (in this case response selection) compared to low-WMC 
individuals (Richmond et al., 2015). Furthermore, we failed to replicate studies that have 
demonstrated that alcohol sensitivity is associated with increased risk for heavy drinking 
(Fleming & Bartholow, 2014), or associated with the ability to implement proactive slowing 
(Bailey & Bartholow, 2016).  
These studies have limitations. We used a cross-sectional design and therefore we are 
unable to investigate these relationships over time. Furthermore, in study 1 there was an over-
representation of females, thus future research should aim to recruit a more representative 
sample. Lastly, 32 participants in study 1 and 34 in study 2 stated that they were distracted 
during the computer tasks and 11 participants in study 2 also did not answer this question 
(see supplementary materials for sensitivity analysis; correlations between working memory 
and alcohol use (study 1) and proactive slowing (study 2) were no longer significant). The 
proportion of reported distractions are similar to recent Ecological Momentary Assessment 
studies examining SST and alcohol consumption in the real word (Jones, Tiplady, Houben, 
Nederkoorn., & Field., 2018). However, completing these tasks online in the participant’s 
natural environment rather than in the laboratory does increase the ecological validity of the 
study, as in the real world inhibition occurs in ‘noisy’ surroundings (Verbruggen, Stevens, et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, only three participants in both studies responded incorrectly to the 
attention measure in the AUDIT and removal of these did not significantly affect results. 
Lastly, the current studies only sought to examine proactive slowing. However, it is also 
possible to measure proactive inhibition (rather than slowing) by incorporating a cue into the 
Stop-Signal tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). This cue informs participants about the 
likelihood of a stop-signal occurring and therefore this index of inhibition could also provide 
a useful avenue for future research. 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated no evidence that inhibitory control processes 
(reactive and proactive) are associated with alcohol use in non-dependent drinkers. 
Furthermore, we demonstrated no convincing evidence for our proposed mediators of WMC 
or alcohol sensitivity. Given the increasing number of null findings, it is possible the role of 








5.11 Supplementary Information 
5.11.1 Study 1 Results 
 
Supplementary Fig 1: A scatterplot to show the relationship between errors on the SOPT 


















5.11.2 Study 2 Results 
Supplementary Fig 2 A scatterplot to show the relationship between individual differences in 





In both studies we asked participants whether they were distracted during the computer tasks. 
In study 1, 32 participants reported that they were distracted. Removal of these removed the 
association between working memory and overall alcohol use, however this may have been 
caused by a reduction in statistical power. In study 2, 34 participants stated that they were 
distracted during the computer tasks and 11 failed to answer the question. Removal of these 
had no effect on the multiple regression. However, when examining correlations, the 
relationship between working memory and proactive slowing was no longer significant. This 
again may have been due to a reduction in statistical power. 
 




5.12 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter contributed to the overall aims of this thesis by adding support to suggest that 
inhibitory control is comprised of both reactive and proactive control, and that there is an 
over-simplistic conceptualisation of inhibitory control in the literature. However, there were 
no associations between individual differences in reactive or proactive control and alcohol 
use in heavy drinkers. As this has been a common finding in this thesis so far, this 
strengthens the rationale to examine neurophysiological responses of inhibitory control in the 
following chapter, which may offer a more sensitive investigation into these relationships 
(and the fluctuations in inhibitory processes), compared to behavioural data. Lastly, there was 
also some evidence for the suggestion that individual differences in WMC may underlie the 
effective use of proactive control. This supports the rationale to examine this potential 





































The effect of acute stress and alcohol-related cues on proactive and reactive 
inhibitory control. 
 
This chapter presents a laboratory study which has been prepared for publication. The  
supplementary materials are also presented. This study was pre-registered on Open Science 
Framework (see Appendices 6) (link is provided in text). To summarize contributions to this 
chapter, I designed the study which was approved by Andrew Jones. I collected and analyzed 
the data with the assistance of Nick Fallon. I wrote the manuscript and Andrew Jones 
provided feedback on this.   
 
Chapter Foreword: Due to the limited findings reported in the previous chapters, this chapter 
contributed to the overall aims of this thesis by providing a more sensitive investigation into 
fluctuations in inhibitory processes. Specifically, this study aimed to investigate the effect of 
acute stress on the behavioural indexes (proactive inhibition, proactive slowing, SSRTs) and 
the neurophysiological components (P300, N200) of inhibitory control, in the presence of 
alcohol-related cues, in heavy drinkers. I also aimed to investigate whether impairments in 
the behavioural indices or neurophysiological responses following acute stress were 
associated with increased alcohol seeking. Lastly, I found limited evidence for the potential 
mechanisms (Working Memory Capacity, alcohol sensitivity), which may underlie effective 















Background: Inhibitory control is suggested to be a state variable, which fluctuates in 
response to environmental and psychological triggers. However, little research has 
investigated the effect of these triggers on proactive inhibitory processes. Objectives: This 
pre-registered study aimed to investigate whether acute stress impaired proactive and reactive 
inhibitory control, lead to neurophysiological changes in the P300 and N200 Event-Related 
Potentials (ERPs) in the presence of alcohol-related cues, and increased alcohol-seeking. 
Methods: Forty heavy drinkers attended two laboratory sessions on a within-subjects basis, in 
which they either completed an easy set of anagrams (control) or were asked to prepare a 
presentation on their physical appearance (stress). Participants then completed a Working 
Memory (Self-Ordered Pointing) task, and a modified Stop-Signal task whilst their 
electrophysiological responses were recorded, followed by an ad libitum taste test. Results: 
Acute stress had limited effects on reactive stopping, and had no effect on proactive 
inhibitory processes or the neurophysiological correlates of response inhibition. 
Contrastingly, alcohol-cue exposure did impair proactive stopping and increase P300 
responses (compared to neutral-cues). Lastly, although proactive stopping was associated 
with ad libitum alcohol consumption following acute stress, there was no evidence of a 
relationship between inhibitory processes (or neurophysiological responses) and alcohol 
consumption. We also found limited evidence for the mechanisms underlying these effects. 
Conclusions/Implications: These results offer limited support to models that suggest 
inhibitory control is a state variable that fluctuates in response psychological and 
environmental triggers. Certainly, there was little evidence of a relationship between 















Inhibitory control - the (in)ability to control inappropriate behaviour in certain situations-is 
suggested to fluctuate within individuals in response to multiple internal and situational 
triggers, including alcohol-cue exposure, alcohol intoxication and stress (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013). This may have important implications for addiction interventions 
since research has demonstrated that poor inhibitory control predicts the transition from 
heavy drinking to dependence (Rubio et al., 2008), comorbid drug and alcohol use (Nigg et 
al., 2006) and treatment success/risk of relapse (Rupp et al., 2016). 
Notably, evidence has exposed short-term impairments in inhibitory control following 
alcohol-cue exposure in non-dependent drinkers (e.g. (Jones & Field, 2015; Muraven & 
Shmueli, 2006; Petit et al., 2012)), and meta-analyses have suggested that this effect is small 
but robust (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018), although there have been some discrepancies (e.g. 
(Baines et al., 2019a; Jones, Rose, et al., 2013)).  There is also some contradictory evidence 
with regards to the acute effects of stress on inhibitory control with some research 
demonstrating impairments (Roos et al., 2017; Scholz et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 2016; Zack 
et al., 2011), whilst others have revealed enhanced inhibitory performance following acute 
stress (Constantinou et al., 2010; Schwabe et al., 2013) or null findings (McGrath et al., 
2016). Consequently, there has been a suggestion that the effect of stress on inhibitory 
control may be in accordance with a U-shaped function, with a moderate level of stress 
improving performance but a high or low level of stress impairing performance (see 
(Henderson et al., 2012)).  
However, one possible explanation for these contradictory findings is the focus on 
‘reactive’ inhibitory control  (outright stopping), indexed by Stop-Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT) in Stop-Signal tasks or commission errors in Go/No-Go tasks, despite cognitive 
neuroscience models (e.g. (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014)) suggesting that this is an 
over-simplistic conceptualization of inhibitory control. Certainly, research has suggested that 
although reactive control is useful, successful response inhibition is also the result of 
preparation through the use of proactive control (Criaud et al., 2012). This involves 
preparation to withhold a response in anticipation of a stop-signal rather than relying on 
outright stopping in response to the presentation of a stop-signal (Aron, 2011; Castro-
Meneses et al., 2015). As such, this may provide a more appropriate explanation of substance 
use (Aron, 2011). It is more likely that substance users would proactively adjust their 
behaviour over time to control their cravings rather than relying on outright stopping of their 




drinking behaviour through a late correction mechanism (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). 
Importantly, proactive and reactive control can be isolated and have been measured using 
modified Stop-Signal tasks (SST) in previous research (e.g. (Baines et al., 2019a; Baines, 
Field, Christiansen, & Jones, 2019b; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; Verbruggen, Stevens, et 
al., 2014)). However, there is still limited evidence investigating proactive control in the 
addiction literature.  
Another possible explanation for contradictory findings is the reliance on behavioural 
measurements (e.g. response times, accuracy) in the literature. These measurements can be 
volatile and influenced by a variety of factors (e.g. hardware delays (Woods et al., 2015) or 
past experience of similar tasks (Wong et al., 2017)). As an alternative, neurophysiological 
evidence may offer a more sensitive investigation into the effect of stress and alcohol-cue 
exposure on inhibitory control processes. In support of this, Dierolf et al (Dierolf, Fechtner, 
Böhnke, Wolf, & Naumann, 2017) reported that acute stress did not damage response times 
or response accuracy on a Go/No-Go task, however it did impact the neural correlates of 
response inhibition. Specifically, acute stress was found to increase difference waves of the 
Event-Related Potential (ERP) P300 but decrease the ERP N200. Ceballos et al (Ceballos, 
Giuliano, Wicha, & Graham, 2012) also reported that stress increased N200 amplitudes (but 
had no effect on P300 amplitudes) in social drinkers. As such, the N200 and P300 ERPs have 
been associated with two aspects of inhibitory control (Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Huster 
et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015). Specifically, the P300 is thought to represent the final stages of 
an inhibitory response (reactive control: (Wessel & Aron, 2015)), whereas the functional 
specificity of the N200 component still has a degree of uncertainty (Dimoska et al., 2006) 
with the possibility it is related to response conflict or error monitoring (Donkers & van 
Boxtel, 2004; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2004). For 
example, participants may experience conflict when they have to over-ride a frequent pre-
potent response to respond, when presented with infrequent no-go stimuli or a stop-signal 
(Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001). This can be manipulated by altering the 
frequency of responses required (Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010).  
Indeed, the N200 is a negative component which peaks around 200-250ms following 
presentation of a stop-signal, whereas the P300 is a positive component which peaks after the 
N200 (at around 300-350ms following a stop-signal) (Dimoska et al., 2003; Jones, Field, et 
al., 2013). When response inhibition is successful, the P300 component has been shown to 
consistently increase in amplitude more than when inhibition is unsuccessful, whereas the 
N200 ERP has been shown to have larger amplitudes during failed inhibition (Dimoska et al., 




2003; Jones, Field, et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2004). Importantly, evidence has suggested that 
reduced P300 amplitudes during response inhibition could be a marker for vulnerability to 
alcohol dependence (Hesselbrock et al., 2001; Kamarajan et al., 2005). Furthermore, in the 
laboratory Jones et al (Jones, Field, et al., 2013)  demonstrated that individual differences in 
amplitudes of P300 subcomponents during response inhibition were negatively associated 
with alcohol intake during an ad libitum taste test.  
ERPs may also be modulated by salient cues. A meta-analysis (Littel, Euser, Munafo, 
& Franken, 2012) of studies with various task paradigms (e.g. passive, oddball paradigms) 
also showed that those with substance dependence exhibit increased P300 amplitudes in 
response to substance-related cues (compared to neutral-cues) and that this effect is larger 
compared to healthy controls (standardised mean differences 0.61 vs. 0.22). This has also 
been demonstrated in heavy, non-dependent drinkers (Herrmann et al., 2001). Contrastingly, 
evidence has also demonstrated decreased N200 components following exposure to alcohol-
cues (compared to neutral-cues) in non-dependent drinkers or differences in N200 and/or 
P300 components between light drinkers and heavy drinkers when exposed to alcohol-related 
cues during inhibitory control tasks (Kreusch et al., 2014; Petit et al., 2012; Watson et al., 
2016). Thus, further examination of these components following acute stress and/or alcohol-
cue exposure may contribute to our understanding or inhibitory control as a state variable. 
Finally, a last reason for contradictory evidence may be due to the poor understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying the preparation for response inhibition (Criaud et al., 2012). 
Research has suggested that individuals with a low sensitivity to alcohol are at risk for heavy 
drinking and alcohol misuse (Fleming & Bartholow, 2014). This is because these individuals 
may consume more alcohol per drinking session to experience the desired effects as they 
have a low level of response to the effects of alcohol (Schuckit et al., 2011). Importantly, 
research has suggested that these individuals experience increased conflict when trying to 
inhibit responses to alcohol-cues (Fleming & Bartholow, 2014), and have difficulty 
implementing proactive control when faced with frequent alcohol-related cues (Bailey & 
Bartholow, 2016). Other ERP research has demonstrated increased P300 amplitudes in 
individuals with a low sensitivity to alcohol in response to alcohol-related cues (Bartholow, 
Henry, & Lust, 2007; Bartholow et al., 2010). Therefore, it is plausible that individual 
differences in alcohol sensitivity may contribute to the efficient use of proactive control when 
exposed to alcohol-cues. 
 Lastly, varied amplitudes of P300 have also been related to WMC  (Saliasi, Geerligs, 
Lorist, & Maurits, 2013) and stress has also been shown to impair working memory 




performance (e.g. (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008; Oei, Everaerd, Elzinga, van Well, & 
Bermond, 2006; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008)). This is unsurprising considering working 
memory processes are thought to support behavioural control (Finn, 2002) or inhibitory 
mechanisms are subsumed under WMC in some models (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Indeed, 
research has suggested that individual differences in WMC may explain variance in the 
ability to effectively use proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Richmond et al., 
2015), with supporting evidence demonstrating that individuals with a high-WMC perform 
better and are more proactive than those with a lower WMC on tasks such as the AX-
Continuous Performance Test   (e.g. (Redick & Engle, 2011; Wiemers & Redick, 2018)). 
Further evidence regarding this could contribute to addiction interventions as research has 
demonstrated that both heavy drinkers and those with substance dependence show deficits in 
WMC (Bechara & Martin, 2004; Mahedy et al., 2018; Noël et al., 2001). 
Consequently, this study aimed to investigate whether acute stress impaired proactive 
and reactive control and lead to changes in the amplitudes of P300 and N200 ERPs during 
inhibitory control. We aimed to investigate whether these impairments occurred only in the 
presence of alcohol-related cues, since research has showed that acute stress significantly 
increases attentional biases towards alcohol-related cues (e.g. (Field & Powell, 2007; Field & 
Quigley, 2009)) and that alcohol-related cues cause state fluctuations in ‘reactive’ inhibitory 
control (Jones & Field, 2015; Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018; Petit et al., 2012). We also aimed 
to investigate if acute stress lead to increased alcohol consumption (compared to a control 
condition) and if deficits in proactive control, reactive control and the neurophysiological 
correlates of inhibitory control were related to individual differences in alcohol consumption. 
We included the alcohol-seeking measures as experimental evidence has demonstrated that 
acute stress increases subjective craving for alcohol (Field & Powell, 2007) and ad libitum 
alcohol consumption in heavy drinkers (McGrath et al., 2016). Lastly, we aimed to examine 
the potential mechanisms (i.e. WMC and AS) underlying the preparation of responses. The 
design, hypotheses, power calculation and analyses were pre-registered on Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/s2utw/ ).  
 
6.3 Method 
In this study, heavy drinkers completed a control session and a session in which they were 
subject to a psychological stressor. During both sessions, they also completed a modified SST 
(based on (Baines et al., 2019a)), designed to measure reactive and proactive control, whilst 




their electrophysiological responses were measured. Participants also completed a Self-
Ordered Pointing Task to measure their WMC and an ad-libitum taste test. It was 
hypothesised that (i) acute stress would cause deficits in reactive stopping, proactive stopping 
and proactive slowing in the presence of alcohol-related cues. It was also predicted that (ii) 
participants would consume more beer (as a % of total fluid) following acute stress 
(compared to control) and that (iii) impairments in proactive and reactive control would 
predict unique variance in alcohol consumption. Furthermore, we predicted that (iv) acute 
stress would lead to differences in the magnitude of P300 and N200 responses in the presence 
of alcohol-cues (compared to control) and that (v) the magnitude of these responses to 
alcohol-cues would be associated with individual differences in alcohol consumption. 
Finally, it was hypothesised that (vi) AS would be associated with the ability to implement 
proactive and reactive control and individual differences in the amplitudes of P300 in 
response to alcohol-cues and that (vii) acute stress would impair WMC (compared to control) 
with WM performance associated with the ability to implement proactive control, P300 
amplitudes and ad libitum alcohol consumption. 
 
6.3.1 Participants 
Heavy drinkers (N= 40; 17 male), with a mean age of mean age 24.70 (±	10.39) were 
recruited from the University of Liverpool and wider community to take part in a two-session 
laboratory study. An a-priori power calculation was used to decide upon the number of 
participants required to find a medium effect size based on previous studies which have 
examined the effect of stress or alcohol-cues on inhibitory control (e.g. (Czapla et al., 2015; 
Dierolf et al., 2017; Kreusch, Vilenne, & Quertemont, 2013; Scholz et al., 2009) (dz = .50, at 
α = .05, 1-β = 90%). Inclusion criteria were heavy drinking (>14 units per week based on UK 
Government guidelines), aged 18+, a fluent English speaker and a self-reported motivation to 
reduce alcohol consumption. Exclusion criteria included a current or previous self-reported 
diagnosis of ADHD, a psychiatric disorder, or alcohol dependence. Participants were also 
excluded from taking part if they were suffering from any illness (or taking medication) that 
could increase sensitivity to alcohol-related effects, were pregnant or currently breastfeeding. 
All participants gave informed consent before taking part in the experiment, which received 
approval from The University of Liverpool Research Ethics Committee. 






Participants completed baseline measures of their alcohol consumption and personality. This 
included a Timeline follow back (TLFB: (Sobell & Sobell, 1990)) to measure the quantity of 
alcohol (units) consumed in the two-weeks prior to taking part in the study (one UK unit = 8g 
of alcohol) and the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT: (Saunders et al., 
1993)) to measure hazardous drinking (α = .56). Participants also completed The Alcohol 
Sensitivity Questionnaire (ASQ; (Fleming et al., 2016)) to measure average alcohol 
consumption required to experience alcohol-related effects, including effects  associated with 
lower doses of alcohol and stimulation (e.g. feeling socially at ease or increased 
talkativeness) and higher doses and sedation (e.g. vomiting or passing out). Low sensitivity to 
alcohol is indicated through a higher number of drinks recorded (α’s > .81). We computed a 
composite score for the ASQ (see (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016; Lee et al., 2015)) as although 
not pre-registered, this prevents bias in the data from missing scores and therefore provides a 
more robust estimate for responses. To do this, we transformed items to z-scores and then 
calculated the mean across all non-missing items. Participants answered an average of 10.61 
(±3.02) which is similar to previous literature (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016). 
The Brief Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol Questionnaire ((CEOA-B; (Ham et al., 
2005)) was also administered to measure alcohol outcome expectancies (α’s > .85) and the 
Temptation and Restraint Inventory (TRI: (Collins & Lapp, 1992)) to measure drinking 
restraint (α’s > .53). Additionally, three subscales of self-reported craving 
(Inclined/Indulgent, Obsessed/Compelled, Resolved/Regulated)  were also measured using 
the Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire ‘right now’ version (AAAQ; 
(McEvoy et al., 2004)) at the beginning of the study and after the computer tasks (α’s > .65).   
To measure impulsivity, participants completed the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS: 
(Patton et al., 1995)) (α’s > .76). The ‘trait’ items of the State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
(Spielberger et al., 1999)) were  administered to measure trait anxiety at the beginning of the 
study (α = .95). The ‘state’ items were administered to measure current feelings of anxiety 
i.e. ‘right now’ at the beginning of the study, after the stress manipulation and at the end of 
the session (α’s > .89). This has been used to measure stress in previous studies (e.g. (Field & 
Powell, 2007; Field & Quigley, 2009; Starcke et al., 2016)). At the end of the second session, 
participants were also required to answer an open question to assess their awareness of the 




overall experimental aims of the study and three fixed-response questions to assess their 
awareness specifically of the presentation task, the Stop-Signal task and the taste test. 
 
Computer tasks 
Modified Stop-Signal task (SST; (Baines et al., 2019a)) 
Participants completed a modified SST to measure proactive inhibition, proactive slowing 
and reactive control (see fig 1 in Appendices 6 for task schematic). This was programmed 
using PsychoPy version 2. At the start of each trial, a small fixation cross was presented in 
the centre of the screen for 1000ms. After this, an alcohol-related image (e.g. someone taking 
a drink of beer or wine) or a neutral-related image (e.g. people in an office appeared). 
Participants were told they should use their right hand to press the ‘V’ key if the image was 
alcohol-related or the ‘N’ key if the image was neutral-related as quickly as possible. These 
were no-signal trials. There were 10 alcohol-related images and 10 neutral-related images 
that were approximately 180 mm x 100 mm in size. A practice block of 20 trials were first 
completed to ensure participants understood the instructions. Two main task blocks then 
followed in a counter-balanced order: 
No-signal block: Within this block, participants were asked to respond to the images 
(alcohol-related or neutral-related) without interruption on 100% of trials as quickly as 
possible (N=40). 
Stop-signal block: Within this block, participants were asked to respond to the images 
on 50% of trials (N=320). On the other half of trials (N=320), a stop-signal was presented in 
the form of two red lines “=” that appeared in the centre of the image. Participants were told 
to try and withhold their response when this occurred but were also given standard stop-
signal instructions that they should respond as quickly as possible and not wait for the stop-
signal to appear (Verbruggen et al., 2019). To aid this, participants were informed that the 
fixation cross at the beginning of each trial may sometimes turn red and this indicated that the 
requirement for response inhibition was more likely. If the fixation cross was white, 
participants were informed that the requirement for response inhibition was less likely.  
Specifically, participants completed 240 no-signal trials with no inhibition cue 
(N=120 alcohol-related images; N=120 neutral-related images), 80 no-signal trials with an 
inhibition cue (N=40 alcohol-related images; N=40 neutral-related images), 80 trials with a 
stop-signal and no inhibition cue (N=40 alcohol-related images; N=40 neutral-related 
images), and 240 trials with a stop-signal and cue (N=120 alcohol-related images; N=120 




neutral-related images).  Therefore, participants were required to withhold their response on 
25% of trials with no prior information and 75% of trials with prior information. The Stop-
Signal Delays (SSD) were fixed at 200ms, 300ms and 400ms. As this increased the 
percentage of stop-signal trials from the standard 25%, a break was inserted after every 100 
trials asking participants to wait for the experimenter to check the electrodes before re-
starting and they were reminded of their instructions not to wait for the stop-signal to appear, 
as this has been shown to reduce the reliability of SSRTs (Verbruggen et al., 2019).  
Proactive slowing was inferred from the degree of reaction time slowing on the stop-
signal block compared to the no-signal block (Median RTstop signal −  Median RTno signal). 
Higher scores indicated increased proactive slowing. Proactive stopping was inferred from 
the proportion of inhibitory failures on the cued stop-signal trials in the signal block (as these 
involve preparation of responses). Reactive control was inferred from SSRTs in the stop-
signal block. These were computed using the integration method10 (Logan & Cowan, 1984) 
as the SSDs were fixed. Using this method, SSRTs are estimated by subtracting the SSD 
from the finishing time of the stopping process. Thus, SSRTs are estimated for each SSD 
separately and then averaged (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). The effects of stress on each 
process were then measured by comparing performance across conditions (control, stress).  
 
Modified Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT; (Petrides & Milner, 1982)) 
This task was programmed using Inquisit 5.0 Lab. Participants were shown a set of 12 
alcohol-related images in a 4 x 3 array (e.g. a pint of beer, a glass of wine) and asked to click 
a picture using the left-hand mouse button. The pictures then re-arranged and a new trial 
began where participants were required to select a different picture again. They were required 
to do this 12 times per block (N=3 blocks). Participants were told to try and avoid clicking 
any of the pictures more than once during each block and were also told that they could not 
click the same position each time. Once completed, the number of errors for each block and 
the total number of errors were displayed (i.e. the number of times participants clicked the 
same images). The total number of errors was used as a measure of WMC, with a higher 
score indicating poorer WMC (see fig 2 in Appendices 6 for task schematic). 
 
 
10 The mean method was stated in the pre-registration. However, the integration method is thought to be more 
reliable and less biased, particularly when using fixed stop-signal delays (Verbruggen et al., 2019). 





In the control session, participants were given 100 easily solvable anagrams and were asked 
to solve as many as they could for 5 minutes. They were informed they could attempt these in 
any order and if they were stuck they should move on. In the stress condition, participants 
were instructed to prepare a 5-min presentation on the topic ‘what I dislike about my body 
and physical appearance.’ This was  based on previous research (e.g. (Field & Powell, 2007; 
Gullo & Stieger, 2011; McGrath et al., 2016)) and a meta-analysis (Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004) which showed that physiological stress is robustly increased by exposure to social 
evaluative threat. Participants were informed that this activity was to assess their personality 
and that the experimenter would stay to watch them present their speech but that it would 
also be recorded on a video camera and assessed by a trainee clinical psychologist on the 
basis of organisation, articulation, openness and defensiveness. Participants were given a pen 
and some paper to prepare for five minutes and were told that they would deliver their 
presentation at the end of the experiment. Whilst the participant prepared, the experimenter 
set up a video camera on a tripod stand and informed the participants that they were attaching 
the camera now so that the participant could get used to it, but it would not start recording 
until the participant presents their speech at the end of the session.  
 
Ad libitum taste test 
Participants were simultaneously provided with 500ml of chilled Skol beer (2.8% vol. ABV) 
and 500ml of chilled fresh orange juice (non-alcoholic beverage) in non-branded glasses. 
Participants were asked to taste and rate the drinks on various gustatory dimensions e.g. 
‘How pleasant was drink 1?’ using Visual Analogue Scales and were instructed to ‘drink as 
much or as little as you like in order to make accurate judgements.’  This procedure has 
demonstrated good construct validity (Jones, Button, et al., 2016). Before beginning, 
participants were also informed that after completion they would take part in a final cognitive 
task, in which they could potentially win small monetary prizes, but that alcohol has been 
shown to impair performance on this task. This was to increase participants’ motivation to 
control their alcohol intake during the bogus taste test (Baines et al., 2019a; Christiansen et 
al., 2013; Field & Jones, 2017). However, participants only actually completed the task 
during session one as performance was of secondary importance here. After the participant 
had left the laboratory, the volume of each beverage consumed was recorded. The measure of 




ad libitum alcohol consumption was calculated as the volume of beer consumed as a 
percentage of total fluid consumed. 
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
Participants attended two counterbalanced laboratory sessions at The University of Liverpool 
between 12:00-18:00pm, separated by at least one week. At the beginning of the first session 
participants were informed that the experiment was investigating the associations between 
cognitive processes, personality differences and the taste perception of alcohol. They were 
first breathalysed and a recording of 0.00mg/l was required to take part. Participants then 
completed their demographic information followed by the baseline measures of self-reported 
alcohol consumption, personality, stress, and alcohol craving. Depending on condition, 
participants then completed the control task (the list of anagrams) or the stress task 
(presentation task) followed by the ‘state’ items of the STAI to measure stress post-
manipulation. The cognitive tasks (modified-SST and SOPT) were then completed in a 
counter-balanced order. Before completing the modified-SST, participants were fitted with 
the appropriately sized electrode cap and were moved into a sound attenuated chamber. They 
were seated approximately 150 cm away from the computer display and were asked to use 
their right hand only to respond during the task. They were also informed that they should 
only blink when the fixation cross was presented on the screen. Breaks were presented 
between blocks where the experimenter checked on the participant and after every 100 trials 
in the stop-signal block.  
After completing the task, the electrode cap was removed and participants were given 
the opportunity to wash the gel out of the hair at the end of each session. Following the 
cognitive tasks, participants completed the AAAQ to measure craving followed by the ad 
libitum taste test and the BART (first session only). The ‘state’ items of the STAI were then 
completed to check feelings of stress at the end of the session and participants were 
breathalysed before they left the laboratory.  
 Upon returning for the second session, participants were breathalysed to ensure they 
had a reading of 0.00mg/l. They then completed the AAAQ and the ‘state’ items of the STAI. 
Following this, participants completed the counterbalanced stress or control task and the 
‘state’ items of the STAI. The cognitive tasks were then completed with the electrode cap re-
fitted before completion of the modified-SST, followed by the AAAQ, the ad-libitum taste 
test and the ‘state’ items of the STAI. Lastly, participants completed the awareness of 




experimental aims questionnaire and were breathalysed and debriefed before leaving the 
laboratory. There was also the option of a cool down period provided at the end of the stress 
session where they could remain in the laboratory and discuss the study. 
 
EEG recording 
The Biosemi ActiveTwo electrode system (Biosemi B.V, Amsterdam, Netherlands) was used 
to record continuous EEG activity. The recording bandpass filter was 0.16 to 100 Hz with  a 
sampling rate of 512 Hz. Participants were fitted with a 64-electode cap. Four flat-type active 
electrodes were also fitted above, below and to the right of the right eye and to the left of the 
left eye to measure electrooculograms (EOG movements) to measure muscle movements.  
 
6.3.4 Data reduction and analysis. 
Information regarding the analyses can be found on Open Science Framework (see 
Appendices 6). In line with previous research (Congdon et al., 2012), we removed any 
negative SSRTs. We also removed any reaction times that were >2000ms or <100ms or more 
than 2.5 standard deviations above the individual mean score in line with past literature (Field 
et al., 2008). Two participants were removed due to a technical error/failing to respond, these 
were also removed from the EEG analysis. In the SOPT, we followed similar guidelines to 
past research (Thush et al., 2008) and removed total errors that were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations above the mean score. One participant was removed as data did not record for one 
session. Lastly, one participant was removed from the BAC analysis due to a technical issue 
with a breathalyser. 
 With regards to the neurophysiological data, electroocular and electrocardiographic 
artifacts were removed using Principal Component Analyses (Berg & Scherg, 1994). Data 
were visually inspected for the presence of movement or muscle artifacts in Brain Electrical 
Source Analysis (BESA) version 7.0, and epochs contaminated with artifacts were manually 
excluded in Matlab v.8.10 (The Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA). EEG data was filtered with a 
high pass filter (0.5 Hz) and low pass filter (45 Hz). ERP’s were epoched (averaged) 
according to onset of the stop-signal in each of the conditions. The Epochs lasted from -200 
before the stop-signal to 800 ms after presentation of the stop-signal. Baseline data correction 
was performed using the data -200 to 0 ms relative to stop-signal. Visual inspection Grand 
average (all subjects and all conditions) ERP data, butterfly plots and surface topographies 
were used to identify the centre of time windows representing the peak times for occurrence 




of components of interest. The largest positive peak after presentation of the stop-signal was 
inferred as the P300. This is in line with past research (e.g. (Jones, Field, et al., 2013; 
Kamarajan et al., 2005)). This peaked around 365 ms in a window of 340-390 ms after the 
stop-signals. The N200 was then inferred  as the first negative peak that occurred before the 
P300. This was found by observing the data backwards and peaked at around 160ms, 
occurring between 140-180 ms following the stop-signals. In line with past research (Jones, 
Field, et al., 2013; Kamarajan et al., 2005), midline electrodes (Pz, Fz and Cz) were used to 
investigate differences in P300 and N200 amplitudes (see fig 1).  
Six participants were removed due to technical issues with the EEG recording 
equipment (i.e. poor signal, issues with triggers recording). Lastly, to ensure there was no 
differences in the percentages of trials removed from the analysis between conditions, a  2 
(condition: control, stress) x 2 (image: alcohol, neutral) x 2 (cue: no-cue, cue) repeated 
measures ANOVA was also conducted on the percentage of stop-signal trials included. This 
revealed no main effects of condition (F (1, 32) = 0.39, p= .536, ηp2 = .01), image (F (1, 32) = 
0.004, p= .948, ηp2 = .00) or cue (F (1, 32) = 2.50, p= .124, ηp2  = .07 and no significant 























Fig 1: (A) A comparison of ERPs along the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, and Pz).  (B) The 





Grand average waveforms at electrode Cz (all subjects, all conditions combined) were used 
to select the time periods for P3 and N2 components. The grey bars indicate the time selected 
(P3 = 340-390 ms, N2 = 140-180 ms). 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Sample Characteristics (see table 1) 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the sample were characteristic of heavy drinkers. Independent 
samples t-tests revealed no significant difference between males and females in AUDIT 




scores (t (38) = 0.95, p= .349, d= .30) or units consumed 11prior to taking part (t (21) = 1.37, 
p= .187, d= .46). There were also no significant differences in trait anxiety scores between 
males and females (t (38) = -.35, p= .728, d= -0.11). 
 
Table 1: Sample characteristics based on baseline measures taken at the beginning of the 
study, shown separately for males and females (values are mean, SD). 
            
   Sample (N=40) Males (n=17)  Females (n=23)  
AUDIT scores  12.70 (4.41)  13.47 (4.94)  12.13 (3.99) 
TLFB Units  42.99 (25.43)  49.94 (34.02)  37.85 (15.48) 
STAI -Trait   44.05 (12.50)  43.24 (12.83)  44.65 (12.51)   
Note: TLFB Units = Alcohol units consumed 14 days prior to taking part measured using a 
Timeline follow back (1 UK unit = 8g of alcohol). STAI Trait = Total scores on the Trait 
version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (scored between 20-80).   
 
6.4.2 Manipulation check (stress) (see table 2) 
A 2 (condition: control, stress) x 3 (time: pre-manipulation, post-manipulation, end of 
session) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the State items of the STAI. This 
revealed a significant main effect of condition (F (1, 39) = 9.27, p= .004, ηp2=.19) with scores 
higher in the stress condition compared to the control condition. There was also a significant 
main effect of time (F (2, 64) = 38.47, p< .001, ηp2= .50) with scores significantly higher at 
post-manipulation compared to pre-manipulation (p<.001) and end of session (p<.001). There 
was no significant difference between pre-manipulation and end of session (p= .374). Lastly, 
there was also a significant condition * time interaction (F (2, 78) = 7.48, p= .001, ηp2= .16). 
Post hoc LSD tests demonstrated that scores increased from pre-manipulation to post-
manipulation in both the stress (p<.001) and control (p<.001) conditions, however scores at 
post-manipulation were significantly higher in the stress condition compared to the control 
condition (p<.001), suggesting the manipulation was successful in increasing stress. There 
were no significant differences between conditions at pre-manipulation (p= .816) or end of 
 
11 TLFB data was not normally distributed and therefore was log transformed to try and improve the 
distribution. However, this did not alter the results of the t-test and therefore non-transformed data is presented.  




session after participants had been informed they would not complete the presentation (p= 
.107). 
 
Table 2: Average scores on the State version of the STAI at pre-manipulation, post-
manipulation and end of session (values are mean, SD). 
            
    Pre-manipulation Post-manipulation End of session  
Control Condition  33.03 (10.49)  36.43 (10.66)  31.38 (7.48) 
Stress Condition  33.33 (9.17)  43.15 (13.71)  33.73 (8.87)  
 
6.4.3 Behavioural results (see table 3). 
Deficits in reactive control were investigated using a 2 (condition; control, stress) x 2 (image; 
alcohol, neutral) x 2 (cue; no-cue, cued) 12repeated measures ANOVA on SSRTS in the 
signal block. There was no main effect of condition (F (1, 36) = 3.80, p= .059, ηp2 = .10) or 
image (F (1, 36) = 1.22, p= .276, ηp2 = .03). The main effect of cue was significant (F (1, 36) 
= 24.56, p< .001, ηp2 = .41), showing that contrary to expectations, SSRTs were significantly 
faster in response to no-cue trials compared to cued trials. Furthermore, there was a 
significant condition * cue interaction (F (1, 36) = 5.62, p= .023, ηp2 = .14). This showed that 
for cued trials, SSRTs were significantly faster in the control session compared to the stress 
session (p= .011), but there was no difference for no-cued trials (p= .346). Furthermore, 
SSRTs were significantly faster for no-cued trials (compared to cued trials) in both the 
control (p= .009) and the stress (p< .001) sessions. There were no other significant 
interactions (ps>.05).  
Impairments in proactive stopping were also investigated using a 2 (condition; 
control, stress) x 2 (image; alcohol, neutral) x 2 (cue, no cue) repeated measures ANOVA on 
the proportion of inhibition errors in the signal block on stop-signal trials. This revealed no 
main effect of condition (F (1, 37) = 1.19, p= .282, ηp2 = .03) suggesting stress did not impair 
proactive stopping. However, there was a main effect of image (F (1, 37) = 7.67, p= .009, ηp2 
= .17) with an increased number of errors made for alcohol images compared to neutral 
images. There was also a main effect of cue (F (1, 37) = 22.24, p< .001, ηp2 = .38) with more 
 
12 This Independent Variable was incorrectly missed from the pre-registration. 




inhibition errors made for no-cue trials compared to cued trials. There were no significant 
interactions (ps > .05).  
Lastly, a 2 (condition; control, stress) x 2 (block; no-signal, signal) x 2 (image; 
alcohol, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on no-cue go reaction times to 
measure deficits in proactive slowing. Due to an uneven number of trials in the no-signal 
block and the no-cue trials in the stop-signal block, we computed median RTs rather than 
means. There was no main effect of condition (F (1, 37) = 0.01, p= .923, ηp2 = .00) suggesting 
stress did not impair proactive slowing. However, there was a main effect of block (F (1, 37) 
= 139.08, p< .001, ηp2 = .79) with participants slowing down their responses in the stop-signal 
block compared to the no-signal block. There was also a main effect of image (F (1, 37) = 
25.19, p< .001, ηp2 = .41) with participants responding significantly faster to alcohol-related 
images compared to neutral-related images. There were no significant interactions (ps > .05).  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for SSRTs (reactive stopping), inhibition errors (proactive 
stopping) (values are mean, SD), and median go-reaction times (ms) (values are median, SE) 
shown separately for each condition and image  
            
               Control                 Stress   
   Alcohol       Neutral          Alcohol     Neutral  
SSRT (no-cue) 286.87 (55.12)      281.76 (48.08)   294.77 (88.28)    294.11 (64.07) 
SSRT (cued)  307.82 (56.49)      304.65 (82.84)   340.02 (62.93)    328.95 (88.07) 
Inh. Errors (no-cue) 9.05 (7.34)      8.38 (7.25)         12.03 (16.48) 10.47 (14.66) 
Inh. Errors (cued) 6.13 (6.49)      5.00 (5.98)         8.42 (15.44) 7.70 (15.11) 
NS block RT  600.26 (18.90)     650.35 (18.59)    600.82 (17.29)    629.07 (20.76) 
SS block RT (no-cue) 760.68 (16.84)     780.54 (20.73)    740.53 (17.54)    767.18 (18.87) 
 
Beer consumption 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to measure beer consumed (as a percentage of total 
fluid) in the ad libitum taste test. However, this revealed no significant difference between 




beer consumed in the control condition and the stress condition (t (39) = -0.46, p= .645, d= 
.05; see table 4 and table 5 for descriptive statistics). There was also no significant difference 
in mean BAC’s at the end of the control condition (0.04 ±0.06) compared to the stress session 
(0.05 ±0.07; t (38) = -0.50, p= .617, d= .15).  
 
Working Memory Capacity 
A paired samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference in the total number of errors  
made in the SOPT during the control condition and stress condition; t (36) = 0.06, p= .950,  
d=.01; see table 4 and table 5 for descriptive statistics).13  
 
6.4.4 Neurophysiological results (see fig 2) 
P300 
A 2 (condition: Stress vs No-Stress) x 2 (image: Alcohol vs Neutral) x 2 (cue: no-cue, cue) x 
3 (Electrode: Fz, Cz, Pz) repeated measure ANOVA was conducted on P300 mean 
amplitudes to investigate differences following stress. This revealed no main effect of 
condition (F (1, 30) = 2.24, p= .145, ηp2 = .07) or cue (F (1, 30) = 0.59, p= .447, ηp2 = .02). 
However, there was a main effect of image (F (1, 30) = 7.10, p= .012, ηp2 = .19), which 
showed that mean amplitudes were significantly higher for alcohol-related images compared 
to neutral-related images. There was also a main effect of electrode (F (2, 47) = 17.31, p< 
.001, ηp2 = .37), which demonstrated that amplitudes of the Fz electrode were significantly 
smaller compared to the Pz electrode (p= .001) and the Cz electrode (p< .001) but there was 
no difference between amplitudes in the Pz and Cz electrodes (p= .412). Lastly, there was 
significant condition * cue (F (1, 30) = 4.57, p= .041, ηp2 = .13) and image * electrode (F (2, 
60) = 4.69, p= .013, ηp2 = .14) interactions. These revealed that amplitudes for alcohol-related 
images were significantly higher than neutral-related images for the Cz electrode. 
Furthermore, for both alcohol-related and neutral-related images, amplitudes were significant 
lower for Fz electrodes compared to Pz (p= .001) and Cz (p< .001) electrodes. However, 
there were no other significant differences (ps > .05). 
 
 
13 Data was skewed and therefore log transformed. However, the result was still non-significant and therefore 
the non-transformed data is presented here. Outlier analysis was also performed but removing these had no 
effect upon results. 





A 2 (condition: Stress vs No-Stress) x 2 (image: Alcohol vs Neutral) x 2 (cue: no-cue, cue) x 
3 (Electrode: Fz, Cz, Pz) repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted on N200 mean 
amplitudes. This revealed no main effect of condition (F (1, 32) = 0.05, p= .832, ηp2 = .001), 
image (F (1, 32) = 0.26, p= .613, ηp2 = .01) or cue (F (1, 32) = 1.47, p= .234, ηp2 = .04). 
However, there was a main effect of electrode (F (2, 64) = 32.00, p< .001, ηp2 = .50), which 
revealed significantly higher amplitudes for the Pz electrode compared to the Fz (p< .001) 
and Cz electrodes (p< .001). There was no difference between mean amplitudes for the Fz 
and Cz electrodes (p= .210). There was also no significant interactions (ps > .05).  
We also hypothesised that following acute stress, impairments in proactive and 
reactive control, and the magnitude of N200/ P300 responses to alcohol-cues, would predict 
unique variance in alcohol consumption. However as there was no difference in alcohol 
consumption between sessions, these analyses are reported in the supplementary materials. 
Table 4 and 5 also presents correlation matrices to show the associations between AS and 























Fig 2: A comparison of ERP components along midline electrodes (Fz, Cz and Pz) for each 





The current studies aimed to investigate if exposure to acute stress and alcohol-cues impaired 
reactive and proactive control, and lead to changes in the neurophysiological responses of 
inhibitory control. We also sought to investigate if these impairments/changes were 
predictive of increased alcohol consumption in an ad libitum taste test or related to potential 
mechanisms that could underlie these relationships. The behavioural results showed that there 




was limited effects of acute stress on reactive stopping and no effect on proactive processes. 
There was also no effect of alcohol-cue exposure on reactive stopping or proactive slowing, 
however exposure to alcohol-cues did impair proactive stopping (as indicated by increased 
inhibition errors) compared to neutral-cue exposure. Poorer proactive stopping was also 
moderately associated with increased ad libitum alcohol consumption following exposure to 
acute stress (see table 4). However, acute stress did not significantly increase ad libitum 
alcohol consumption, and impairments in reactive stopping or proactive slowing did not 
predict increased alcohol consumption.  
These findings offer limited support for theoretical models (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013) that suggest impairments in inhibitory control fluctuate in response 
to psychological (acute stress) and environmental (alcohol-cue exposure) triggers. Certainly, 
the finding that acute stress did not impair reactive stopping contrasts previous research 
(Roos et al., 2017; Scholz et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 2016), although there have been other 
‘null’ findings (e.g. (McGrath et al., 2016)). However, the condition * cue interaction did 
demonstrate that stress impaired reactive stopping to cued stop-signal trials. Nevertheless, we 
hypothesised that the impairing effect of stress would be in response to alcohol-related cues 
only, thus our findings also contradict research which has demonstrated that acute stress 
increases attentional biases towards alcohol-related cues (Field & Powell, 2007; Field & 
Quigley, 2009), and impairs ‘reactive’ control following exposure to alcohol-related cues 
(Zack et al., 2011).  
Indeed, alcohol-cue exposure also had no effect on reactive stopping. This contradicts 
research that has demonstrated short-term impairments in inhibitory control following 
alcohol-cue exposure (e.g. (Muraven & Shmueli, 2006; Petit et al., 2012; Weafer & Fillmore, 
2012)). However, Jones et al’s meta-analyses (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018) reported this 
effect to be small in magnitude (standardised mean difference 0.21) and we found similar 
results in a previous study (Baines et al., 2019a), with others also reporting discrepancies 
(e.g. (Jones, Rose, et al., 2013; Nederkoorn et al., 2009)). Indeed, alcohol-cue exposure did 
impair proactive stopping, but there is a paucity of literature to compare this finding to. It 
could be interpreted that this finding supports Sharma (Sharma, 2017), who also 
demonstrated how heavy drinkers had difficulty implementing proactive control in a 
modified Alcohol-Stroop task, and were instead relying on reactive stopping as a late 
correction mechanism (Braver, 2012).  
The null finding with regards to alcohol-seeking following acute stress is in contrast 
to previous studies which have demonstrated acute stress to increase ad libitum alcohol 




consumption in heavy drinkers (McGrath et al., 2016) and alcohol dependent individuals 
(Thomas et al., 2011). This finding also contrasts those studies which demonstrated social 
drinkers will readily consume more alcohol following stress (de Wit et al., 2003; Magrys & 
Olmstead, 2015) and longitudinal evidence that suggests a causal relationship between stress 
and drinking (Boden et al., 2014; Russell et al., 1999). Indeed, the lack of association 
between ‘reactive’ inhibitory control and ad libitum alcohol consumption in both sessions is 
in contrast to previous findings (Field & Jones, 2017; Jones, Field, et al., 2013; Weafer & 
Fillmore, 2008), however McGrath et al (McGrath et al., 2016) also failed to demonstrate this 
following acute stress. Contrastingly, there was an association between poorer proactive 
stopping and increased alcohol consumption following acute stress. This offers some support 
to researchers (e.g. (Aron, 2011)) who have argued proactive control may be a useful 
explanation of substance use behaviour. However, multiple regression analyses (see 
supplementary materials) showed that proactive stopping did not predict alcohol consumption 
when entered into a model with reactive stopping and proactive slowing, re-emphasising that 
this relationship is moderate and not robust. 
With regards to the neurophysiological results, there was no effect of acute stress on 
P300 or N200 responses. This is in contrast to Dierolf et al (Dierolf et al., 2017), who also 
failed to find behavioural differences, but reported N200 and P300 differences following 
stress (compared to control) in healthy males. Indeed, Ceballos et al (Ceballos et al., 2012) 
also reported that stress increased N200 amplitudes in social drinkers, although they too 
failed to find an effect of stress on P300 amplitudes. Alcohol-cue exposure also had no effect 
on N200 responses, contrasting Watson et al  (Watson et al., 2016), who demonstrated 
decreased N200 components following exposure to alcohol-cues (compared to neutral-cues). 
Contrastingly, P300 responses were significantly higher for alcohol-related images compared 
to neutral-related images. As the sample consisted of heavy drinkers, this finding is in partial 
support of research (e.g. (Herrmann et al., 2001; Littel et al., 2012; Namkoong, Lee, Lee, 
Lee, & An, 2004)) reporting that P300 amplitudes are increased in response to alcohol-related 
cues (compared to neutral-related cues) in substance users compared to controls. This may 
represent increased salience to alcohol-related cues in the current sample. Bartholow et al 
(Bartholow et al., 2007) also reported this in those with a LS to alcohol (but not HS 
individuals), however we failed to demonstrate a relationship between alcohol sensitivity and 
P300 responses. Indeed, alcohol sensitivity was not associated with alcohol use or proactive 
control in contrast to previous findings (Bailey & Bartholow, 2016; Fleming & Bartholow, 
2014). Furthermore, neither P300 nor N200 responses in either session were associated with 




ad libitum alcohol consumption contrasting Jones et al (Jones, Field, et al., 2013), and 
Bartholow et al (Bartholow et al., 2007) who reported a relationship with self-reported 
alcohol consumption. 
 Lastly, acute stress had no effect on WMC. This is contradictory to previous findings 
(e.g. (Luethi et al., 2008; Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et al., 2008)), although there are other 
contrasting results (e.g. (Lukasik, Waris, Soveri, Lehtonen, & Laine, 2019)). Poorer WMC 
was however associated with worse proactive inhibition, which is supportive of previous 
findings (Richmond et al., 2015; Wiemers & Redick, 2018), and may suggest that individuals 
with a high WMC are better at goal maintenance compared to those with a low-WMC 
(Richmond et al., 2015). However, this was only the case following acute stress (i.e. not 
during the control session) and the clinical application of this finding is limited as  WMC was 
not associated with alcohol use, in contrast to past research (Mahedy et al., 2018; Peeters et 
al., 2015; Thush et al., 2008). Thus, taking these findings and those regarding alcohol 
sensitivity into account, we found limited evidence of WMC or AS as mechanisms 
underlying effective proactive control.  
However, it should be noted that these findings offer support for models which 
suggest inhibitory control is a multi-component processes (e.g. (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 
2014)) which is comprised of both proactive and reactive control. In support of previous 
findings (Verbruggen et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 
2014), participants slowed down their responses as stop-signal probability increased. 
Furthermore, we were also able to isolate proactive stopping through the inclusion of a cue 
indicating stop-signal probability based on past research (Brevers et al., 2017; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b). Indeed, participants made more inhibition errors for no-cue trials compared to 
cued trials suggesting they prepared themselves to detect stop-signals through proactive 
adjustments of their behaviour, when a stop-signal cue was presented, in line with previous 
studies (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; Zandbelt et al., 2011).This likely 
explains the finding that SSRTs were faster to no-cue trials (compared to cued trials) as 
participants slowed down their responses to cued trials.  
Nevertheless, these findings should be interpreted in light of limitations. Although the 
stress-manipulation was successful, nineteen participants reported being aware that the 
presentation task was designed to induce stress. Upon removal, there was no longer a main 
effect of image on proactive stopping and P300 responses. However, this may have been 
caused by a reduction in statistical power (see supplementary materials for further analyses). 
This level of awareness was likely the result of a within-subjects design, in which the stress 




manipulation was the only change across the conditions. Furthermore, as McGrath et al 
(McGrath et al., 2016) note, this number may have been influenced by the requirement for 
participants to fill in a questionnaire assessing their state anxiety shortly before and after the 
presentation task. Certainly, the open question asking participants to guess the purpose of the 
study showed that only three were actually aware of the overall purpose of the study, and 
removal of these actually added a main effect of condition on SSRTs (p=.046, ηp2= .12), 
suggesting that acute stress may indeed have an impact on reactive stopping.  
Secondly, the sample consisted only of heavy drinkers. Future research would benefit 
from the inclusion of a control group of light drinkers or those who abstain from alcohol use 
to allow for comparison of impairments in inhibitory control across groups. This would be 
particularly useful as studies that have compared the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on 
inhibitory control in heavy drinkers vs. a control group of light drinkers have yielded 
contradictory results (e.g. (Czapla et al., 2016; Nederkoorn et al., 2009), and Sharma 
(Sharma, 2017) reported differences in the ability to implement proactive control in heavy vs. 
light drinkers. It would also be useful to examine the effect of low, moderate and high levels 
of stress on both reactive and proactive control. This could potentially explain the ‘null’ 
findings in the current study, and would help to confirm whether the effect of acute stress on 
inhibitory performance follows a U-shaped function (see (Henderson et al., 2012)). However, 
without a robust relationship between inhibitory processes and alcohol use, the clinical 
application of these findings would be limited. 
In conclusion, the results demonstrated that acute stress had limited effects on reactive 
stopping, and no effect on proactive inhibitory processes or the neurological correlates of 
inhibitory control. Alcohol-cue exposure also had no effect on reactive stopping. However, 
alcohol-cue exposure did impair proactive stopping and increase P300 responses (compared 
to neutral-related cues). We also found limited evidence to suggest that working memory 
processes underlie proactive control. These results support that inhibitory control is a multi-
component process. However, we only demonstrated limited support for models that suggest 
impairments in inhibitory control fluctuate in response to psychological processes and the 
environment. Indeed, there was also little evidence of a relationship between inhibitory 
control processes and ad libitum alcohol consumption.  




Table  4: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for  proactive and reactive inhibitory processes, P300 and N200 responses to alcohol-
related cues, alcohol sensitivity, Working Memory Capacity and ad libitum alcohol consumption, for the stress condition. 
                    
    Mean (SD)  2  3  4  5  6  7            8 
Reactive control  312.64 (66.63)  .21  .53**  -.29  -.24  -.04  .32          .20 
Proactive slowing  141.60 (112.43) -  -.38*  .16  -.13  .04  -.22         -.10 
Proactive inhibition   9.53 (14.80)    -  -.22  .37*  -.19  .37*          .36* 
P300    2.12 (1.55)      -  -.09  -.04  .11          .10 
N200     0.08 (0.69)        -  -.32  -.01          .22 
Alcohol sensitivity  0.02 (0.70)          -  .01          .01 
Working Memory  8.19 (2.89)            -          .17 
Alcohol consumption  48.57 (22.78)                       -   
Reactive control = SSRTs (higher scores = worse reactive control). Proactive slowing = RT slowing in the stop-signal block compared to the 
no-signal block. Proactive inhibition = % of inhibition errors.  P300/N200  = amplitudes of ERP responses to alcohol-related cues. Alcohol 
sensitivity  = composite score of alcohol sensitivity. Working Memory = errors on SOPT. Alcohol consumption = beer consumed as a % of total 
fluid in the ad libitum taste test. *p<. 05,  **p< .01 
 
 




Table  5: Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for  proactive and reactive inhibitory processes, P300 and N200 responses to alcohol-
related cues, alcohol sensitivity, Working Memory Capacity and ad libitum alcohol consumption, for the control condition. 
                    
    Mean (SD)  2  3  4  5  6  7          8  
Reactive control  296.18 (48.15)  .24  -.39*  -.22  .34  .07  -.17      -.13 
Proactive slowing  160.02 (78.28)  -  -.44**  -.15  -.34  -.04  -.09      .08 
Proactive inhibition  7.28 (6.12)    -  .11  -.00  -.23  .18      .10  
P300    2.61 (1.83)      -  .16  .04  -.26      -.22 
N200     0.15 (1.14)        -  .21  -.15      -.21 
Alcohol sensitivity  0.02 (0.70)          -  -.09      -.03 
Working Memory  8.22 (2.25)            -      .24 
Alcohol consumption   47.32 (24.15)                  -  
Reactive control = SSRTs (higher scores = worse reactive control). Proactive slowing = RT slowing in the stop-signal block compared to the 
no-signal block. Proactive inhibition = % of inhibition errors.  P300/N200  = amplitudes of ERP responses to alcohol-related cues. Alcohol 
sensitivity  = composite score of alcohol sensitivity. Working Memory = errors on SOPT. Alcohol consumption = beer consumed as a % of total 
fluid in the ad libitum taste test. *p<.05, p<.001  




6.6. Supplementary Information 
6.6.1 Results 
Craving (see table 1) 
A 3 (subscale: mean scores on Inclined/Indulgent, Obsessed/Compelled, Resolved/Regulated) 
x 2 (condition: control, stress) x 2 (time: start of session, post-cognitive tasks) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on scores on the AAAQ. This revealed main effects of 
scale (F (2, 65) = 161.66, p<.001, ηp2= .81) and condition (F (1, 39) = 7.04, p= .011, ηp2= .15) 
which showed that scores were higher overall in the stress session compared to the control 
session. However, there were no other significant main effects or interactions (ps> .05).  
 
Table 1: Mean scores on the subscales of the AAAQ at the beginning of the sessions (Time 1) 
and post manipulation/computer tasks (values are mean, SD). 
            
      Control Condition     Stress Condition    
   Time 1  Time 2  Time 1  Time 2   
Inclined/Indulgent 4.43 (1.75) 4.68 (1.85) 4.77 (1.80) 4.88 (1.83) 
Obsessed/Compelled 1.14 (1.23) 1.31 (1.43) 1.44 (1.36) 1.41 (1.51) 
Resolved/Regulated 1.17 (1.17) 1.04 (1.06) 1.32 (1.42) 1.29 (1.37)  
 
The associations between proactive and reactive control and ad libitum alcohol 
consumption. 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate if proactive and reactive control 
predicted unique variance in alcohol consumption, separately for each session. Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) ranged between 1.18 and 2.16 suggesting no issues with multi-
collinearity. The full regression models did not predict significant variance in alcohol 
consumption (stress (R2 = .13; F (3, 34) = 1.68, p= .189; control (R2 = .04; F (3, 34 = 0.47, p= 
.706). Following acute stress, neither SSRTs (β = -.03, p= .904, 95% CI -.16 to .14), 
proactive slowing (β = .06, p= .775, 95% CI -.07 to .10) nor proactive stopping (β = .39, p 
=.104, 95% CI -.13 to 1.33) were predictive of ad libitum alcohol consumption. Furthermore, 
neither SSRTs (β = -.12, p=.514, 95 % CI -.25 to .13), proactive slowing (β = .16, p= .390, 




95% CI -.07 to .17) or proactive stopping (β = .12, p= .550, 95% CI -1.12 to 2.06) were 
predictive of alcohol intake in the control session. 
 
 
The associations between neurological responses to alcohol-cues and ad libitum alcohol 
consumption. 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate if the magnitude of N200 and 
P300 responses to alcohol-cues predicted unique variance in alcohol consumption for each 
condition separately. VIFs ranged between 1.01 and 1.03 suggesting no issues with multi-
collinearity. The full regression models did not predict a significant amount of variance in 
alcohol consumption in the stress session (R2 = .06; F (2, 30) = 1.03, p= .370) or control 
session (R2 = .08; F (2, 30) = 1.31, p= .284). Specifically in the stress session, neither P300 
amplitudes (β= .13, p= .486, 95% CI -.35 to 7.22) nor N200 amplitudes (β= .23, p= .201, 
95% CI -4.36 to 19.89) were predictive of significant variance in alcohol consumption. 
Similarly, neither P300 amplitudes (β= -.19, p= .294, 95% CI -7.29 to 2.29) nor N200 
amplitudes (β= -.18, p= .308, 95% CI -11.60 to 3.78) in the control session were predictive of 
significant alcohol consumption. 
 
Awareness of experimental aims 
In this study we checked participants’ awareness of our experimental aims. Three participants 
guessed the full aims (inferred from an open ended question). Removal of these did not 
significantly affect the results with regards to proactive stopping or slowing. However, the 
main effect of condition on reactive stopping was now significant (p=.046, ηp2= .12). 
Nineteen participants also guessed the aim of the presentation task was to induce stress. 
There was no effect on the results regarding SSRTS or proactive slowing, however the main 
effect of image proactive stopping was removed. This was likely due to a reduction in 
statistical power. In terms of the neurophysiological results, removal of these participants 
removed the main effect of image on P300 responses which had demonstrated that mean 
amplitudes were significantly higher for alcohol-related images compared to neutral-related 
images and the condition * cue, image * electrode interactions. However, this was likely 
influenced by a reduction in power. Contrastingly, there was now an image * cue * electrode 
interaction which showed that P300 amplitudes were higher in the Cz electrode for alcohol-
related images (compared to neutral-related) on no-cued trials. Removal of these participants 
had no effect on the N200 responses.  




Furthermore, thirteen participants guessed the aim of the Stop-Signal task was to 
assess behavioural impulsivity (response inhibition). Upon removal, this removed the 
condition * cue interaction suggesting that acute stress no longer impaired reactive stopping 
to cued trials. Removal of these participants had no effect on proactive stopping. With 
regards to proactive slowing, removal of these participants added a condition * image 
interaction which showed that participants responded faster to alcohol-cues (compared to 
neutral cues) regardless of session and responded faster to neutral-cues in the control session 
(compared to the stress).  
With regards to the neurophysiological results, removal of these only removed the 
condition * cue interaction on P300 amplitudes which had no significant post-hoc tests 
anyway. Removal of these also added an image * cue interaction on N200 amplitudes which 
was the result of significantly lower amplitudes for alcohol-related images compared to 
neutral-images for no-cued trials. Amplitude of N200 responses were also significantly 
higher for no-cued images (compared to cued) for neutral-related images. Lastly, eight 
participants guessed the aim of the taste test was to measure how much they drank. However, 
removal of these had no effect on the null finding with regards to beer consumption in the 
control vs. stress sessions.  
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter contributed to the key aims of this thesis by demonstrating limited evidence that 
inhibitory processes fluctuate in response to psychological triggers. Contrastingly, alcohol-
cue exposure did impair proactive stopping and increase P300 responses. This strengthens the 
suggestion that investigating only reactive stopping is of limited theoretical benefit. However, 
there was little evidence of a relationship between inhibitory processes (or 
neurophysiological responses) and alcohol consumption, or for the suggestion that Working 
Memory Capacity or alcohol sensitivity may underlie the effective use of proactive control. 
These findings are discussed in the following chapter, alongside the other findings reported in 











This thesis had two primary aims. The first aim was to isolate reactive control from proactive 
slowing in heavy drinkers, based on evidence from Verbruggen et al  (Verbruggen, McLaren, 
et al., 2014), to confirm that that there is an over-simplistic conceptualisation of inhibitory 
control as a reactive stopping response in the addiction literature, with little 
acknowledgement of other inhibitory processes that may contribute to a better explanation of 
substance use behaviour (Aron, 2011; Brevers et al., 2017). The second aim was to 
investigate if these processes fluctuate within individuals in response to certain environmental 
and psychological triggers (alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue exposure and exposure to acute 
stress), based on two theories (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013), and whether 
these impairments predicted increased alcohol-seeking in non-dependent drinkers. Lastly, I 
also sought to investigate the potential mechanisms which may underlie the ability to 
implement proactive control effectively (alcohol sensitivity (AS) and Working Memory 
Capacity (WMC)). These research questions were important to provide knowledge on which 
specific inhibitory processes (if any) were impaired by psychological and environmental 
triggers, and which processes (if any) were related to increased alcohol consumption. This 
knowledge was required to update contemporary theories of addiction (e.g. (de Wit, 2009; 
Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013)), but also to identify if these 
processes could be targeted within addiction interventions. Therefore, throughout this thesis I 
recruited non-dependent heavy drinkers as this population is at risk for developing Alcohol 
Use Disorders. This chapter first summarises the main findings from each study. Following 
this, is a discussion of findings across studies in relation to contemporary models of addiction 
and past literature.   
 
7.1 Summary of Main findings in each study 
 
Study one aimed to isolate proactive slowing and reactive control in heavy drinkers, and 
investigate whether individual differences in these processes were associated with individual 
differences in self-reported alcohol consumption. The results demonstrated that reactive 
control and proactive slowing could be isolated in heavy drinkers. Specifically, heavy 
drinkers employed proactive slowing strategies as the probability of an inhibitory response 




was increased, in both the Stop-Signal tasks and the AX-Continuous Performance Test, 
suggesting that inhibitory control is a multi-component process comprised of both reactive 
and proactive control. Despite this, individual differences in reactive control and proactive 
slowing were unrelated to individual differences self-reported alcohol use. Therefore, I failed 
to support my primary hypothesis. However, this study was important in allowing me to 
identify a task I could use moving forward with the research in this thesis. I conducted a split-
third reliability analysis on all tasks which demonstrated that they all surpassed the .70 cut off 
for good internal reliability (Kline, 1999). I therefore chose the task that I thought would be 
most practical to incorporate alcohol-cues. I also conducted a Principal Component Analysis 
to investigate if the measures of proactive and reactive control loaded onto the same factors 
across tasks. However, these measures loaded onto one factor per task, but this was likely 
influenced by the methodological differences between tasks. 
Following on from this, studies two and three aimed to investigate if alcohol-cue 
exposure (study two) and alcohol intoxication (study three) impaired proactive slowing and 
reactive control. I also modified a Stop-Signal task from study one to allow measurement of 
signal detection (i.e. detection of a stop-signal) to enable investigation into whether this 
process was also impaired by alcohol-cue exposure and alcohol intoxication. Lastly, as 
alcohol-cue exposure and alcohol intoxication have been shown to increase alcohol-seeking 
in non-dependent drinkers (Christiansen et al., 2013; de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Fatseas et al., 
2015; MacKillop & Lisman, 2007), I also aimed to investigate whether alcohol-cue exposure 
and alcohol intoxication increased ad libitum alcohol consumption, and whether impairments 
in inhibitory processes mediated this relationship. The results showed that alcohol-cue 
exposure did not significantly impair proactive slowing or signal detection. Indeed, following 
alcohol-cue exposure, SSRTs were unexpectedly quicker (indicating better reactive control), 
compared to neutral-cue exposure. Although this effect was abolished when I only compared 
blocks in the task in which the stop-signals were presented centrally (this methodology is 
more comparable to past literature (e.g. (Field & Jones, 2017; Kreusch, Vilenne, & 
Quertemont, 2013; Petit et al., 2012)). Contrastingly, this study did demonstrate that alcohol-
cue exposure significantly increased ad libitum alcohol consumption and had a weak effect 
on craving (supporting e.g. (Christiansen et al., 2017; Fatseas et al., 2015; Jones, Rose, et al., 
2013)). However, despite the increase in alcohol-seeking, there was no association between 
inhibitory processes and increased ad libitum alcohol consumption. Therefore, I found no 
support for the prediction that impairments in these processes would mediate the relationship 
between alcohol-cue exposure and increased alcohol-seeking. 




Similarly, the results of study three demonstrated that alcohol intoxication did not 
impair proactive slowing nor signal detection. However, alcohol intoxication did impair 
reactive control (demonstrated through slower SSRTs) compared to the placebo-alcohol 
supporting  past research (e.g. (Fillmore et al., 2009; Marczinski et al., 2005; Weafer & 
Fillmore, 2008)), but not compared to the control beverage. This suggests that the impairing 
effect of alcohol intoxication on reactive control is limited to the pharmacological effects. 
Indeed, reactive control was unexpectedly better following the placebo-alcohol beverage 
compared to the control, suggesting reactive stopping was not impaired by the anticipated 
effects of alcohol. In contrast, alcohol intoxication significantly increased ad libitum alcohol 
consumption compared to the placebo-alcohol and control (supporting (de Wit & Chutuape, 
1993; Fernie et al., 2012; Rose & Grunsell, 2008)), but there was no difference following the 
placebo and control. This suggests that alcohol-seeking was also not influenced by the 
anticipated effects of alcohol, although these results may have been influenced by a long 
interval between the intake of the placebo beverage and the taste test (Christiansen et al., 
2013). Lastly, I hypothesised that impairments in inhibitory processes following alcohol 
intoxication (compared to placebo-alcohol and control) would predict unique variance in 
alcohol consumption. However, no evidence for this was found nor for the prediction that 
impairments in these processes would mediate the relationship between alcohol priming and 
increased alcohol-seeking.  
In two online studies (study four and five) I then aimed to clarify the role of reactive 
control and proactive control in heavy drinkers outside of the laboratory. I also examined 
potential mechanisms that could underlie the preparation of responses (WMC (study four and 
five) and AS (study five)). The results of study four demonstrated that poorer WMC (and 
increased alcohol craving) was associated with increased overall alcohol use (supporting 
(Bechara & Martin, 2004; Mahedy et al., 2018; Noël et al., 2001)). However, there were no 
associations between individual differences in proactive slowing or reactive control with 
individual differences in alcohol use. Furthermore, individual differences in proactive 
slowing were also unrelated to individual differences in WMC. Therefore, the assumptions 
required to examine mediation were not met. This hypothesis was also labelled as exploratory 
(and therefore not pre-registered), hence this analysis was not reported. 
Similarly, the results of study five showed no associations between individual 
differences in reactive control or proactive slowing and overall alcohol use. Furthermore, 
there were no associations between individual differences in alcohol sensitivity and alcohol 
use or proactive slowing. Despite this, poorer WMC was associated with poorer proactive 




slowing in support of my prediction and past literature (e.g. (Redick & Engle, 2011; 
Richmond et al., 2015; Wiemers & Redick, 2018)), but due to no association between 
individual differences in WMC and overall alcohol use, I did not meet the assumptions to 
investigate if WMC mediated the relationship between proactive slowing and alcohol use. 
Since this hypothesis (and the hypothesis regarding the mediating effect of AS) was labelled 
as exploratory (and not pre-registered), these analyses were not reported.  
Lastly, study six aimed to investigate another factor (acute stress) which is thought to 
impair inhibitory control (Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013). In particular, there is limited 
evidence regarding this effect and the studies which have been conducted have provided 
contradictory evidence. Additionally, this study aimed to provide neurophysiological 
evidence (rather than just behavioural evidence) to provide a more sensitive investigation of 
short-term fluctuations of inhibitory control, and whether these are related to increased 
alcohol-seeking. Lastly, I sought to investigate the potential mechanisms (WMC, AS) which 
could explain these relationships in a laboratory environment.  
The results showed that there was no effect of acute stress on proactive processes or 
the neurological correlates of inhibitory control. Indeed, acute stress only impaired reactive 
stopping to cued stop-signal trials. Furthermore, alcohol-cue exposure had no effect on 
reactive stopping or proactive slowing. However, alcohol-cue exposure was found to impair 
proactive stopping (the proportion of inhibition errors) and increased P300 responses, 
compared to neutral-cue exposure. Despite this, acute stress did not significantly increase 
alcohol-seeking and I found limited evidence for the associations between inhibitory 
processes (including the neurological components) and ad libitum alcohol consumption. 
Lastly, neither WMC nor AS were associated with ad libitum alcohol consumption, proactive 
slowing or P300 responses. Indeed, only poorer WMC was moderately associated with poorer 
proactive inhibition following acute stress. 
 
7.2 Over-simplification of inhibitory control  
 
Taken together, findings from studies one to six provided support for Verbruggen et al’s 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014) model. I was able to consistently isolate proactive 
slowing and reactive control in heavy drinkers, and these samples displayed proactive 
slowing as the requirement for response inhibition increased in all Stop-Signal tasks (studies 
one to six) and an AX-Continuous Performance Task (study one). This was important as it 




has been suggested that proactive control may provide a more appropriate explanation of 
substance use behaviour (Aron, 2011).   
The isolation of proactive control in heavy drinkers supports research which has 
demonstrated that participants slow down their responses as stop-signal probability increases 
(Verbruggen et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, in study six I also isolated proactive stopping by incorporating a stop-signal cue 
to indicate stop-signal probability, based on previous research (e.g. (Brevers et al., 2017; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b)). The findings of study six showed that heavy drinkers made 
more inhibition errors for trials with no stop-signal cue compared to trials with a stop-signal 
cue. This suggests the participants prepared themselves to detect a stop-signal when a stop-
signal cue was presented and supports previous findings (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2009b; Zandbelt et al., 2011) that suggest we can proactively adjust our behaviour. 
As such, these results also demonstrated that SSRTs were faster to no-cue trials (compared to 
cued trials). It is likely this finding can be explained by participants proactively adjusting 
their behaviour (and slowing down), suggesting that proactive control does have downstream 
effects on SSRTs, and it is therefore important to recognise proactive processes to provide a 
full model of inhibitory control (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
 Additionally, in study two and three I also isolated signal-detection in modified Stop-
Signal tasks. This is an important process as if the stop-signal is not detected rapidly enough 
or detected at all, response inhibition will not be engaged or successful (Verbruggen, 
McLaren, et al., 2014). Furthermore, research has suggested that signal detection could be 
particularly key to explaining hazardous drug and alcohol use (Brevers et al., 2017), due to a 
difficulty in detecting inhibitory signals in typically ‘noisy’ surroundings  in the real-world 
(e.g. in a busy pub or bar) (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Indeed, stopping times in both 
studies were slower when stop-signals were presented in the periphery of the computer screen 
compared to centrally. Exploratory analyses also revealed that participants in both studies 
made more errors on stop-signal trials when the stop-signals were presented in the periphery, 
compared to centrally. These results supports the notion that reactive stopping involves 
multiple processes that allow an individual to stop successfully, rather than simply the 
duration of the single stopping process (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). To be specific, 
as well as a final motor-related process (the ‘reactive’ act of inhibiting or not), reactive 
stopping is also influenced by how quickly a stop-signal is detected. Despite this, group 
differences in stopping performance are generally attributed to the inhibition of motor 
responses and the influence of signal detection is regularly overlooked (Verbruggen, 




McLaren, et al., 2014). Therefore, researchers should attempt to acknowledge this process 
when investigating inhibitory processes. 
To summarise, heavy drinkers employed proactive strategies as the probability for the 
requirement of response inhibition increased. These samples were also faster at detecting 
stop-signals presented in the centre of the screen compared to when they were presented in 
the periphery. This suggests that a focus only on reactive stopping is over-simplistic, and 
moving forward researchers should acknowledge and measure other inhibitory processes in 
the addiction literature, otherwise they risk providing an incomplete model of inhibitory 
control (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014; Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014) in substance 
use behaviour. Indeed, there are a lot of inconsistencies in the literature (e.g. (Fernie et al., 
2010; Nederkoorn et al., 2009; Smith & Mattick, 2018)), which may be the result of 
‘invisible’ factors (such as preparation and learning).  
 
7.3 Inhibitory control as a state variable 
 
Despite the above findings, the research in this thesis only provided limited support for 
theoretical models which suggest that inhibitory control is a state variable that fluctuates in 
response to psychological processes and environmental triggers (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013). Without solid evidence for state fluctuations in inhibitory 
processes, it is hard to argue that inhibitory control deficits underlie a ‘loss of control’ over 
drinking. Furthermore, throughout this thesis, I have argued that that these theories based 
their assumptions on an over-simplistic conceptualisation of inhibitory control. However, 
these studies failed to find robust evidence of alcohol-cue exposure, alcohol intoxication or 
acute stress leading to short-term fluctuations in proactive inhibitory processes within 
individuals. The findings with regards to this are further discussed below.    
 
7.3.1 Alcohol intoxication 
 
With regards to the effect of alcohol priming, I did find some support for the suggestion that  
alcohol intoxication leads to state fluctuations in response inhibition in study three. Certainly, 
acute alcohol intoxication was found to impair reactive inhibitory control compared to a 
placebo-alcohol dose, which offers support to past research (e.g. (Fillmore et al., 2009; 
Marczinski et al., 2005; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008)). However, the addition of a control group 
revealed that the effect of alcohol intoxication on SSRTs is limited. Specifically, there was no 




evidence of an impairing effect of alcohol compared to the control when analysing both 
peripheral and central stop-signal blocks, and only weak evidence when comparing central 
blocks only. This suggests that the impairing effect is limited and is contradictory of 
Christiansen et al (Christiansen et al., 2013) who demonstrated that an alcoholic prime 
impaired executive functioning compared to both a placebo-alcohol and control beverage. 
Indeed, reactive control was also better following the placebo-alcohol beverage compared to 
the control, suggesting that the anticipated effects of alcohol had no impairing effects. This is 
in contrast to past research (Christiansen et al., 2016), which demonstrated a placebo-alcohol 
impaired inhibitory control compared to a control, and Chrisitiansen et al (Christiansen et al., 
2013) who showed no difference in executive functioning following a placebo-alcohol and 
control prime. Consequently, these findings only offer limited support to theories which posit 
inhibition as a state variable (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013). 
Additionally, alcohol intoxication did not impair detection of stop-signals, nor did a 
placebo-alcohol prime.  This is in contrast to research that suggests alcohol intoxication 
impairs selective attention (Plawecki et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2014), and therefore may 
increase the difficulty of detecting inhibitory signals in typically ‘noisy’ surroundings in the 
real-world (e.g. in a busy pub or bar) (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Lastly, I also found 
no evidence that the pharmacological or anticipated effects of alcohol impaired proactive 
slowing.  It should be noted that there is very little literature to compare these findings to, 
although our findings were supportive of Campbell et al (Campbell et al., 2017) who also 
found that alcohol intoxication did not significantly impair proactive control. However, due 
to the paucity of literature it is plausible that an effect may exist particularly in other samples, 
such as those with an Alcohol Use Disorder. Nevertheless, I only found limited support for 
the argument that inhibitory control is a state variable, which fluctuates in response to alcohol 
intoxication. 
 
7.3.2 Acute stress 
 
Furthermore, I found limited effects of acute stress (compared to a control) on reactive 
stopping in study six. This contrasts previous literature (e.g. (Roos et al., 2017; Scholz et al., 
2009; Starcke et al., 2016)) that has demonstrated short-term deficits in inhibitory control 
following exposure to acute stress, and models which argue inhibitory control fluctuates in 
response to psychological processes (de Wit, 2009; Jones, Christiansen, et al., 2013). These 
findings also contrast research that has demonstrated enhanced performance on inhibitory 




tasks following acute stress (Constantinou et al., 2010; Schwabe et al., 2013). However, 
McGrath et al (McGrath et al., 2016) also reported ‘null findings’ in a similar sample. 
Certainly, the condition * cue interaction did demonstrate that stress impaired reactive 
stopping to cued trials (compared to control), but we hypothesised that the impairing effect of 
stress would be in response to alcohol-related cues only. Thus, our findings also contradict 
research which has demonstrated that acute stress increases attentional biases towards 
alcohol-related cues (Field & Powell, 2007; Field & Quigley, 2009), and impairs ‘reactive’ 
control following exposure to alcohol-related cues (Zack et al., 2011). However, the 
supplementary finding that removal of participants who were aware of the overall purpose of 
the study, added a main effect of condition on reactive stopping may suggest this effect 
warrants further investigation. Furthermore, I found no effect of acute stress on proactive 
slowing or proactive stopping. This also contradicts the concept that inhibitory control is a 
state variable that fluctuates within individuals in response to acute stress. However, to my 
knowledge there is a lack of research to compare these findings to, thus it is possible that an 
effect of acute stress on proactive processes does exist, and it is only with further research 
could this be revealed.  
Lastly, with regards to neurophysiological responses, I found no effect of acute stress 
on P300 or N200 responses (i.e. the ERPS associated with aspects of inhibitory control 
(Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Huster et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015)). This finding offers 
some support to Ceballos et al (Ceballos et al., 2012) who also failed to find an effect of 
stress on P300 amplitudes. However, they did find that stress increased N200 amplitudes in 
social drinkers. Furthermore, the findings also contrast Dierolf et al (Dierolf et al., 2017), 
who although failed to find behavioural differences, reported increased P300 difference 
waves and decreased N200 difference waves following acute stress (compared to control) in 
healthy males. Taking these findings together, I provided limited behavioural and 
neurophysiological support for the suggestion that acute stress impairs reactive or proactive 
inhibitory control processes. 
 
7.3.3 Alcohol-cue exposure 
 
Importantly, I failed to replicate findings that support these models (de Wit, 2009; Jones, 
Christiansen, et al., 2013) to show alcohol-cue exposure leads to short-term impairments in 
‘reactive’ inhibitory control in studies two and six. Indeed, reactive control was unexpectedly 
better following alcohol-cue exposure (study two) and there was no difference in reactive 




stopping to alcohol-cues (compared to neutral-cues) in study six. Specifically in study two, 
this finding was when all blocks of the Stop-Signal task were included in the analyses (i.e. 
central and peripheral stop-signal blocks). When the analysis was conducted with only central 
stop-signal blocks, there was no difference in SSRTs following alcohol-cue exposure and 
neutral-cue exposure. Nevertheless, these findings are in contrast to previous research (Field 
& Jones, 2017; Kreusch, Vilenne, & Quertemont, 2013; Monk et al., 2016; Muraven & 
Shmueli, 2006; Petit et al., 2012; Weafer & Fillmore, 2012) that has demonstrated alcohol-
cue exposure impairs ‘reactive’ inhibitory control in non-dependent drinkers. However, there 
is other evidence which has also failed to support this in non-dependent drinkers (Jones, 
Rose, et al., 2013; Nederkoorn et al., 2009) and male dependent drinkers (Mainz et al., 2012). 
Indeed, although the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on inhibitory control was found to be 
robust in a recent meta-analyses (Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018), the effect was suggested to 
be small  (Standardised mean difference = -0.21, 95% CI = −0.32, −0.11). Nevertheless, our 
findings do not support the notion that alcohol-cue exposure impairs ‘reactive’ inhibitory 
control.   
Furthermore, alcohol-cue exposure did not impair signal detection in study two. This 
contradicts research that suggests alcohol-cues may guide the selective attention of heavy 
drinkers (Townshend & Duka, 2001) and therefore prevent individuals detecting inhibitory 
signals in the environment. There was also no effect of alcohol-cue exposure on proactive 
slowing in study two or study six. Taken together, these findings fail to support the notion 
that impairments in inhibitory control processes fluctuate in response to the environment. 
However, I did find that alcohol-cue exposure impaired proactive stopping (the proportion of 
inhibition errors) compared to neutral-cue exposure in study six. Although there is a paucity 
of literature to compare this to, this finding could be argued to support Sharma (Sharma, 
2017) who also demonstrated heavy drinkers having difficulty utilising proactive control in 
the presence of alcohol-related cues (compared to neutral cues), in a modified Stroop task. 
Indeed, Sharma inferred that  heavy drinkers were relying on reactive control as a late 
correction mechanism to inhibit their responses. This finding therefore offers some support to 
the suggestion that inhibitory control is a state variable that fluctuates in response to alcohol-
cue exposure 
With regards to the neurophysiological responses, P300 responses to alcohol-cues 
were also found to be significantly increased (compared to neutral-cues) in study six. This 
finding supports previous research (e.g. (Herrmann et al., 2001; Littel et al., 2012; Namkoong 
et al., 2004)) that has also revealed increased P300 responses to alcohol-cues (compared to 




neutral-cues) in substance users (compared to controls). Furthermore, this finding offers 
support to Bartholow et al (Bartholow et al., 2007) who also reported that P300 responses to 
alcohol-cues (compared to neutral-cues) were increased in those with a LS to alcohol (but not 
those with a HS to alcohol). However I failed to demonstrate a relationship between alcohol 
sensitivity and P300 responses. Furthermore, although past research has suggested decreased 
P300 responses during inhibition is a marker for risk of alcoholism (Hesselbrock et al., 2001; 
Kamarajan et al., 2005), the findings in this thesis suggest that P300 responses may also be 
related to cue-reactivity or salience to alcohol-related cues. However, alcohol-cue exposure 
had no effect on N200 responses in this study. This contrasts previous research that has 
demonstrated decreased N200 components following exposure to alcohol-cues (compared to 
neutral-cues) in non-dependent drinkers (Watson et al., 2016). Furthermore, although the 
functional specificity of the N200 component still has a degree of uncertainty (Dimoska et al., 
2006), it could be argued that this refutes claims that N200 responses are related to response 
conflict (rather than response inhibition per se) (Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Enriquez-
Geppert et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2004), as it would be expected that if 
alcohol-cues are more salient than neutral-cues to heavy drinkers, they would experience a 
degree of response conflict which would be reflected in differences in N200 responses. To 
summarise, I failed to find that alcohol-cue exposure impairs reactive inhibitory control nor 
proactive slowing. However, alcohol-cue exposure was found to impair proactive stopping 
and increase P300 responses. Thus, I provided mixed support for inhibitory control as a state 
variable in response to alcohol-cue exposure.  
 
7.4 Potential mechanisms  
 
This thesis also investigated the potential mechanisms that may underlie effective response 
inhibition. However, I found very little support for the mechanisms explored. The results of 
study four demonstrated that poorer WMC (and increased alcohol craving) was associated 
with increased overall alcohol use. This supports evidence that has demonstrated that both 
heavy and dependent substance users display deficits in tasks that measure WMC (e.g. 
(Bechara & Martin, 2004; Mahedy et al., 2018; Noël et al., 2001)). However, there was no 
association between individual differences in WMC and overall alcohol use in the presence 
of alcohol-related cues in study five suggesting this relationship is not robust. In study six, I 
also failed to find an effect of acute stress on WMC in contrast to previous research  (e.g. 




(Luethi et al., 2008; Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et al., 2008)), although there are other 
contrasting results in the literature (e.g. (Lukasik et al., 2019)). 
 Despite this, I did demonstrate that poorer WMC was associated with poorer 
proactive slowing in study five and worse proactive inhibition in study six. These findings 
support past literature that has demonstrated WMC predicts performance on inhibitory 
control tasks and that individuals with a lower-WMC tend to be less proactive than those with 
a higher-WMC (Redick & Engle, 2011; Richmond et al., 2015; Wiemers & Redick, 2018). 
Certainly, this relationship could have useful real-world implications. It is possible that high-
WMC individuals have an increased ability to initiate and maintain goals (in this case 
response selection) to guide their behaviour, compared to low-WMC individuals who rely 
more on reactive control (Richmond et al., 2015). However, correlation analyses in studies 
four to six also demonstrated WMC was not associated with reactive control, nor P300 
responses. Therefore, it is hard to suggest those with a low-WMC rely more on their reactive 
control. Additionally, the relationships between proactive inhibitory processes and WMC did 
not exist in the presence of neutral-related cues in study four and only existed following acute 
stress (i.e. not during the control session) in study six. Certainly, the clinical application of 
these findings are limited by a lack of robust relationship between WMC and alcohol use.  
Furthermore, in contrast to previous research that has suggested alcohol sensitivity is 
a risk factor for alcohol misuse and dependence (Fleming & Bartholow, 2014; Schuckit & 
Smith, 2000), individual differences in alcohol sensitivity were unrelated to individual 
differences in alcohol use in study five and study six. In both studies, I also failed to find an 
association between individual differences in alcohol sensitivity and proactive inhibitory 
processes or P300 responses. This fails to support Bailey and Bartholow (Bailey & 
Bartholow, 2016), who suggested that those with a low sensitivity to alcohol may be unable 
to utilise proactive control efficiently in the presence of alcohol-related cues. This also fails 
to support ERP research that has demonstrated increased P300 amplitudes in individuals with 
a low sensitivity to alcohol, in response to alcohol-related cues (Bartholow et al., 2007; 
Bartholow et al., 2010). Consequently, I found limited evidence of WMC or AS as 
mechanisms underlying effective reactive or proactive control. 
To summarise so far, the studies in this thesis have provided evidence that inhibitory 
control is a multi-component process, which is comprised of both reactive and proactive 
control. However, with the exception of an impairing effect of alcohol-cue exposure on 
proactive stopping in study six, I failed to find robust evidence that proactive inhibitory 
processes are impaired by alcohol-cue exposure, acute alcohol intoxication or acute stress. 




Furthermore, there were only limited effects of alcohol intoxication and acute stress on 
reactive stopping, and no impairing effects of alcohol-cue exposure. In addition, there was no 
evidence that acute stress affected the neurophysiological responses associated with 
inhibitory control, although alcohol-cue exposure did increase P300 amplitudes (compared to 
neutral-cue exposure). Lastly, I have found little evidence that WMC or AS are mechanisms 
which underlie the effective use of proactive control, or mediate the relationships between 
inhibitory processes and alcohol use.  
 
7.5 Relationship between inhibitory control processes and alcohol 
consumption 
The results of this thesis also provide little evidence that individual differences in inhibitory 
processes are related to alcohol use. Specifically, the results of study two and three did 
demonstrate that alcohol-cue exposure and alcohol intoxication significantly increased ad 
libitum alcohol consumption and had a weak effect on craving. This is in line with other 
research that has revealed increased alcohol-seeking following alcohol-cue exposure 
(Christiansen et al., 2017; Fatseas et al., 2015; Jones, Rose, et al., 2013; Koordeman et al., 
2011; MacKillop & Lisman, 2007) and alcohol intoxication in both heavy drinkers and 
alcohol dependent individuals (de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Fernie et al., 2012; Rose & 
Grunsell, 2008). However, there was no significant difference in ad libitum alcohol 
consumption following the placebo-alcohol compared to the control in study three. This does 
support previous research (Christiansen et al., 2013) suggesting that it is only alcohol’s 
pharmacological effects (and not the anticipated effects) which are key to the alcohol priming 
effect. However, other studies have demonstrated that a placebo-alcohol beverage increases 
subsequent subjective (e.g. self-reported craving) and/or objective (e.g. bogus taste test) 
measures of alcohol seeking (Christiansen et al., 2016; Christiansen et al., 2017). These past 
findings suggest that increases in craving and alcohol-seeking following an alcoholic priming 
drink are at least partially the result of the anticipated effects of alcohol and not solely the 
pharmacological effects (Christiansen et al., 2017).  
However, although alcohol-cue exposure and alcohol intoxication increased ad 
libitum alcohol consumption, there were no robust effects on craving. This is in contrast to 
previous studies (e.g. (Christiansen et al., 2013; Fatseas et al., 2015; Field & Jones, 2017; 
Rose et al., 2013)), but does suggest that alcohol-seeking can increase without an 
accompanied increase in self-reported craving, a result which has also been reported in 




previous literature (e.g. (Wiers et al., 2010) see also (Tiffany, 1990; Wiers et al., 2007)). 
Nevertheless, in both of these studies individual differences in inhibitory processes were 
unrelated related to ad libitum alcohol consumption. This contrasts previous studies (Field & 
Jones, 2017; Jones, Field, et al., 2013; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008). Specifically, we failed to 
replicate studies that have found impairments in inhibitory control partially mediated the 
relationship between alcohol-cue exposure and increased alcohol-seeking (Field & Jones, 
2017), or moderated the relationship between alcohol-cue exposure and increased craving in 
heavy drinkers (Papachristou, Nederkoorn, Havermans, et al., 2012). However, Jones et al 
(Jones, Rose, et al., 2013) also failed to demonstrate that individual differences in inhibitory 
control were associated with alcohol-seeking following alcohol-cue exposure. Nevertheless, 
we also failed to support studies that have demonstrated this relationship following alcohol 
intoxication. For example, Weafer and Fillmore (Weafer & Fillmore, 2008) demonstrated that 
individual differences in the degree of impairment in inhibitory control from alcohol 
intoxication were positively associated with ad-libitum alcohol consumption. However, in 
this study the alcohol prime was not consumed in the same testing as session as the measure 
of alcohol-seeking and therefore this does not explain whether alcohol-induced impairments 
in inhibition mediated the alcohol priming effect (Knibb et al., 2018). Indeed, the results of 
this thesis suggest it is unlikely that increased alcohol-seeking following alcohol-cue 
exposure and intoxication is the result of impairments in inhibitory processes. 
Furthermore in study six, acute stress did not reliably increase self-reported craving or 
ad libitum alcohol-seeking (compared to a control). This is in contrast to previous studies 
which have demonstrated that acute stress increases craving (Field & Powell, 2007) and 
alcohol consumption in heavy drinkers (McGrath et al., 2016) and alcohol dependent 
individuals (Thomas et al., 2011). This finding also contradicts studies that have 
demonstrated that social drinkers readily consume more alcohol following stress (de Wit et 
al., 2003; Magrys & Olmstead, 2015), and longitudinal evidence, which implies a causal 
relationship between stress and alcohol use (Boden et al., 2014; Russell et al., 1999). 
However, the lack of association between individual differences in reactive control and 
increased alcohol-seeking following acute stress does offer support to some studies (McGrath 
et al., 2016). Indeed, there was also a relationship between poorer proactive stopping and 
increased alcohol-seeking following acute stress in this study. This finding does offer some 
support to researchers (e.g. (Aron, 2011)) who have argued proactive control may be a useful 
explanation of substance use behaviour. However, this correlation was only moderate and is 
limited due to the non-significant difference in alcohol-seeking following acute stress 




compared to the control session, and the null finding with regards to the effect of stress on 
proactive stopping. Indeed, proactive stopping was not a significant predictor of ad libitum 
alcohol consumption when entered into a multiple regression model with SSRTs and 
proactive slowing. Notably, in this study neither P300 nor N200 responses following acute 
stress (and the control session) were associated with ad libitum alcohol consumption, in 
contrast to Jones et al (Jones, Field, et al., 2013), as well as Batholow et al (Bartholow et al., 
2007) who demonstrated a relationship between P300 responses and self-reported alcohol 
use. 
Lastly, we also failed to find support for the associations between individual 
differences in reactive control or proactive slowing and individual differences in self-reported 
alcohol use in studies one, four and five. Hence, we failed to find support for studies that 
have demonstrated a relationship between ‘reactive’ inhibitory control and alcohol use 
(Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, et al., 2012; Colder & O'Connor, 2002; Houston et al., 2014; 
Murphy & Garavan, 2011). However, there are other studies, which have also reported 
contradictory findings (e.g. (Bø & Landro, 2017; Fernie et al., 2010)) or demonstrated very 
little evidence of inhibitory control deficits in heavy drinkers (e.g. (Bednarski et al., 2012; 
Franken et al., 2017; Nederkoorn et al., 2009)). Importantly, these findings fail to support 
models of addiction that posit inhibitory control as a candidate mechanism for substance 
addiction (de Wit, 2009; Fillmore, 2003; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). Taking this, and the 
limited evidence for fluctuating inhibitory processes into account, the theoretical implications 
of this thesis suggest that further clarification is necessary to understand the psychological 
mechanisms, which underlie a ‘loss of control’ over drinking. Further support for this 
suggestion has been found recently in a meta-analysis (Lui et al., 2019), which reported a null 
relationship between inhibitory control and the use of most substances. However, the authors 
did find that both sample (age, time in education) and task (the proportion of no-go trials in a 
Go/No-Go task) characteristics had a significant effect on inhibitory control performance.  
This led them to suggest that the relationship may only exist in extreme groups (i.e. addicted 
individuals), and certainly that both task and sample characteristics may play a role in 
detecting such a relationship. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that an association does 
exist in some groups, and it has just failed to be detected.  
Indeed, Campbell et al (Campbell et al., 2017) found a smaller effect of alcohol 
intoxication on reactive inhibitory control than they predicted and therefore suggested the 
possibility of a lack of power and publication bias in the current literature. Furthermore, in 
their meta-analyses exploring the effect of alcohol-cues on inhibitory control, Jones et al 




(Jones, Robinson, et al., 2018) report that the literature contains a number of poor quality 
studies with reporting biases and a lack of power.  Based on the results of this thesis, it is 
certainly possible that the relationship between ‘reactive’ inhibitory control and alcohol use 
has been over-emphasised in the literature, particularly in non-dependent samples. In support 
of this, an updated meta-analyses by Smith et al (Smith & Mattick, 2018) failed to replicate 
their previous findings (Smith et al., 2014) of inhibitory deficits in non-dependent, heavy 
drinkers. Indeed, although it is possible that a relationship may still exist between proactive 
control and alcohol use due to a paucity of literature, this relationship would have to be 
considered in the broader context of an inconsistent or lack of association between reactive 
control and alcohol use in non-dependent drinkers.  
Importantly, a key strength of this thesis is that the design, hypothesis and analysis 
strategies of studies two, three, five and six were all pre-registered on Open Science 
Framework. This should improve confidence in the findings due to the transparency of a-
priori and exploratory hypotheses, and should also increase the ease of replication (Munafò et 
al., 2017). Certainly, Nosek et al (Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018) argue that pre-
registration is a useful solution to reducing biases in the literature. This is supported by 
findings which illustrate higher replicability in studies with a-priori hypotheses (Swaen, 
Teggeler, & van Amelsvoort, 2001), an increase in null findings (Kaplan & Irvin, 2015), and 
a reduction in effect sizes (Schäfer & Schwarz, 2019) following pre-registration. This 
suggests that various factors such as publication bias, researcher bias, as well as problematic 
research techniques may distort the true nature of true effects (Schäfer & Schwarz, 2019). 
Thus, it is only by continuing in the direction of well-powered and pre-registered studies can 
we begin to correct any biases in the literature and reveal the true relationship between 
inhibitory deficits and alcohol use in non-dependent samples. Indeed, it should be noted that 
the majority of power calculations in this thesis were based on medium effect sizes reported 
in previous studies. However, some research has since been published (e.g. (Jones, Robinson, 
et al., 2018)) which report smaller effect sizes. Therefore, the sample sizes recruited  may 
have affected the results in this thesis. However, the consistent null findings reported 
throughout suggest that this is unlikely. 
 
7.6 Clinical Implications  
 
The results of this thesis suggest that the addiction field should acknowledge that inhibitory 
control is a multi-component process. Certainly, I demonstrated that alcohol-cue exposure 




impaired proactive stopping in study six but this aside, I found little other evidence of state 
fluctuations in proactive inhibitory processes following alcohol intoxication, alcohol-cue 
exposure and acute stress. Thus, this offers little support to those who suggest proactive 
control may be a better explanation of impairments in inhibitory control in substance use 
behaviour compared to reactive stopping (e.g. (Aron, 2011)). Furthermore, although I found 
alcohol intoxication impaired SSRTs (albeit a limited effect), alcohol-cue exposure did not 
impair reactive stopping and acute stress (compared to control) only impaired reactive 
stopping to cued stop-signal trials. Indeed, the clinical significance of these limited findings 
are further restricted by the failure on the most part to demonstrate a relationship between 
inhibitory processes and alcohol use. Supporting this, Jones et al (Jones, Robinson, et al., 
2018) also questioned the clinical significance of their finding that the effect of alcohol-cue 
exposure on reactive inhibitory control was robust, due to the small effect size and the 
questionable relationship between inhibitory control and substance use. As such, the only 
finding supportive of this relationship was in study six which demonstrated a moderate 
association between poorer proactive stopping and increased alcohol consumption following 
acute stress.  
As a result of this, it is hard to argue for the development of addiction interventions 
targeting these effects to reduce drinking. Furthermore, those studies which have investigated 
the effect of training inhibitory control on alcohol use have yielded contradictory results. For 
example, we (Jones et al., 2019) recently carried out a study which supported a developing 
body of research (e.g. (Jones, McGrath, et al., 2018; Smith, Dash, Johnstone, Houben, & 
Field, 2017)) that suggests inhibitory control training (and also cognitive bias modification 
(Boffo et al., 2019)) is not effective in reducing alcohol use in heavy, non-dependent 
drinkers. The inhibitory training in this study also failed to improve both reactive stopping 
and proactive slowing in response to alcohol-related cues. Thus, without a robust relationship 
between inhibitory control and alcohol use and studies demonstrating successful training to 
reduce alcohol use, it is hard to argue for the clinical significance of the findings in this 
thesis. Consequently, it may be time future research look towards alternative processes to 
target for addiction interventions (Jones et al., 2019) or as stated, it is only with continuing in 
the direction of well-powered and pre-registered studies can we reduce bias in the literature 
and truly understand the relationship between inhibitory processes and alcohol use. Indeed, if 
a robust relationship was confirmed, Field et al (Field et al., 2019) argue that it is plausible to 
transfer results from experimental studies into behaviour change interventions outside of the 
laboratory, by following an Experimental Medicine Framework and considering 




methodological problems (e.g. sample characteristics, demand effects) that may limit the 
transfer of interventions into real-world behaviour change. 
 
7.7 Limitations  
 
However, this thesis does have methodological limitations which may have impacted the 
results. Firstly, the sample mainly consisted of heavy drinking undergraduate students. I 
decided to recruit heavy drinkers as this sample are at risk for later development of substance 
dependence. However, I also aimed to recruit individuals who were motivated to cut down 
their drinking. Indeed, ‘a motivation to reduce alcohol consumption’ was included in the 
inclusion criteria for each study. However, although motivations to cut-down drinking have 
been reported in young adults following alcohol-related accidents (Barnett, Goldstein, 
Murphy, Colby, & Monti, 2006; Barnett et al., 2002) or overdoses (Reis, Harned, & Riley, 
2004),  the majority of students remain heavy drinkers with little motivation to cut down  
(Field et al., 2019; Shealy, Murphy, Borsari, & Correia, 2007). This is suggested to be the 
case until they leave University and “mature” out of hazardous drinking for various reasons, 
such as increased emotional stability and self-control, which are related to a reduction in 
drinking for enhancement and coping motives (Littlefield, Sher, & Wood, 2010). Indeed, the 
measurement of motivation can also be challenging in students, as generally these samples 
are poor at problem recognition (Barnett et al., 2006), however I did attempt to measure 
“concerns about drinking” using the TRI (see Appendices 1.D). Nevertheless, it is plausible 
that the samples in this thesis may have had little motivation to inhibit their responses in the 
Stop-Signal tasks and restrict their alcohol intake in the ad libitum taste tests. This could have 
contributed to the lack of associations between inhibitory control and alcohol use in studies 
one to six.  
 In addition, as all participants were heavy drinkers, these studies did not include light 
drinkers or abstainers as controls. In particular, this would have been useful to compare the 
effects of alcohol-cue exposure between groups since the results showed that alcohol-cue 
exposure had differential effects on reactive and proactive stopping, in heavy drinkers. 
Indeed, studies that have compared the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on inhibitory control in 
heavy drinkers vs. a control group of light drinkers have yielded contradictory results (Czapla 
et al., 2016; Nederkoorn et al., 2009), and Sharma (Sharma, 2017) reported differences in the 
use of reactive and proactive control in heavy vs. light drinkers when completing a modified 
Stroop task, with preceding alcohol-related and neutral-related cues. This would also allow 




further investigation into the effect of alcohol-cue exposure on P300 responses, as although 
our results suggested heavy drinkers showed increased salience to alcohol-cues (compared to 
neutral-cues), we were unable to compare this to light drinkers or abstainers. Lastly, since I 
failed to find main effects of acute stress on proactive or reactive inhibitory processes, it may 
be useful to compare these results to a group of light drinkers or abstainers. Certainly, 
previous research (e.g. (King, Munisamy, de Wit, & Lin, 2006)) has demonstrated differences 
in cortisol release following a heavy dose of alcohol in heavy compared to light drinkers.  
Finally, throughout the research in this thesis, I used Stop-Signal tasks (Logan et al., 
1984) to measure proactive and reactive inhibitory control. These are one of the most popular 
task paradigms used throughout the literature and I demonstrated good internal reliability of 
the task I took forward in study one. However, recent evidence has questioned the validity of 
these tasks in measuring executive functioning. In a sample of 463 undergraduate students, 
Von Gunten et al (Von Gunten, Bartholow, & Martins, 2019) reported a lack of association 
between inhibition (in a Stop-Signal task, Anti-Saccade task, Stroop task, Go/No-Go task and 
Simon task) and outcomes of self-regulation. This finding therefore questions the validity of 
inhibitory control measures.  Additionally, I used these tasks to measure individual 
differences in proactive and reactive inhibitory control. However, Von Gunten et al suggest 
that there may not be enough between-subjects variance in these tasks to reliably rank 
inhibition scores. Furthermore, research (e.g. (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Gärtner & Strobel, 
2019)) has demonstrated low correlations between inhibitory control tasks. To give a specific 
example, one study (Gärtner & Strobel, 2019) demonstrated that correlation coefficients 
between six tasks (Stop-Signal, Word-Naming, Anti-Saccade, Stroop, Eriksen Flanker and 
Shape-Matching) were less than 0.3. Thus, this also challenges whether the commonly used 




7.8 Future research 
 
As stated, this thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between inhibitory processes and 
alcohol use in those at risk for developing Alcohol Use Disorders. However, due to finding 
contradictory results, it would be useful to explore the relationship between reactive control, 
(and more so) proactive control and alcohol use in those with a past or current alcohol 
dependency. Certainly, Smith et al’s original meta-analyses (Smith et al., 2014) demonstrated 




that evidence of impairments in inhibitory control were more apparent in individuals who are 
alcohol dependent. Thus, this could provide a useful line of future research, and perhaps shed 
light on if a true relationship exists between inhibitory control and alcohol use in other 
samples. As mentioned, there is a paucity of research investigating proactive control and 
alcohol use, but Hu et al’s (Hu et al., 2015) study, which reports differences in the proactive 
response adjustments (but not reactive control) in alcohol dependent patients vs. healthy 
controls, suggests this could warrant further investigation in these samples.  
Furthermore, as I found no main effects of acute stress on reactive or proactive 
control (or the neurological correlates of response inhibition) in study six, it may be useful to 
investigate the effect of low, moderate and high acute stress on these processes to investigate 
whether there are differential effects of different levels of stress. This would contribute to the 
explanation of whether the effect of acute stress on inhibitory control follows a U-shaped 
function  (see (Henderson et al., 2012)). Future research could also benefit from using more 
objective measures of stress, for example cortisol release (see (Hellhammer, Wüst, & 
Kudielka, 2009)) rather than self-report measures to eliminate any bias in the results. Lastly, 
it would be useful to develop these investigations outside of the laboratory. One possible 
technique could be to use an Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) method to 
investigate the effects of real-time alcohol intoxication, cue-exposure and acute stress on 
inhibitory control and the relationship with alcohol use. Indeed, Jones et al (Jones, Tiplady, et 
al., 2018) demonstrated that alcohol consumption increased as inhibitory control worsened 
throughout the day in their EMA study. Thus, it may be useful to also measure proactive 
slowing and signal detection in an EMA study of non-dependent drinkers. This would also 
allow comparisons between groups if heavy drinkers and light drinkers or abstainers were 
included. However as stated, without a robust relationship between inhibitory control and 
alcohol use, the clinical application of these findings would be limited. Certainly, any 
findings with regards to proactive control would have to be considered in the context of an 




In conclusion, the results of this thesis demonstrated that heavy drinkers are able to 
proactively adjust their behaviour as the requirement for response inhibition increases. This 
suggests that inhibitory control is a multi-component process which is comprised of both 
reactive and proactive control, and has been over-simplified in past literature. However, the 




research in this thesis found only limited behavioural and neurophysiological evidence that 
impairments in inhibitory processes fluctuate within individuals in response to psychological 
and environmental triggers. In particular, there was a failure to replicate a seemingly robust 
effect of alcohol-cue exposure on impairments in reactive control, and only limited effects of 
acute stress and alcohol intoxication on reactive stopping. Contrastingly, there was evidence 
that alcohol-cue exposure increased P300 responses (compared to neutral-cue exposure). 
However, there was also very limited evidence for the potential mechanisms which may 
underlie these effects. Importantly, this thesis also found little evidence of a relationship 
between inhibitory process and alcohol consumption, suggesting this may have been over-
emphasised in the literature. This therefore contradicts theories that posit inhibitory control as 
a key mechanism for substance addiction, and restricts the clinical significance of the current 
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Appendices 1 Questionnaires. 
 
Appendices 1.A: Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT).  
 
 
1) How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? 
 
Never     Less than monthly   2-4 times a month     2-3 times per week    4+per week 
 
2) How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you’re 
drinking? 
 
1-2   3-4   5-6   7-9  10+ 
 
3) How often do you have 6 or more drinks on one occasion? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
4) How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop drinking 
once you had started? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
5) How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected from 
you because of drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
6) How often during the last year have you needed a drink first thing in the morning to get 
yourself going after a heavy drinking session? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
7) How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after 
drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
8) How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened the 
night before because you had been drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
9) Have you or someone else been injured because of your drinking? 
 
No       Yes, but not in the last year  Yes, during the last year 
 
10) Has a relative, friend, doctor or other health worker been concerned about your 
drinking or suggested you cut down? 
 
No      Yes, but not in the last year  Yes, during the last year 




Appendices 1.B Timeline Follow Back (TLFB) 
 
To help me evaluate your drinking I need to get an idea of your alcohol consumption in the 
past fourteen days. Please fill out the table with the number of units of alcohol consumed on 
each day, being as accurate as possible. Please use the information given below to work out 
how many units you consumed on each day in the past week and fill in the number of units in 
the table. On days when you did not drink please write 0 (zero). I realise it isn’t easy to recall 
things with 100% accuracy, but if you are not sure how many units you drank on a certain 
day please try to give it your best guess.  
 
What is a unit of alcohol? 
The list below shows the number of units of alcohol in common drinks:- 
• A pint of ordinary strength lager (Carling Black Label, Fosters) - 2 units  
• A pint of strong lager (Stella Artois, Kronenbourg 1664) - 3 units  
• A pint of ordinary bitter (John Smith's, Boddingtons) - 2 units  
• A pint of best bitter (Fuller's ESB, Young's Special) - 3 units    
• A pint of ordinary strength cider (Woodpecker) - 2 units  
• A pint of strong cider (Dry Blackthorn, Strongbow) - 3 units  
• A 175ml glass of red or white wine - around 2 units  
• A 750ml bottle of red or white wine – around 9 units 
• A pub measure of spirits - 1 unit  
• An alcopop (eg Smirnoff Ice, Bacardi Breezer, WKD, Reef) - around 1.5 units  
 
 
Please now fill in the following table stating the total number of alcohol units you consumed 
for each day. Please start from whichever day it was yesterday and work backwards. For 
example if today is Monday start from Sunday and work backwards, with Monday being 




Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
       
 
Previous week: 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 











Appendices 1.C Brief Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol Questionnaire  
 
 
1. When I drink alcohol I would feel brave and daring 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
2. When I drink alcohol It would be easier to talk to people 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
3. When I drink alcohol I would act sociable 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
4. When I drink alcohol I would take risks 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
5. When I drink alcohol I would feel courageous 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
6. When I drink alcohol I would be loud, boisterous and noisy 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
7. When I drink alcohol I would feel guilty 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 




8. When I drink alcohol I would feel dizzy 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
9. When I drink alcohol I would feel moody 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
10. When I drink alcohol I would be clumsy 
 
1    2    3      4 
 




11. When I drink alcohol I would be a better lover 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
12. When I drink alcohol I would enjoy sex more 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
13. When I drink alcohol I would feel aggressive 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
14. When I drink alcohol I would feel peaceful 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 




15. When I drink alcohol I would feel calm 
 
1    2    3      4 
 
Disagree          Agree 
 
 
2.1. When I drink alcohol I would feel brave and daring. This would be... 
 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
 
2.2.  When I drink alcohol It would be easier to talk to people. This would be... 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
 
2.3.  When I drink alcohol I would act sociable. This would be... 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
 
2.4. When I drink alcohol I would take risks. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.5. When I drink alcohol I would feel courageous. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.6. When I drink alcohol I would be loud, boisterous and noisy. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.7. When I drink alcohol I would feel guilty. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 





Bad                   Good 
 
2.8. When I drink alcohol I would feel dizzy. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.9. When I drink alcohol I would feel moody. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.10. When I drink alcohol I would be clumsy. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.11. When I drink alcohol I would be a better lover. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.12. When I drink alcohol I would enjoy sex more. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.13. When I drink alcohol I would feel aggressive. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.14. When I drink alcohol I would feel peaceful. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 
 
2.15 When I drink alcohol I would feel calm. This would be..." 
 
  1   2   3   4   5 
 
Bad                   Good 




Appendices 1.D Temptation and Restraint Inventory 
 
 
Instructions:  Please read each of the following questions carefully.  Circle the number that represents 
your answer to each question.  BE SURE TO CIRCLE ONLY ONE NUMBER FOR EACH 
QUESTION.  Remember that your honest response -- the one that makes the most sense to you 
personally is the response we want.  Don't worry about how other people would answer, we want your 
views.  Please work as quickly as you can, while giving the most honest and accurate answer you can 
to each question.  In general, your first impressions are the best. 
 
1. When you feel anxious, are you more likely to drink? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
2. When you feel lonely, are you more likely to drink? 
            
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
         Not at                                                                                         Extremely 
          all 
 
3. How often do you attempt to cut down the amount you drink? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
          Never                                                                                        Always           
 
4. At times, do you find yourself unable to stop thinking about drinking? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
5. Does seeing other people drink remind you of your efforts to  
   control your alcohol consumption? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
6. Do you ever feel so nervous that you really need a drink? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
           
7. Do thoughts about drinking intrude into your daily activities? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
8. Does seeing alcohol-related commercials, magazine ads., and/or signs for liquor stores  
stimulate concerns about the need to limit your drinking? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 




          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
 9. Do you find that once you start drinking it is difficult for you to stop? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
10. Do feelings of guilt about drinking too much help you to control your alcohol intake?  
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
11. Is it hard to distract yourself from thinking about drinking? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
12. Does the sight and smell of alcohol make you think about limiting your drinking? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
13. How much difficulty do you have controlling your drinking? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          None                                                                                         A Great Deal 
 
14. Do you ever cut back on your drinking in an attempt to change your drinking habits? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Never                                                                                        Always 
 
15. How much effort does it take for you to keep your drinking under control? 
 
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 























Directions:  People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations.  This is 
a test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think.  Read each statement 
and place a check in the appropriate box on the right side of the page.  Do not spend 































1. I plan tasks carefully     
2. I do things without thinking     
3. I am happy-go-lucky     
4. I have “racing” thoughts     
5. I plan trips well ahead of time     
6. I am self-controlled     
7. I concentrate easily     
8. I save regularly     
9. I find it hard to sit still for long periods of time     
10. I am a careful thinker     
11. I plan for job security     
12. I say things without thinking     
13. I like to think about complex problems     
14. I change jobs     
15. I act “on impulse”     
16. I get easily bored when solving thought problems     
17. I have regular medical/dental checkups     
18. I act on the spur of the moment     
19. I am a steady thinker     
20. I change where I live     
21. I buy things on impulse     
22. I finish what I start     
23. I walk and move fast     
24. I solve problems by trial-and-error     
25. I spend or charge more than I earn     
26. I talk fast     
27. I have outside thoughts when thinking     
28. I am more interested in the present than the future     
29. I am restless at lectures or talks     










Appendices 1.F Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire 
 
 
This questionnaire relates to YOUR ATTITUDES toward alcohol RIGHT NOW. Please 
indicate how much you agree with the statements below by circling the number corresponding 
most closely to your general attitude RIGHT NOW. Your answers may range from AGREE 
NOT AT ALL (0) with the statement to AGREE VERY STRONGLY (8) with the statement. 
 
  I AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT… 
 







           
1.  I would like to have a drink or two. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2.  I am avoiding people who are likely to offer me a drink. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3.  If I were in a pub or club I would want a drink. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4.  My desire to drink seems overwhelming. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5.  I am planning to drink alcohol. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6.  I am deliberately occupying myself so I will not drink alcohol. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7.  I am thinking about the benefits of being sober. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8.  I want to drink alcohol so much that if I start drinking now I will find it difficult to 
stop. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9.  I would accept a drink now if one was offered to me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
10.  I am avoiding places in which I might be tempted to drink alcohol. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
11.  I am thinking about alcohol a lot of the time. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
12.  I want to drink as soon as I have the chance. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
13.  The bad things that could happen if I drink alcohol are fresh in my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 




















Appendices 1.G Brief Mood Introspection Scale 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the response on the scale below that indicates how well each 













































Definitely do not feel do not feel   slightly feel   definitely feel 











Definitely do not feel do not feel   slightly feel   definitely feel 
 
14. Fed up 
 
Definitely do not feel do not feel   slightly feel   definitely feel 
 
15. Jittery  
 




































Appendices 1.H Subjective Intoxication Scale 
 
This questionnaire is concerned with how you feel right now. 
Please place a mark on each line to indicate how you feel on each dimension.  
 
                                                           Light headed 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
 





                                                               Irritable 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
 





         Stimulated 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
            






                                                        Alert 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
 





                                                               Relaxed 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
 





                                                              Contented 
               ___________________________________________________________ 
 










Appendices 1.I Ad Libitum Taste Test 
 
Please consume as much as you like DRINK 1 in order to give an answer for the questions 
below. You can take as long as necessary.                
 
How fruity was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How smooth was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How sweet was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How refreshing was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How bitter was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How strong tasting was  DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How gassy was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How pleasant was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How light was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How tasty was DRINK 1? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 














Please consume as much as you like DRINK 2 in order to give an answer for the questions 
below. You can take as long as necessary.                
 
How fruity was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How smooth was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How sweet was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How refreshing was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How bitter was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How strong tasting was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How gassy was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How pleasant was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How light was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0= Not at all                                                                                                  10= Extremely. 
 
How tasty was DRINK 2? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





















1. Do you ever experience a hangover after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without experiencing 






2. Do you ever pass out after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without passing out 







3. Do you ever throw up (vomit) after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without vomiting 







4. Do you ever feel nauseated after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without feeling 




5. Do you ever forget part of an evening (i.e. blackoouts) after drinking alcohol?  
 




YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without forgetting 






6. Do you ever feel dizzy or feel things spinning after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO 
IF YES, what is the maximum number of drinks you could consume without feeling dizzy 







7. Do you ever become more talkative after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before becoming more 






8. Do you ever become more flirtatious after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before becoming more 






9. Do you ever feel high or “buzzed” after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling high or 
buzzed after drinking alcohol? 









10. Do you ever feel more socially at ease after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling more 






11. Do you ever feel more relaxed after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling more 






12. Do you ever feel sluggish after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling sluggish 






13. Do you ever feel less inhibited after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling less 









14. Do you ever feel that your driving would be affected after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling your 






15. Do you ever feel sedated or sleepy after drinking alcohol?  
 
YES or NO  
 
IF YES, what is the minimum number of drinks you could consume before feeling sedated or 



































Appendices 1.K State Trait Anxiety Inventory  
 




















Appendices 1.L Funnelled Debrief (studies one-three) 
 























































2 .  The computer task was designed to……………. 
 
Measure reaction times in response to the target stimuli                           [  ] 
 
Assess my cognitive processing              [  ] 
 
Train me to think more quickly                                                                 [  ] 
    
Measure reaction times to correlate with alcohol use       [  ] 
 
        Assess my behavioural impulsivity (response inhibition)                        [  ] 
 




3. The purpose of this taste test was to………. 
 
Measure my liking for each drink                    [  ] 
 
Measure my preference for each drink           [  ] 
 
Measure my preferences to each drink in response to the computer task        [  ] 
 
Measure how much I drank in response to the computer task                         [  ] 
 
Find out which drink I preferred                                                                    [  ] 
 
Measure whether I would drink less/more beer in response to my  
answers on the questionnaire                                                                                             [  ] 
 
 
I do not know the purpose                                                     [  ]  























Appendices 1.M Funnelled Debrief (Study six) 
	
	






















































2 .  The computer task was designed to……………. 
 
Measure reaction times in response to the target stimuli                           [  ] 
 
Assess my cognitive processing              [  ] 
 
Train me to think more quickly                                                                 [  ] 
    
Measure reaction times to correlate with alcohol use       [  ] 
 
        Assess my behavioural impulsivity (response inhibition)                        [  ] 
 




4. The purpose of this taste test was to………. 
 
Measure my liking for each drink                    [  ] 
 
Measure my preference for each drink           [  ] 
 
Measure my preferences to each drink in response to the computer task        [  ] 
 
Measure how much I drank in response to the computer task                         [  ] 
 
Find out which drink I preferred                                                                    [  ] 
 
Measure whether I would drink less/more beer in response to my  
answers on the questionnaire                                                                                             [  ] 
 
 
I do not know the purpose                                                     [  ]  
                  
 
	
1. The purpose of the 5 min presentation task was to………. 
 
Measure my organisation, articulation, openness & defensiveness       [  ]  
         
To measure my ability to think on the spot and perform under pressure     [  ]           
          
To induce stress           [  ] 
 
To assess my personality          [  ] 
 
To investigate if I would increase/decrease alcohol consumption in response to this       [  ] 
 
To see if my performance on the computer tasks was affected      [  ] 
 
 
I do not know the purpose                                                     [  ]




Appendices 2 Pre-registration of the effect of alcohol cues on 
proactive inhibitory control and signal detection. 
Laura Baines  Paul Christiansen Matt Field Andrew Jones 
 
Introduction 
Inhibitory control is defined as the inability to suppress, postpone or alter a response that is 
no longer necessary or is inappropriate given the current situation (Jones & Field, 2015; 
Logan et al, 1984). This ability has substantial overlap with self-control (Baumeister, 2014) 
and as a result is implicated in theoretical models of addiction (de Wit, 2009; Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2011). Experimental research supports theoretical predictions, with meta-analyses 
demonstrating that inhibitory control is impaired in heavy drinkers / alcoholics compared to 
controls (Smith et al., 2014), and associations with hazardous drinking are often reported in 
laboratory studies (Christiansen et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014).  
These models however present an over-simplistic view of inhibitory control as a 
reactive stopping response, whilst failing to recognise the complexity of the behaviour. A 
recent cognitive model (Verbruggen et al., 2014) has argued that inhibitory control involves a 
combination of sequential processes including: signal detection (identifying an inhibitory 
signal), followed by selecting and executing (or inhibiting) an appropriate action. 
Additionally, the model suggests that each sub-process is underpinned by other non-
inhibitory processes, for example, proactive control and associative learning, both of which 
may play a significant role in substance misuse. 
In terms of associative learning, alcohol-related cues are thought to promote an 
associative approach response (Field et al., 2011; Field et al., 2008). Due to rapid automatic 
approach behaviour, the exposure to alcohol-related cues is thought to impair inhibitory 
control (Jones et al., 2013). Indeed laboratory evidence supports this, with alcohol cues 
embedded into Stop Signal and Go/No-Go tasks causing temporary impairments in inhibition 
(Jones & Field, 2015; Petit et al., 2012). Despite this, it is unclear whether the impairing 
effects of alcohol cues on inhibitory control arise from effects on proactive control, reactive 
control or signal detection (or a combination of these). Alcohol cues may compete with 
inhibitory signals in the environment for attentional selection (Pessoa et al., 2012) reducing 
the detection of inhibitory signals, and may induce cognitive biases that effect the 
maintenance of proactive control and the execution of a reactive stopping response (Stacy & 




Wiers, 2010). Therefore, it is likely that both signal detection and proactive control are 
influenced by alcohol-related cues and contexts. 
As such, the aim of this study is to investigate whether alcohol cues and contexts 
impair inhibitory sub-processes and proactive control and whether these deficits are related to 
individual differences in alcohol consumption. Participants will complete a modified stop 
signal task based on Verbruggen et al (Verbruggen et al., 2014) under alcohol cue-exposure 
and a control condition. Study hypotheses are stated below: 
Hypothesis 1: Craving will be increased following alcohol cue-exposure, compared 
to neutral cue exposure.  
Hypothesis 2: Heavy drinkers will show deficits in i) proactive control, ii) signal-
detection and iii) reactive control, following exposure to alcohol-related cues.  
Hypothesis 3: Participants will consume more beer (as a % of total fluid consumed), 
following exposure to alcohol-related cues.  
Hypothesis 4: Proactive control and signal detection deficits will predict unique 
variance in alcohol consumption and related problems, after controlling for reactive 
inhibition. 
Hypothesis 5: The effects of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol consumption will be 




Heavy drinkers (N=64) will take part in a laboratory study with two sessions, approximately 
one week apart. We conducted a power analyses based on a pooled effect size (d = .39, α = 
.05, 1-β = 90%) from studies which have examined the effect of alcohol-related cues on 
inhibitory control in heavy drinkers (Czapla et al., 2015; Jones & Field, 2015; Kreusch et al., 
2013). Heavy drinking will be defined using UK government guidelines: males and females 
who consume > 14 UK units of alcohol per week (1 UK unit = 8g of pure alcohol). 
Participants will be eligible to participate if they are aged 18 or over, a fluent English speaker 
and report a motivation to reduce their alcohol consumption. Exclusion criteria will include a 
self-reported current or previous diagnosis of substance use disorder, ADHD, psychiatric 
disorder, a current/recent illness (e.g. flu) that could increase sensitivity to alcohol, or taking 
medications (e.g. antidepressants) that are affected by alcohol. Finally, participants cannot 
take part if they have an allergy to beer or fruit juice, are currently pregnant or breastfeeding. 
The study has been approved by the University of Liverpool’s Institutional Review Board.  






The Timeline follow back (Sobell & Sobell, 1990) will be administered to measure 
retrospective alcohol consumption in units (one UK unit = 8 g of alcohol), over the previous 
two weeks. A guide providing the number of units in standard UK drinks  will be provided to 
assist participants in calculating their alcohol consumption.  The Alcohol use disorders 
identification test (Saunders et al., 1993) will be administered to measure hazardous drinking. 
This includes 10 fixed-response items and scores are measured between 0 and 40. Higher 
scores are indicative of greater alcohol consumption, with a score over 8 indicative of  
hazardous drinking. The Brief comprehensive effects of alcohol questionnaire (Ham et al., 
2005) contains 15 items to measure alcohol outcome expectancies (what participants expect 
to happen when they consume alcohol). The Temptation Restraint Inventory (Collins & Lapp, 
1992) to measure drinking restraint (preoccupation with and efforts to reduce drinking). This 
consists of 15 items and gives scores on two sub-scales; Cognitive behavioural control (CBC) 
and Cognitive emotion preoccupation (CEP). Barratt Impulsivity Scale (Patton et al., 1995) 
to measure impulsivity across three dimensions (motor, non-planning and attentional). This 
consists of 30 items with higher scores indicating increased impulsivity. The Approach and 
Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire (McEvoy et al., 2004) to measure self-reported craving. 
This consists of 14 items scored from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very strong) measuring three sub-
scales of craving; mild inclinations to drink, intense inclinations to drink and inclinations to 
avoid alcohol. Participants will also complete a short questionnaire to measure awareness of 
the experimental aims of the study. This will include an open question asking what the 
purpose of the experiment was and two fixed-response questions asking the purpose of the 
computer task and the taste test (see supplementary material 1).  
 
Modified Stop-Signal task (SST: Verbruggen et al., 2014)) 
Participants will complete a modified Stop-Signal task, which isolates proactive control, 
reactive control and signal detection. At the beginning of each trial a white fixation line will 
appear in the middle of the screen for 500ms, as well as a white border around the edge of the 
screen display. Following these, two words will appear, one immediately above the line and 
one immediately below the fixation line. These words will be natural-related (e.g. lion) or 
man-made (e.g. desk). Natural words are target words and participants have to respond as 
quickly as possible to their position in relation to the line (above or below) by a key press. 
Man-made words are distractors.  Depending on condition, the neutral-related image or 




alcohol related image appeared in the background on each trial. The task consists of three 
blocks, which are presented in a randomised, counterbalanced order: 
 
No-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target word in relation 
to the line without interruption on 100% of trials (128 in total).  
 
Central-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target word in 
relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). On the remaining 25% 
(32 in total) trials, the white fixation line between the words increased in size by 300%. 
Participants are told to try and withhold their response to the target word position if this 
happens. 
 
Peripheral-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target word in 
relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). On the remaining 25% 
(32 in total) trials, the white square around the edge of the display increased in size by 300%. 
Participants are told to try and withhold their response to the target word position if this 
happens. 
 
In both the central-signal and peripheral signal block the delay between presentation of the 
target and distractor word and the colour change of the stop signals (fixation line or square 
around the display) was adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis using a tracking procedure 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). In each both the initial delay was 250 ms, if participants failed 
to inhibit the delay decreased by 50 ms making subsequent inhibition easier, if participants 
successfully inhibited then the delay increased by 50 ms making subsequent inhibition more 
difficult. Proactive control is inferred from the degree of reaction time slowing on stop-signal 
blocks compared to no-signal blocks (this indicates motivation to inhibit on the stop-signal 
blocks). Signal detection is inferred from the difference in stop signal reaction time (SSRT) 
between central-signal and periphery-signal blocks. Reactive control is inferred as the mean 
SSRT collapsed across central and peripheral signal blocks. Effects of alcohol-cues on each 
process will be measured by comparing performance across conditions (alcohol context, 
neutral context). 




Fig 1 Schematic of the modified Stop-signal task
 
Ad libitum taste test 
Participants will receive 250ml of chilled Skol beer (2.8% vol. ABV) and 250ml of chilled 
fresh orange juice (non-alcoholic beverage). They will not be informed of the brands used 
and will be given each drink simultaneously in unmarked glasses.  Participants will be asked 
to taste and rate the drinks on various gustatory dimensions e.g. bitter, gassy using visual 
analogue scales and will be told to ‘drink as much or as little as you like in order to make 
accurate judgements’. This task or slight variations thereof has good construct validity (Jones 
et al., 2015). Participants will be told they have 10 minutes to complete the taste test, 
however, they will also be told that alcohol will impair performance on the next task, in 
which they will have the opportunity to win small amounts of money (Christiansen et al., 
2012), in order to increase their motivation to reduce their intake.  The volume of each drink 
consumed will be recorded unobtrusively at the end of each session. We will then calculate 
the amount of beer as a percentage of total fluid consumed. 




Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART: (Lejuez et al., 2003)) 
Participants will complete a short cognitive task in which they have to click a mouse to pump 
up simulated balloons (see schematic). They will be presented with one balloon per trial and 
will complete 10 trials. Each time participants click to pump up the balloon, the balloon will 
increase in size and they will hypothetically collect $0.05 in a temporary bank. They can 
transfer this money to a “permanent” bank by clicking collect. However, they will be 
informed that if the balloon bursts, they will lose the money in the temporary bank. Once the 
balloon has burst or the participant has collected the money, the size of the balloon will be 
reset and the temporary bank will be reset to $0. We will set the balloons to burst on a 
variable ratio, with 64 pumps as the average explosion point. We include this task to increase 
participants’ belief that they need to restrict their alcohol consumption during the taste-test to 
perform well on this task, across both conditions. Performance on this task is of secondary 
importance here. However, we will calculate ‘Adjusted average pumps’ (which represents the 
mean number of pumps on balloons which did not burst), as the outcome variable based on 
previous research (e.g. (Lejeuz et al., 2003)).  
 
Procedure/Design 
Participants will attend two sessions approximately week apart, the order of which will be 
counterbalanced. One session will be completed in a standard neutral laboratory, the other 
will be completed in the University of Liverpool’s Bar Laboratory 
(https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/psychology-health-and-society/facilities/bar-lab/), which is 
fitted like a typical UK bar and contains advertisements for alcohol, beer pumps etc. 
Participants will be breathalysed at the beginning of each session and must have a BAC of 
0.0mg/l in order to take part. Participants will first complete demographics, the battery of 
questionnaires measuring alcohol use and personality (first session only) and the AAQ to 
measure craving before the SST. They will then complete the three blocks of the Stop-signal 
task with the appropriate background depending on session. Before each block of the task, 
participants will be asked to smell a drink and allow a small amount to touch their lips (beer 
in the alcohol session, water in the neutral session), to increase cue-reactivity further. Next, 
participants will fill in the AAAQ to measure craving following the task. They will then 
complete the ad libitum taste and will be informed that alcohol may impair their performance 
on the last task, in which they have the opportunity to win small amounts of money. Lastly 
participants will complete the BART task and a final breath alcohol sample. At the end of the 




final session, participants will also complete a short questionnaire assessing their awareness 
of experimental aims (see supplementary materials 1). 
 
Proposed Analyses 
Hypothesis 1: Craving will be increased following alcohol cue-exposure, compared to 
neutral cue exposure. 
To examine whether alcohol cue exposure increases craving, scores on the AAAQ will be 
analysed using a 3 (subscale: inclined/indulgent, obsessed/compelled, resolved-regulated) x 2 
(time: pre-manipulation, post-manipulation) x 2 (condition: alcohol cue exposure, control / 
neutral) repeated measures ANOVA.  Main effects and interactions will be investigated using 
the appropriate comparisons.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Heavy drinkers will show deficits in i) proactive control, ii) signal-detection 
and iii) reactive control, following exposure to alcohol-related cues. 
Deficits in proactive control will be analysed using a 2 (block: no-signal block, central and 
peripheral signal blocks) x 2 (condition: alcohol cue exposure, control / neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA on reaction times. Main effects and interactions will be investigated using 
the appropriate comparisons. Deficits in signal-detection and reactive control will be 
analysed using a 2 (block: central signal, peripheral signal) x 2 (condition: alcohol cue 
exposure, control / neutral) repeated measures ANOVA on SSRT. Main effects and 
interactions will be investigated using the appropriate comparisons. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants will consume more beer (as a % of total fluid consumed) in the 
alcohol session than neutral session. 
To examine differences in ad-libitum alcohol consumption we will conduct independent t-
tests on beer consumed (as a percentage of total fluid) . 
 
Hypothesis 4: Proactive control and signal detection deficits will predict unique variance 
in alcohol consumption and related problems, after controlling for reactive inhibition. 
To examine whether indices of inhibitory control we will run multiple regression analyses to 
investigate if proactive control, signal detection and reactive control predict unique variance 
in beer (as % of total fluid consumed). These analyses will be run separately by condition.  
 




Hypothesis 5: The effects of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol consumption will be 
partially mediated by changes in the different components of control. 
To examine whether changes in the different components of control partially mediate the 
effect of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol consumption, we will run a within-subjects 
mediation analysis using MEMORE macro for SPSS (Montoya & Hayes, 2016). This will 
estimate the total, direct and indirect effects of alcohol cues on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption through changes in the different components of control (reactive control, 
proactive control and signal detection).   
 
Exploratory analyses  
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Appendices 3 Pre-registration of the effect of acute alcohol 
intoxication on reactive and proactive control, and signal 
detection 




Inhibitory control is defined as a the inability to suppress, postpone or alter a response 
that is no longer necessary or is inappropriate given the current situation (Jones & 
Field, 2015; Logan et al, 1984). This ability has substantial overlap with self-control 
(Baumeister, 2014) and as a result is implicated in theoretical models of addiction (de 
Wit, 2009; Goldstein & Volkow, 2011). Poor inhibitory control has been associated 
with hazardous drinking in numerous laboratory studies (Christiansen et al., 2012; 
Houston et al., 2014) and experimental research has demonstrated that alcohol impairs 
inhibitory control at doses that would not lead to global deficits in cognitive 
performance (Field et al., 2010). Furthermore, research suggests the magnitude of 
inhibitory deficits following alcohol intoxication is associated with ad-libitum 
consumption when sober (Weafer & Fillmore, 2008). 
Despite this, theoretical models present an over-simplistic view of inhibitory 
control as a reactive stopping response, whilst failing to recognise the underlying and 
complex mechanistic nature of inhibitory control. A recent cognitive model 
(Verbruggen et al., 2014) has argued that inhibitory control involves a combination of 
sequential processes including: signal detection (identifying an inhibitory signal), 
followed by selecting and executing an appropriate action. Additionally, each sub-
process is underpinned by other non-inhibitory processes, including proactive control 
and associative learning, both of which may play a significant role in substance 
addiction. 
Consequently, although research has shown that inhibitory control is 
compromised by moderate doses of alcohol (e.g. (Abroms & Fillmore, 2004; de Wit 
et al., 2000; Marczinski et al., 2005)) and that these doses increase both objective (e.g. 
ad libitum consumption) and subjective (e.g. craving) measures of alcohol seeking 
(e.g. Christiansen et al., 2012; Fernie et al., 2012; Rose & Grunsell, 2008)), it is 
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unclear whether impairments in inhibitory control arise from the effects of alcohol on 
proactive control, reactive control or signal detection (or a combination). 
Further research has demonstrated that an alcohol-placebo prime impairs 
inhibitory control (Christiansen et al., 2016) and increases craving and ad libitum 
consumption (e.g. (Christiansen et al., 2013; Rose et al., 2013)). Specifically, 
Christiansen et al (Christiansen et al., 2016) also showed that Go/No-Go task 
performance correlated with expectancies of behavioural and cognitive impairment 
following placebo-alcohol. Furthermore, Leeman et al (Leeman et al, 2009) showed 
that ad-libitum consumption was predicted by craving following a placebo-alcohol 
drink, but not an alcohol drink. These imply that the anticipated effects of alcohol 
play may at least some role in inhibitory control deficits and increased alcohol 
seeking following the consumption of an alcohol prime.  Despite this, there is an 
absence of empirical research investigating the effects of placebo-alcohol directly on 
inhibitory control and therefore it is unclear whether any impairment in inhibitory 
control from the anticipated effects of alcohol arises from impairment in proactive, 
reactive control or signal detection.  
Therefore, the aim of the study is to investigate whether both a priming dose 
of alcohol and the anticipated effects of alcohol impair inhibitory sub-processes and 
proactive control, compared to a control condition, and whether these are related to 
individual difference in alcohol consumption.  The inclusion of a placebo-alcohol and 
control condition will allow us to disentangle the pharmacological from the 
anticipatory effects of alcohol-intoxication. Study hypotheses are stated below: 
Hypothesis 1: Priming participants with alcohol will increase subjective 
intoxication ratings and motivation to drink (measured by an estimation of units in the 
priming drink, mean BAC; (post-drink, end of session), scores on subjective 
intoxication scales and self-reported craving), compared to placebo-alcohol and 
control conditions. We also hypothesise that increases in subjective intoxication 
ratings and motivation to drink will be observed in the placebo-alcohol condition 
compared to control. 
Hypothesis 2: Alcohol intoxication will cause deficits in i) proactive control, 
ii) signal detection and iii) reactive control, compared to the placebo-alcohol and 
control priming drinks (placebo-alcohol will also induce greater impairments than 
control, but not to the same extent as alcohol). 
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Hypothesis 3: Participants will consume more beer (as a % of total fluid) 
following alcohol compared to placebo-alcohol and controls (placebo-alcohol will 
induce greater consumption compared to control condition, but not to the same extent 
as alcohol). 
Hypothesis 4: Following alcohol intoxication, proactive control, signal 
detection and reactive control will predict unique variance in alcohol consumption. 
Hypothesis 5: The effects of alcohol intoxication on ad libitum alcohol 





Heavy drinkers (N = 36) will take part in a laboratory study with three sessions, 
approximately one week apart. The number of participants was decided upon using a 
power calculation to find a medium effect size (d = .50) at α = .05, and 90% power. 
Studies have demonstrated larger effect sizes of alcohol impairments on inhibitory 
control (Stroop) tasks (e.g. Christiansen et al, 2016, d =. 61) however as no research 
has examined the effects on inhibitory subcomponents we opted for a more 
conservative estimate of d = .50. Heavy drinking will be defined using UK 
government guidelines: males and females who consume > 14 UK units of alcohol 
per week (1 UK unit = 8g of pure alcohol). Other inclusion criteria will include being 
aged 18 or over, and a fluent English speaker, self-reported motivation to reduce their 
alcohol consumption. We aim to recruit equal number of males and females. 
Exclusion criteria will include a self-reported current or previous diagnosis of 
substance use disorder, ADHD, psychiatric disorder, a current/recent illness (e.g. flu) 
that could increase sensitivity to alcohol, or taking medication (e.g. antidepressants) 
that are affected by alcohol. Finally, participants cannot take part if they have an 




The alcoholic drink will contain vodka (Smirnoff Red, 37.5% alcohol by volume 
(ABV)) and chilled tonic water. The alcohol dose will be calculated as 0.6g of pure 
alcohol per kg of body weight (maximum 200ml) and the drink mixed one part vodka, 
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three parts tonic. The placebo-alcohol drink will contain chilled tonic water, the total 
volume of which will be the same as the alcoholic drink. Vodka mist will be sprayed 
on the surface of the drink and smeared onto the rim of the glass. Tabasco sauce will 
also be added to simulate the taste of alcohol. The control drink will consist of chilled 
water; the total volume of this will be identical to the alcoholic and placebo drink.  
 
Questionnaires 
The Timeline follow back (Sobell & Sobeel, 1990), will be administered to measure 
retrospective alcohol consumption in units (one UK unit = 8 g of alcohol), over the 
previous two weeks. A guide providing the number of units in standard UK drinks  
will be provided to assist participants in calculating their alcohol consumption.  The 
Alcohol use disorders identification test (Saunders et al, 1993) will be administered to 
measure hazardous drinking. This includes 10 fixed-response items and scores are 
measured between 0 and 40. Higher scores are indicative of greater alcohol 
consumption, with a score over 8 indicative of hazardous drinking. The Brief 
comprehensive effects of alcohol questionnaire (Ham et al, 2005) contains 15 items to 
measure alcohol outcome expectancies (what participants expect to happen when they 
consume alcohol). The Temptation Restraint Inventory (Collins & Lapp, 1992) to 
measure drinking restraint (preoccupation with and efforts to reduce drinking). This 
consists of 15 items and gives scores on two sub-scales; Cognitive behavioural 
control (CBC) and Cognitive emotion preoccupation (CEP). Barratt Impulsivity Scale 
(Patton et al, 1995) to measure impulsivity across three dimensions (motor, non-
planning and attentional). This consists of 30 items with higher scores indicating 
increased impulsivity. The Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire 
(McEvoy et al, 2004) to measure self-reported craving. This consists of 14 items 
scored from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very strong) measuring three sub-scales of craving; 
mild inclinations to drink, intense inclinations to drink and inclinations to avoid 
alcohol. The Subjective intoxication scales (SIS: Duka et al, 1998)) to measure 
subjective feelings of ‘lightheaded,’ ‘irritable’, ‘stimulated’, ‘alert’, ‘relaxed’ and 
‘contented’ on six scales from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Extremely. Participants will also 
complete a short questionnaire to measure awareness of the experimental aims of the 
study. This will include an open question asking what the purpose of the experiment 
was and two fixed-response questions asking the purpose of the computer task and the 
taste test (see supplementary material 1).  
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Stop-signal task (SST; Verbruggen et al, 2014))  
Participants will complete a modified Stop-Signal task, which isolates proactive 
control, reactive control and signal detection. At the beginning of each trial a white 
fixation line will appear in the middle of the screen for 500ms, as well as a white 
border around the edge of the screen display. Two words will then appear, one 
immediately above the line and one immediately below. These words will be natural-
related (e.g. lion) or man-made (e.g. desk). Natural words are target words and 
participants have to respond as quickly as possible to their position in relation to the 
line (above or below) by a key press. Man-made words are distractors.  The task 
consists of three blocks, which were presented in a randomised, counterbalanced 
order: 
 
No-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target word in 
relation to the line without interruption on 100% of trials (128 in total).  
 
Central-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target 
word in relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). On the 
remaining 25% (32 in total) trials, the white fixation line between the words increased 
in size by 300%. Participants are told to try and withhold their response to the target 
word position if this happens. 
 
Peripheral-signal block: In this block participants identify the position of the target 
word in relation to the line without interruption on 75% of trials (96 in total). On the 
remaining 25% (32 in total) trials, the white square around the edge of the display 
increased in size by 300%. Participants are told to try and withhold their response to 
the target word position if this happens. In both the central-signal and peripheral 
signal block the delay between presentation of the target and distractor word and the 
colour change of the stop signals (fixation line or square around the display) was 
adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis using a tracking procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009) In each both the initial delay was 250 ms, if participants failed to inhibit the 
delay decreased by 50 ms making subsequent inhibition easier, if participants 
successfully inhibited then the delay increased by 50 ms making subsequent inhibition 
more difficult.  
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Proactive control is inferred from the degree of reaction time slowing on stop-signal 
blocks compared to no-signal blocks (this indicates motivation to inhibit on the stop-
signal blocks). Signal detection is inferred from the difference in stop signal reaction 
time (SSRT) between central-signal and periphery-signal blocks. Reactive control is 
inferred as the mean SSRT collapsed across central and peripheral signal blocks. 
Effects of alcohol-cues on each process will be measured by comparing performance 
across conditions (alcohol, alcohol-placebo, control).  
 
Ad libitum taste test 
Participants will receive 250ml of chilled Skol beer (2.8% vol. ABV) and 250ml of 
chilled fresh orange juice (non-alcoholic beverage). They will not be informed of the 
brands used and will be given each drink simultaneously in unmarked glasses.  
Participants will be asked to taste and rate the drinks on various gustatory dimensions 
e.g. bitter, gassy using visual analogue scales and will be told to ‘drink as much or as 
little as you like in order to make accurate judgements’. This task or slight variations 
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thereof has good construct validity (Jones et al, 2015). Participants will be told they 
have 10 minutes to complete the taste test, however, they will also be told that alcohol 
will impair performance on the next task, in which they will have the opportunity to 
win small amounts of money (Christiansen et al., 2012) in order to increase their 
motivation to reduce their intake.  The volume of each drink consumed will be 
recorded at the end of each session. We will then calculate the amount of beer as a 
percentage of total fluid consumed for each session. 
 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejeuz et al, 2003)) 
Participants will complete a short cognitive task in which they have to click a mouse 
to pump up simulated balloons (see schematic). They will be presented with one 
balloon per trial and will complete 10 trials. Each time participants click to pump up 
the balloon, the balloon will increase in size and they will hypothetically collect $0.05 
in a temporary bank. They can transfer this money to a “permanent” bank by clicking 
collect. However, they will be informed that if the balloon bursts, they will lose the 
money in the temporary bank. Once the balloon has burst or the participant has 
collected the money, the size of the balloon will be reset and the temporary bank will 
be reset to $0. We will set the balloons to burst on a variable ratio, with 64 Pumps as 
the average explosion point. We include this task to increase participants’ belief that 
they need to restrict their alcohol consumption during the taste-test to perform well on 
this task, across both conditions. Performance on this task is of secondary importance 
here. However, we will calculate ‘Adjusted average pumps’ (which represents the 
mean number of pumps on balloons which did not burst), as the outcome variable 
based on previous research (e.g. Lejeuz et al, 2003)).  
 
Procedure/Design 
Participants will attend three sessions (alcohol, alcohol-placebo and control) in a 
neutral laboratory. Each session will have to be at least one week apart and will be 
completed in a pseudo-counterbalanced order, meaning all participants will complete 
the control session first, followed by either the placebo or alcohol session in a 
counterbalanced order. Participants will be informed that the experiment is 
investigating the effect of a high, low and no dose of alcohol on taste perception. 
Participants will be breathalysed at the beginning of each session and must have a 
BAC of 0.0mg/l in order to take part. Participants will first complete demographics 
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and a battery of questionnaires measuring personality and alcohol use (first session 
only). They will then complete the AAAQ and dependent on condition, will receive 
either the alcohol, placebo or control drink (in 2 glasses) and will be asked to 
consume this within 10 minutes. This will be followed by a 20-minute absorption 
period. Participants will then complete the AAAQ, SIS and a breath alcohol sample, 
followed by the stop-signal task. Following the task, participants will complete the 
ad-libitum taste and will be informed that alcohol may impair their performance on 
the last task, in which they have the opportunity to win small amounts of money. 
Lastly participants will complete the BART task and a final breath alcohol sample. 
They will be informed at the beginning of the study that if their BAC is greater than 
0.17mg/l, they will be asked to stay in the laboratory until it reaches this level or 
below. If they wish to leave, they will be asked to sign a waiver form ensuring they 
are aware that they must not drive, ride a bike, operate machinery, or exercise for at 
least 4-5 hours. At the end of the final session, participants will also complete a short 




Hypothesis 1: Priming participants with alcohol will increase subjective 
intoxication ratings and motivation to drink (measured by an estimation of units in 
the priming drink, mean BAC; (post-drink, end of session), scores on subjective 
intoxication scales and self-reported craving), compared to placebo-alcohol and 
control conditions. Increases in subjective intoxication ratings and motivation to 
drink will be observed in the placebo-alcohol condition compared to control. 
To examine differences in the estimated number of alcohol units in the priming drink 
and scores on the SIS in each session, three-way repeated measures ANOVAs will be 
conducted (alcohol, alcohol-placebo, control). To examine differences in mean BAC 
between post-drink assessment and the end of the sessions, a 3 (session: alcohol, 
alcohol-placebo, control) x 2 (time: post-drink assessment, end of session) repeated 
measures ANOVA will be conducted. Finally to examine whether alcohol increases 
craving, scores on the AAAQ will be analysed using a 3 (subscale: inclined/indulgent, 
obsessed/compelled, resolved-regulated) x 2 (time: pre-drink, post-drink) x 3 
(condition: alcohol, placebo, control) repeated measures ANOVA. Main effects and 
interactions will be investigated using the appropriate comparisons. 
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Hypothesis 2: Alcohol intoxication will cause deficits in i) proactive control, ii) 
signal detection and iii) reactive control, compared to the placebo-alcohol and 
control priming drinks (placebo-alcohol will also induce greater impairments than 
control, but not to the same extent as alcohol). 
Deficits in proactive control will be analysed using a 2 (block: no-signal block, 
central and peripheral signal blocks) x 3 (condition: alcohol, alcohol-placebo, control) 
repeated measures ANOVA on reaction times. Main effects and interactions will be 
investigated using the appropriate comparisons. Deficits in signal detection and 
reactive control will be analysed using a 2 (block: central signal, peripheral signal) x 3 
(condition: alcohol, placebo-alcohol, control) repeated measures ANOVA on SSRT. 
Main effects and interactions will be investigated using the appropriate comparisons.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants will consume more beer (as a % of total fluid) following 
alcohol compared to placebo-alcohol and controls (placebo-alcohol will induce 
greater consumption compared to control condition, but not to the same extent as 
alcohol).  
To examine differences in ad-libitum alcohol consumption (beer as a % of total fluid 
consumed) we will conduct a repeated measures ANOVA (condition: alcohol, 
placebo-alcohol, control). We will also investigate differences in ratings of 
pleasantness between sessions using repeated measures ANOVA, similar to above. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Following alcohol intoxication, proactive control, signal detection 
and reactive control will predict unique variance in alcohol consumption. 
We will run multiple regression analyses separately across each condition to 
investigate if indices of inhibitory control (proactive, reactive control and signal 
detection) predict unique variance in beer (as % of total fluid consumed) in the ad 
libitum taste test.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The effects of alcohol intoxication on ad libitum alcohol 
consumption will be partially mediated by changes in the different components of 
control. 
To examine whether changes in the different components of control partially mediate 
the effect of alcohol intoxication on ad libitum alcohol consumption, we will run a 
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within-subjects mediation analysis using MEMORE macro for SPSS (Montoya & 
Hayes, 2016). This will estimate the total, direct and indirect effects of alcohol 
intoxication on ad libitum alcohol consumption through changes in the different 
components of control (reactive control, proactive control and signal detection).   
 
Exploratory analyses  
We also plan to conduct exploratory analyses, for example, exploring differences in 
the number of errors made between blocks on the SST, as well as between the three 
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Appendices 4 Task schematics used in study four (chapter 
five) 
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Appendices 5 Pre-registration of an exploration of the 
associations between proactive control, working memory, 
alcohol sensitivity and overall alcohol use. 
Laura Baines Andrew Jones 
 
Introduction 
Inhibitory control is defined as the inability to suppress, postpone or alter a response 
that is no longer necessary or is inappropriate given the current situation (Logan et al, 
1984). Numerous laboratory studies have reported associations between inhibitory 
control and hazardous drinking (Christiansen et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014), and 
meta-analyses have demonstrated that inhibitory control is impaired in heavy 
drinkers/alcohol dependent patients compared to controls (Smith et al, 2014). In 
particular, exposure to alcohol-related cues is believed to impair inhibition (Jones et 
al, 2013), and research using alcohol cues embedded into Stop Signal and Go/No-Go 
tasks has supported this, demonstrating short-term deficits in inhibition (Jones & 
Field, 2015; Petit et al, 2012). 
This evidence however presents an over-simplistic view of inhibitory control 
as a reactive stopping response, whilst failing to recognise the complexity of the 
behaviour. A recent cognitive model (Verbruggen et al, 2014) has argued that 
inhibitory control involves a combination of sequential processes including: signal 
detection (identifying an inhibitory signal), followed by selecting and executing (or 
inhibiting) an appropriate action. Additionally, each sub-process is underpinned by 
other non-inhibitory processes, including proactive control and associative learning, 
both of which may play a significant role in substance use (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen 
et al., 2014). By deconstructing inhibition into these separate components we can gain 
a better understanding of the link between inhibition and alcohol-consumption. 
Specifically, some research has suggested that alcohol-cues may induce 
cognitive biases that effect the maintenance of proactive control and the execution of 
a reactive stopping response (Stacy & Wiers, 2010). It is possible that these cues 
compete with inhibitory signals in the environment for attentional selection (Pessoa et 
al, 2012) reducing the detection of inhibitory signals. Additionally, alcohol-related 
cues are especially salient for heavy drinkers (Sharma, 2017) which could explain the 
potential differences in the use of proactive control in heavy and light drinkers. For 
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example, using a face-word version of a Stroop task (followed by an alcohol or 
neutral word), Sharma (Sharma, 2017) demonstrated that the performance of the 
heavy drinkers, but not the light drinkers, was negatively affected by the context of 
the preceding image. Consequently, light drinkers were thought to be employing 
proactive control whereas heavy drinkers were using reactive control to complete the 
task. Nevertheless, it is still not fully understood whether the impairing effects of 
alcohol cues on inhibitory control arise from effects on proactive control or reactive 
control (or a combination of these). 
Furthermore, event-related potential (ERP) research has demonstrated that 
alcohol-related stimuli in particular captures the attention of individuals who self –
report low sensitivity (LS) to alcohol (e.g. (Bartholow et al, 2010; Fleming & 
Bartholow, 2014)). In a recent paper by Bailey & Bartholow (Bailey & Bartholow, 
2016), it was  reported that when LS individuals are faced with task irrelevant 
alcohol-related stimuli, they experience conflict. When this conflict is infrequent, 
these individuals can overcome it by using reactive control effectively, however, 
when this conflict increases, these individuals have difficultly using proactive control 
efficiently. Therefore, it is possible the individual differences in sensitivity to alcohol 
may contribute to the effective use of proactive and reactive control.  
Importantly, research has also demonstrated that performance in multiple 
cognitive domains can be predicted by Working Memory Capacity (WMC) 
(Richmond et al, 2015), which is ‘cognitive system responsible for providing access 
to information required for ongoing cognitive processes’ (Wilhem et al, 2013). 
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that individual differences in WMC may 
account for variance in the ability to implement proactive control (Richmond et al, 
2015). This is because WMC is essential to guide future behaviour through the 
storage of information in an active state (Redick, 2014). Despite this, it is still not 
fully understood which sub-processes of inhibitory control may be modulated by 
WMC. Consequently, the aim of this research is to explore the direct and indirect 
effects of exposure to alcohol cues on overall alcohol use via SSRT, proactive control 
and WMC. We also aim to investigate whether alcohol sensitivity and WMC are 
associated with the ability to implement proactive control. 
Hypothesis 1: Deficits in proactive control, reactive control, WMC and low 
alcohol sensitivity will be associated with alcohol use.  
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Hypothesis 2: There will be a direct association between exposure to alcohol-
related cues and overall alcohol use. There will also be an indirect effect of exposure 
to alcohol-related cues on overall alcohol use via deficits in proactive, reactive control 
and working memory i.e. Exposure to alcohol-related cues will be associated with 
deficits in proactive, control reactive control and WMC which in turn will be 
associated with overall alcohol use. 
Hypothesis 3: Alcohol sensitivity will predict the ability to implement 
proactive and reactive control. 
Hypothesis 4: The ability to implement Proactive control will be positively 




Heavy drinkers (N=116) will be recruited from the university and wider community 
using social media and advertisements. The number of participants was decided upon 
using a power calculation to find a medium effect size (F² = .15) at α = .05, and 90% 
power with five predictors (craving, reactive control, proactive control, working 
memory, alcohol sensitivity). Heavy drinking will be defined using UK government 
guidelines: males and females who consume > 14 UK units of alcohol per week (1 
UK unit = 8g of pure alcohol (Department of Health, 2008)). Other inclusion criteria 
will include being aged 18 or over, a fluent English speaker, self-reported motivation 
to reduce alcohol consumption and access to a laptop/PC/Ipad. Exclusion criteria will 
include a self-reported current or previous diagnosis of substance use disorder, 




Modified Self-ordered pointing task (SOPT; Petrides & Miller, 1982)). 
Participants will be shown sets of alcohol-related images e.g. pint of beer, glass of 
wine, rearranged in different positions in each trial. They will be asked to click on a 
different picture in a different position using the left hand mouse button (or directly 
on the screen if using a touch screen device) on each trial. Once they have clicked a 
picture the next trial begins and the pictures are rearranged. They will be asked to try 
not to click the same picture during that block. In the first block, participants will be 
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shown 6 pictures (3 x 2 array) followed by an 8-item (4 x 2 array) block, a 10-item (5 
x 2 array) block and finally a 12-item (4 x 3 array) block. The number of errors are 
used to measure WMC.  
 
Fig 1 Schematic of the Self-ordered pointing task 
 
 
Modified Stop-signal task (Verbruggen et al, 2014) 
Participants will complete a modified Stop-Signal task, which isolates proactive 
control and reactive control.  On each trial participants will be shown a white line in 
the middle of the screen and an alcohol-related word e.g. beer will appear either 
above or below the line. If the word appears above the line, participants should press 
the ‘Y’ key, if the word appears below the line, participants should press the ‘N’ key 
using the keyboard (these ‘keys’ will appear at the bottom on the screen on touch 
screen devices). A neutral word will also be presented but participants should not 
respond to these. The task will consist of two blocks: 
 
No-signal block: In this block participants will be asked to respond to the alcohol-
related word without interruption on 100% of trials. 
 
Signal block: During this block, participants will be asked to respond to the alcohol 
word without interruption on 75% of trials. On the remaining 25%, the white line will 
became thicker. Participants will be told to try and withhold their response to the 
word position if this happens. They will also be given standard stop signal task 
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instructions that sometimes this will be easy and sometimes this will be difficult or 
even impossible, but that they should not wait for the line to appear (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009). In the signal block, the delay between the presentation of the alcohol 
word and the stop signal will be adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis using a tracking 
procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). The initial delay will be 250 ms, if 
participants fail to inhibit the delay will decrease by 50 ms making subsequent 
inhibition easier, if participants successfully inhibit then the delay will increase by 50 
ms making subsequent inhibition more difficult. Proactive control is inferred from the 
degree of reaction time slowing on stop-signal blocks compared to no-signal blocks 
(this indicates motivation to inhibit on the stop-signal blocks). Reactive control is 
inferred from the Stop-signal Reaction Time in the signal block. 
 





The Alcohol use disorders identification test (Saunders et al, 1993) will be 
administered to measure hazardous drinking. This includes 10 fixed-response items 
and scores are measured between 0 and 40. Higher scores are indicative of greater 
alcohol consumption, with a score over 8 indicative of hazardous drinking. The 
Timeline follow back (Sobell & Sobell, 1990) will be administered to measure 
retrospective alcohol consumption in units (one UK unit = 8 g of alcohol), over the 
previous two weeks. A guide providing the number of units in standard UK drinks 
will also be provided to assist participants in calculating their alcohol consumption.  
The Alcohol Sensitivity Questionnaire (Fleming et al., 2016) also be administered. 
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This includes 15 items asking participants how many alcoholic drinks they must 
typically drink to experience alcohol-related effects. 9 of these items are associated 
with lower doses of alcohol and stimulation (e.g. increasing talkativeness) and 6 are 
associated with heavier doses of alcohol and sedation (e.g. passing out). Participants 
are first asked whether or not they have experienced each alcohol-related effect and if 
the answer is YES, they are asked to estimate the minimum number of drinks required 
to experience the lower dose effects or the maximum number of drinks they could 
consume without experiencing the higher dose effects. High scores on this 
questionnaire indicate low sensitivity to alcohol. Participants will also be asked when 
the last time was that they drank alcohol (more than one week ago, within the last 
week, in the last couple of days, yesterday, today, within the last couple of hours), 
how they would rate their motivation to reduce alcohol consumption from 0 (not at 
all) to 10 (extremely) and how they would rate their current urge to drink alcohol 
from 0 (no urge) to 10 (extreme urge). Lastly, participants will be asked if they were 
distracted during the computer tasks (Yes/No). We will also include a measure of 
attention in the AUDIT questionnaire in which participants will be asked to respond 
with YES.  
 
Procedure/Design 
The study will be completed using Inquisit Web 5.0 (Millisecond software). 
Participants will first be presented with an information sheet and consent form and 
will be asked to confirm they have read and understood both. Next, they will 
complete the SST followed by the SOPT. Participants will then give demographic 
information and complete the questionnaires. Following this, participants will be 
debriefed and thanked for participation. They will also have the opportunity to input 
their email address in order to be entered into a prize draw for a £50 amazon voucher.   
 
Proposed analyses 
For our dependent variable, we will compute a composite measure of alcohol use to 
better capture the general pattern of alcohol use, rather than a specific behaviour such 
as heavy episodic drinking. This is in line with some previous research (e.g. (Baines 
et al., 2016; Christiansen & Bloor, 2014; Fernie et al., 2013)). This will consist of 
scores on the AUDIT, units consumed as measured by the TLFB and frequency of 
heavy episodic drinking (6 + units in a single session for females 8 + for males: 
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Office of National statistics 2015), z-scored and combined. Stop Signal Reaction time 
will be calculated using the mean method (Verbruggen et al., 2013). The mean stop-
signal delay will be subtracted from the mean go reaction time for the stop-signal 
block.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Deficits in proactive, reactive control and working memory will 
predict overall alcohol use. Alcohol sensitivity will also predict overall alcohol use. 
We will conduct multiple regression analyses to investigate whether deficits in 
proactive control, reactive control and working memory predict overall alcohol use. 
We will also investigate if alcohol sensitivity predicts alcohol use. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a direct association between exposure to alcohol-related 
cues and overall alcohol use. There will also be an indirect effect of exposure to 
alcohol-related cues on overall alcohol use via deficits in proactive control, reactive 
control and WMC i.e. Exposure to alcohol-related cues will be associated with 
deficits in proactive control, reactive control and WMC which in turn will be 
associated with overall alcohol use. 
We will conduct structural equation modelling in order to assess both the direct and 
the indirect effects of exposure to alcohol cues on overall alcohol use via SSRT, 
proactive control and working memory.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Alcohol sensitivity will predict the ability to implement proactive and 
reactive control. 
We will conduct multiple regression analyses to investigate if alcohol sensitivity 
predicts deficits in proactive and reactive control.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The ability to implement Proactive control will be positively 
associated with working memory capacity. 
We will conduct a simple regression analysis to investigate if WMC is associated with 
the ability to implement proactive control.  
Exploratory analyses  
Any exploratory analyses will be labelled as such in the publication of the data. 
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Appendices 6 Pre-registration of the effect of acute stress 
and alcohol cues on proactive and reactive inhibitory control 
Laura Baines  Andrew Jones  Nicholas Fallon 
 
Research Questions 
Research has suggested that impairments in inhibitory control may fluctuate in 
response to various factors such as alcohol related cues, alcohol intoxication and 
stress. However, there is limited research focusing on the effect of acute stress on 
inhibitory control and the research that exists has produced contradictory findings. 
Furthermore, most of the research has failed to consider the complexity of inhibitory 
control. A recent cognitive model (Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014) has 
demonstrated that inhibitory control is not a single process, but rather is made up of 
sub-components; proactive control (the preparation of a response), signal detection 
(the identification of the inhibitory signal) and reactive control (the actual stopping of 
a response). Consequently, this study aims to investigate whether acute stress impairs 
proactive and reactive control in the presence of alcohol-related cues and whether 
these deficits relate to individual differences in alcohol consumption.  
     In addition, two event-related potential (ERP) 
components; N200 and P300 have been recognised as electrophysiological markers of 
inhibitory control. However, research investigating the effect of stress on inhibitory 
control has mainly focused on behavioural inhibition. Therefore, we aim to allow a 
more specific investigation into the underlying processes behind the effect of stress on 
sub-processes of inhibitory control and alcohol use using EEG data. Lastly, there is 
some evidence that individual differences in alcohol-sensitivity (AS) and/or working 
memory capacity (WMC) may account for differences in the use of proactive and 
reactive control. However, there is still relatively little known about this. Thus, we 
also aim to investigate if WMC and AS are associated with deficits in inhibitory 
control and the magnitude of P300. Hypothesis 1: Acute stress will cause deficits in 
i) proactive slowing, ii) proactive stopping and iii) reactive stopping in the presence 
of alcohol cues.  
Hypothesis 2: Participants will consume more beer (as a % of total fluid) 
following acute stress compared to the control task.     
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  Hypothesis 3: Following acute stress, impairments in proactive and reactive 
control will predict unique variance in alcohol consumption.  
Hypothesis 4: Acute stress will also lead to differences in the magnitude of 
P300 and N200 responses in the presence of alcohol cues. The magnitude of these 
responses to alcohol cues will be associated with individual differences in alcohol 
consumption.  
Hypothesis 5: Alcohol sensitivity will be associated with the ability to 
implement proactive and reactive control as well as amplitudes of P300 in response to 
alcohol cues. 
 Hypothesis 6: Stress will also have an effect on WMC. WM performance 
will be related to the ability to implement proactive control, P300 responses as well as 
ad libitum alcohol consumption. 
 
Data collection procedures 
Participants will be identified via the University of Liverpool's experiment 
recruitment scheme but also word of mouth and advertisements placed around campus 
and social media. We will also submit adverts to the announcement board on the 
University website. 
 Inclusion criteria:  
1. Are aged 18 years of over  
2. Fluent English speaker  
3. Are regular alcohol drinkers. Individuals should only participate if they 
drink at least 14 units of alcohol per week.  
4. Provide an alcohol breathalyser reading of 0.0 mg/l. As participants 
may be given alcohol during the experiment, we will ask them to 
provide a breathalyser reading before starting the experiment. 
5. Like the taste of beer  
Exclusion criteria:  
1. Have ever received treatment for an alcohol problem, or currently seeking 
such treatment.  
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2. Currently taking any medication which may be affected by drinking alcohol 
(e.g., antidepressants, benzodiazepine), this includes cold and flu medicine, 
such as paracetamol.  
3. Have a current or previous diagnosis of ADHD or a psychiatric disorder 
4. Currently suffering from or recovering from any illness that may increase your 
sensitivity to alcohol, e.g. cold, flu.  
5. FEMALES: Breastfeeding or pregnant. As the experiment may involve giving 
alcohol to drink, if individuals are pregnant or there is any possibility of being 
pregnant or have had unprotected sexual intercourse since their last period 
they will NOT be eligible to take part in this study. Participants will be able to 
self-exempt with out the researcher knowing their sexual history as the 
exclusion criteria is presented on the information sheet.  
6. Have an allergy to beer or fruit juice. Participants will be paid up to £30 of 
love2shop vouchers or 18 course points. We anticipate data collection to be 
completed by 1st September 2018. 
Sample size           
We aim to recruit 40 participants. The number of participants was decided upon using 
a power calculation to find a medium effect size (dz = .50) at α = .05, and 90% power. 
Data collection will be terminated when the stated number of participants are 
recruited.  
Variables                    
Manipulated variables include condition (within-subjects; stress/control), image in the 
stop-signal task (alcohol/neutral)  
Measured variables include: Ad-libitum alcohol consumption - using a bogus taste-
test (Jones et al, 2016) Alcohol sensitivity - inferred from the alcohol sensitivity 
questionnaire Proactive slowing - inferred from the degree of reaction time slowing 
on the stop-signal block compared to the no-signal block (this indicates motivation to 
inhibit on the stop-signal blocks). Proactive stopping - inferred from the proportion of 
inhibitory failures on the cued stop-signal trials in the signal block (as these involve 
preparation of responses). Reactive stopping - inferred as the stop signal reaction time 
in the signal block. Working memory capacity - inferred from the number of errors in 
the self-ordered pointing task. P300 - inferred from the largest positive peak following 
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presentation of the stop signal. N200 - inferred from the first negative peak occurring 
prior to the P300. Fz, Pz, Cz - these are midline electrodes inferred from the EEG.  
Indices                  
SSRT will be calculated using the mean method (Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 
2013). The mean stop-signal delay will be subtracted from the mean go reaction time 
for the signal block separately for each condition. Proactive slowing will be calculated 
by finding the mean of the reaction times for go only trials in the signal blocks 
separately for each condition. We then will subtract the mean reaction times for the 
no-signal block from the go only means. Proactive inhibition will be calculated using 
the proportion of inhibition failures separately for each condition. 
Design plan 
This experiment uses a within-subjects design. Participants will complete both a 
control session and a stress session, the order of which will be counterbalanced. 
 
Analysis plan 
Manipulation check: We will run a 2 (condition; control, stress) x 3 time (before 
manipulation, after manipulation, before debriefing) repeated measures ANOVA in 
order to check the manipulation of stress has worked.  
Hypothesis 1: Deficits in reactive control will be investigated using a 2 (condition; 
control, stress) x 2 (image; alcohol, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA on SSRTS in 
the signal block. The same will be conducted on the proportion of inhibition errors in 
the signal block to investigate proactive stopping. We will also conduct a 2 
(condition; control, stress) x 2 (block; no-signal, signal) x 2 (image; alcohol, neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA on go reaction times to measure proactive slowing.  
Hypothesis 2: A paired samples t-test will be conducted on the beer consumed (as a 
% of total fluid) in the ad libitum taste test between the stress condition and control 
condition.  
Hypothesis 3: Multiple regressions will be conducted investigating if proactive and 
reactive control predict unique variance in beer consumed (as % of total fluid) in the 
ad libitum taste test for each condition (stress, control) separately. 
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 Hypothesis 4: 2 (condition: Stress vs No-Stress) x 2 (image: Alcohol vs Neutral) x 3 
(Electrode: Fz, Cz, Pz) repeated measures ANOVAS will be conducted on P300 and 
N200 mean amplitudes to investigate differences following stress.  
Hypothesis 5: Multiple regression analyses will be conducted to investigate if alcohol 
sensitivity predicts deficits in proactive and reactive control as well as P300 
amplitudes separately across conditions. 
 Hypothesis 6: A paired samples t-test will be conducted on the number of errors 
made in the self-ordered pointing task between conditions (stress, control). We will 
then run multiple regression analyses to investigate if working memory capacity is 
associated with proactive control, P300 magnitudes and beer consumed in the ad 
libitum taste test. Main effects and interactions will be investigated using the 
appropriate comparisons. Any other analyses will be labelled as exploratory.  
Transformations                   
Mean reaction times will be subjected to a trimming procedure; reaction times that are 
less than 200 ms or more than 2000 ms or 3 standard deviations outside of the 
individual mean will be removed. 
 
Follow-up analyses 
Significant main effects and interactions will be investigated using the appropriate 
comparisons. The nature of interactions will determine the number of comparisons 
carried out. We will report all comparisons, including those that are non-significant. 




We will use p is less than .05 criteria for determining if the analyses suggests that the 
results are significantly different from those expected if the null hypothesis were true. 
We will use two-tailed tests for each analysis. 
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Data exclusion                      
We will examine box-and-whisker plots of our dependent variables and outliers will 
be removed. We will also disclose if the results are affected when removed.  
Missing data 
Participants with missing data will be excluded from the analysis. 
 






Fig 2 Task schematic of Self-Ordered Pointing task 
 
 
 
 
 
